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Summary  
 
This research aims to examine the effects of regulations and institutions on key 
decisions of a firm. These include firm’s capital structure and investment decisions, which in 
turn affect firm performance. In particular, we consider  India’s  emerging market economy and 
the UK’s developed economy as specific case studies.  
The Thesis consists of three key empirical papers. In the first paper, we use the 
introduction and completion of Clause 49, a transparency and disclosure reform aimed at 
strengthening investor protection, as a natural experiment to estimate the effect of increased 
disclosure on reliance of debt/equity using firm-level panel data for the period 1996-2014. This 
helps us to redress the potential endogeneity of firm-level disclosure on capital structure 
decisions. Estimates of difference-in-difference models suggest that the introduction and 
completion of Clause 49 led to a greater (lower) reliance on equity (debt) and also a reduction 
in reliance on bank loans among domestic listed (relative to cross-listed) Indian firms in our 
sample; however, similar effect was not observed among firms belonging to business groups. 
We then explore possible channels through which increased disclosure can influence capital 
structure choices of different groups of firms. 
In the second paper, we examine the effects of executive compensation on corporate 
capital structure and market performance using the introduction of Director’s Remuneration 
Regulation (DRR2013) in the UK as a natural experiment. Given the potential endogeneity of 
executive compensation, we use the introduction of DRR2013 as a natural experiment to 
identify the causal effect of executive compensation on corporate capital structure in the UK. 
Results from our analysis suggest that an increase in equity based compensation share decreases 
firm’s reliance on debt and improves firm performance; an increase in bonus compensation 
share, however, leads to an increase in reliance on debt but doesn’t seem to have a significant 
  
 
effect on performance. We attribute these results  to the debt agency theory, after controlling 
for managerial over-confidence indices. 
Finally, the last paper uses India’s historical land ceiling legislation to estimate its effect 
on land acquisition for industries affecting corporate investment in India. We argue that the 
implementation of the land ceiling legislations had increased the transaction costs of buying 
land and the price premium firms pay when acquiring land, thus inducing firms to invest less 
in land and capital. Moreover, the adverse effect of land ceiling legislations is worse in states 
with more fertile land that had lower ceiling size under the ceiling legislation. Analysis using 
the state-level data over 1960-85 during the period most of these legislations were formulated 
confirms our conjecture; the adverse effects of lower ceiling size on corporate investment  seem 
to persist in the long- run over 1960-2015. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1. Context 
 
 
Success of publicly traded companies critically depends on success of “delegated monitoring 
(given separation of control & ownership), which in turn depends on complex systems of 
supporting institutions and transparent flow of information that promote the efficient 
governance. The public outcry over the recent corporate scandals around the globe has 
generated demands for accountability and responsibility in corporate behaviour. It is widely 
believed that it will take more than just corporate leadership to restore public confidence in our 
corporations and capital markets, which are fundamental for the healthy growth of the sector. 
Consequently, regulatory reforms including increased transparency and disclosure, 
shareholders’ activism on executive compensation as well as effective law enforcement has 
assumed increasing importance around the world. In this context, the present dissertation 
chooses three issues pertaining to firm financing, executive compensation and land acquisition 
for industries to assess the impact of public policies in India and the United Kingdom. 
 Public policies or interventions are usually introduced/implemented to redress some 
public concerns. Whether it is the government trying to implement policies for public welfare 
or the regulatory authorities trying to protect investors, their success can only be assessed by 
undertaking an adequate policy evaluation exercise. The need to quantitatively identify the 
effects of a policy is therefore indisputable, as it allows the measurement of its real effects and 
a comparison with the expected ones. The policy evaluation exercise also gives essential and 
valuable evidence for future policy discourse. This has led to a growing literature on causal 
analyses of various public policy interventions to aid the process of evidence-based policy 
making (Bortolotti, et al. 2011) and we hope to contribute to the literature. 
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1.2. Aims and objectives 
 
 The present dissertation chooses to study the effects of three different public interventions 
on corporate decisions pertaining to firm’s financing or capital structure, performance as well 
as investment in total and fixed capital.   
 This thesis is a collection of three papers focusing on recent issues in current public 
policy debate. Transparency is a key driver of corporate trust/reputation, though it is an area 
were companies commonly underperform. Thus, there is increasing external and internal 
pressure on organizations to become more transparent. In this context, the first empirical 
chapter analyses the effect of increased disclosure on corporate financing decisions of listed 
firms and how it affected firms’ choice of debt and equity financing that remains little 
understood. In this respect, we use India’s Clause 49 regulations, which introduced increased 
transparency and disclosure of Indian listed companies in the early Millennium, as a natural 
experiment with a view to assess the causal impact of increased disclosure.  
Standard theories of corporate capital structure suggests that firms choose capital 
structure to maximise firm value. Yet there is now a growing literature claiming that many firm 
decisions are driven not by considerations of firm value maximisation, but by CEO’s personal 
interests. In this context, the second empirical chapter examines the effect of CEO 
compensation on various firm decisions including capital structure and firm performance, 
utilising the 2013  Directors’ Remuneration Regulation (or DRR 2013 in short) in the UK that 
introduced compulsory disclosure of executive compensation in an attempt to limit excessive 
executive compensation.   
Firms in India often find it difficult to purchase land for industries. This often leads to 
tussles between farmers, industrialists and government. While the reasons behind this difficulty 
are unclear, anecdotal evidence suggests that the consequences are both visible and sizeable: 
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projects are delayed, relocated, or cancelled. The final chapter explores the impact of post-
independence land ceiling legislations on corporate investment in total and fixed capital in the 
Indian states, with implications for further interventions in this respect.  
While these three empirical chapters study different contexts and different outcome 
variables, to some extent, thus contributing to different strands of literature, the unifying theme 
of the thesis has been the assessment of the impact of public policies and regulations on 
corporate finance, investment and performance, with implications for corporate governance, 
which also contribute to the ongoing public policy debate.  
The thesis is thus a piece of applied empirical research in the field of corporate finance 
and corporate governance. One of the most prevalent and difficult issues confronted by such 
empirical studies is endogeneity, which often  leads to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible (Roberts &Whited, 2012). In many 
cases, endogeneity can be severe enough to reverse even qualitative inference. The thesis is 
therefore an attempt to overcome these endogeneity concerns and establish a causal relationship 
in key decisions pertaining to firm financing, investment that inevitably affect firm 
performance, using natural experimental designs triggered by the aforementioned public policy 
interventions. As such, it uses novel instrumental variables and difference-in-differences 
methods. 
 Each of the chapters makes use of a policy intervention to break the circularity between 
the outcome variable and the potentially endogenous key explanatory variable. The latter allows 
us to assess the impact of the, beneficial or detrimental, of these policy interventions and also 
offers scope for further policy interventions. This assessment is important and helpful not only 
for policy makers from the point of view of improving or bringing about appropriate 
amendments but also for those affected by it including debtors/shareholders, managers/ 
employees, landowners/farmers.  
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These analyses focus on two countries, India and the UK. While both countries are 
members of the Commonwealth Organisation since 1949, India, unlike the UK, suffer from 
weaker institutions. As such, the thesis allows us to compare and contrast the effectiveness of 
public policies on selected corporate decisions, namely, corporate capital structure, in these two 
countries. This in turn enables me to draw implications for future policies.  
 
1.3. Main findings  
 
In the first paper titled “Regulations and Firm Financing: Impact of Clause 49 in India” 
we aim to assess the impact of increased transparency and disclosure, using Clause 49 
regulations introduced by the Security and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 2000 as a 
potential natural experiment, on various measure of corporate capital structure. Since the Clause 
49 directly targeted the Indian domestic listed (as opposed to cross-listed Indian firms, which 
form our control group) companies only, we consider them as the treated firms and use 
difference in difference model to estimate the differential effect of Clause 49 on treated (relative 
to control) firms after the 2000 introduction as well as 2006 completion of Clause 49. We 
compile Orbis firm-level panel data available from Bureau van Djik and Prowess ownership 
data available from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (or CMIE for short) for the 
period 1996-2012. Using this data, we compare the capital structure of the treated domestic 
listed firms with the cross-listed firms (control group) before and after the 
introduction/implementation of the Clause 49. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that 
the introduction/completion of Clause 49 had led to a greater (lower) reliance on equity (debt) 
and also a reduction in reliance on bank loans among domestic listed (relative to cross-listed) 
Indian firms in our sample. These effects are more pronounced when we consider the 
completion (rather than the introduction) of the reform. We argue and show some suggestive 
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evidence that these results can be attributed to the reduced information asymmetry between 
managers and investors and increased investor protection in the post-regulation years. The 
effectiveness of the reform was, however, limited among the sub-sample of firms affiliated to 
business groups who continued to have greater reliance on debt and no change in public equity 
or public debt. Results are robust to alternative specifications and samples.  
In the second paper titled “Effect of Managerial Compensation on Capital Structure and 
Performance - Evidence from a natural experiment in the UK,” we examine the effects of 
executive compensation on corporate capital structure and performance. Given the potential 
endogeneity of executive compensation in determining capital structure, we use the 2013 
introduction of Director’s Remuneration Regulation or DRR 2013 for short as a natural 
experiment to identify the causal effect of executive compensation on corporate capital structure 
in the UK. The new regulation significantly enhanced the information available to investors 
regarding executive pay and incorporated a requirement for the board to seek approval from the 
shareholders. In this respect, we distinguish between shares of different components of 
compensation, namely, cash, equity and bonus, in total compensation, arguing that more equity 
compensation may align executives with the shareholders while more bonuses may encourage 
excessive risk taking. Since the DRR directly targeted the UK domestic listed (as opposed to 
cross-listed) companies only, we consider them as the treated firms and exploit the exogenous 
variation in executive compensation after the introduction of the reform among treated and 
control firms to identify the causal effect of the increased disclosure of executive compensation 
on various corporate capital structure measures. Given the circularity between executive 
compensation and corporate capital structure, we use a two-stage least square instrumental 
variable method. Using the data from Datastream and Boardex over a period of 2010-16, we 
first determine various compensation ratios in terms of the exogenously given instrumental 
variables (IV) : Treated (that takes a value 1 for the domestic listed firms and 0 for others and 
  
6 
 
defined by the DRR 2013 administrative rule), DRR (that takes a value 1 for 2014-16 and 0 
otherwise) and their interactions (among other controls). We find that the reform had led to an 
increase in equity and bonus components of compensation though it had no significant changes 
in cash compensation among the treated (relative to the control) firms after the reform. These 
results are compatible with the evidence that there has been limited shareholders’ dissent 
following the introduction of the regulation and thus raise questions about the effectiveness of 
DRR 2013 on executive compensation. At the second stage, we use the predicted values of 
equity and bonus shares from the first stage to determine various capital structure measures, 
after controlling for all other factors that may also influence capital structure. These second 
stage IV estimates suggest that the higher bonuses enhance firms’ reliance on debt while higher 
equity compensation share lowers it. Third, higher equity tends to boost firms’ market 
performance while higher bonuses do not have any significant effect on it. In general these 
results are supportive of our hypotheses: greater equity compensation shares help aligning the 
executives with the firm resulting in greater reliance on equity financing, greater market 
monitoring and hence better performance; in contrast, greater bonus compensations tend to 
encourage greater risk-taking thus explaining higher reliance on debt and no boost to 
performance. These results are robust to alternative specifications and possible executive 
behavioural prospects and contribute to the limited UK literature not only in terms of the 
identification strategy, but also in terms of identifying the contributions of individual 
components of executive compensation, highlighting the contrasting effects of equity and bonus 
compensation shares on corporate capital structure that remain rather underexplored. 
 Finally in the third paper titled “An Unintended Consequence of Historical Land Ceiling 
Legislations:  Impact on Land Acquisition and Corporate Investment in India,” we aim to study 
the impact of historical land reform legislations, particularly that related to the land ceiling size, 
on corporate investment in India’s densely populated economy where the tussle between 
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farmers and industrialists/governments often becomes a politically explosive issue. India’s 
historical land ceiling legislations paved the way to allocate excess land over and above a 
maximum land ceiling to landless. Historically, the size of the land ceiling in India varied with 
land fertility across the states such that states with more fertile land tend to have lower land 
ceilings size as determined by the ceiling legislation. This has led to fragmentation of land and 
more so in states with more fertile land that had lower ceiling sizes. We argue that the 
transaction costs of acquiring land are higher in states with lower size of land ceilings; 
accordingly, land acquisition for industrialisation would require permission from a larger 
number of landowners since average landholding size tend to be typically smaller in the states 
with lower ceilings. Our identifying mechanism relies on the fact that the variation in land 
ceiling size across the states was dependent on land fertility and as such is beyond the control 
of the state. We first use the historic state-level panel data compiled from various official 
sources over 1960-85, a period that saw the enactment of most land reform legislations across 
the Indian states. Later we also use firm-level panel data for more recent years 1996-2012 to 
explore the long-term effects of the historic land ceiling legislations. Ceteris paribus, there is 
evidence from our analysis that corporate investment in fixed and total capital is less in states 
where the size of the ceilings legislation was low. The detrimental effects of land ceiling 
legislations persist in the long run too. Further analysis highlights that the adverse ceiling effect 
on capital investment, especially for fixed capital, tends to be more pertinent when firms are 
more land intensive (relative to industry level land intensity). 
 
1.4. Key contribution   
 
Following on from our discussion above, the empirical chapters in the thesis jointly 
contribute to the capital structure and investment literature as each of them aim to determine 
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the casual effects of (i) increased disclosure on capital structure (Paper 1), (ii) that of executive 
compensation on capital structure (paper 2) and (iii) that of land ceiling size on average land 
holding as well as corporate investment in total and fixed capital (paper 3). Given its objectives, 
each paper contributes to somewhat different strands of the literature including corporate 
finance, corporate governance, corporate investment, industrial location, managerial 
compensation as well as developmental economics literature (especially when dealing with the 
two papers focusing on India).  
Results from paper 1 contribute to the literature on empirical capital structure that 
primarily focuses on the role of various firm characteristics (Frank and Goyal, 2009). However 
since the Asian Crisis of 1997, international and donor organisations have emphasized the role 
of various corporate governance reforms to promote growth. To the best of our knowledge, ours 
is the first paper that analyses the effect of increased disclosure using Clause 49 as a natural 
experiment, thus redressing the endogeneity bias prevalent in the literature that predominantly 
uses firm-level disclosure measures. Accordingly, we explore different channels through which 
increased disclosure of various financial, ownership and management information may impact 
different capital structure measures, which remains rather unexplored in the literature. Use of 
Clause 49 as a natural experiment not only helps us to address the identification issue that the 
use of firm level corporate governance measures suffer from within the empirical capital 
structure literature, but also to identify the specific mechanism(s) through which Clause 49 
affected the capital structure of treated domestic listed (relative to cross-listed) firms in our 
sample. Although it is a case of India, results of this study have important implications beyond 
India’s border and especially for other emerging countries undertaking similar reforms.  
Paper 2 examines the effect of executive compensation on corporate capital structure 
measures and firm performance in the UK. It contributes to the existing literature (John & John 
(1993); Murphy (1999); Ortiz-Molina (2007) etc.) in two ways.  First, it to redresses the 
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simultaneity and circularity between executive compensation shares and corporate capital 
structure using DRR 2013 as a natural experiment. Accordingly, we identify a causal effect of 
executive compensation on capital structure. Second, unlike the bulk of the empirical capital 
structure literature, we identify that different components of CEO compensation package, 
namely, the equity and bonus components, have differential impact on firm-level capital 
structure that remains rather unexplored. While DRR 2013 (like its predecessors) had limited 
impact on executive compensation because it did not stir up shareholders’ activism, it generated 
some mixed effects on capital structure and performance. Our results highlight the relative 
benefits of equity based compensation that lowers reliance on debt and boosts performance; we 
argue that these results are mainly driven by the disclosure of the executive compensation that 
informs company creditors which in turn gives credence to the debt-agency theory. In contrast 
higher cash-based bonus compensation seems to generate some undesirable effects on corporate 
capital structure in our sample, as it increases firms’ reliance on debt while failing to boost 
firms’ market performance. Finally, the debate on executive compensation is not only a 
corporate issue in the UK, recent debates has seen it being extended to the higher education 
sector as well (e.g., see https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/jan/09/universities-vice-
chancellors-excessive-pay-new-guidelines) – thus our analysis yields important implications 
for the ongoing public policy debate on executive pay in the corporate as well as the higher 
education sector. 
Finally, paper 3 integrates different strands of the literature, namely, the traditional 
corporate investment literature, the industrial economics literature and also the development 
economics literature. Using historical state-level panel data for sixteen major Indian states from 
1960 to 1985, we test our hypotheses (see section 4.4.1.). Our identification mechanism relies 
on the fact that the ceiling size is beyond the control of the state authority. This is because, by 
and large, land ceilings were determined by the share of food crops before 1971 and by the 
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quality of the soil from 1971 onwards. Neither characteristic can be changed by the state 
government since the choice of crops grown on a plot is a decision of the land user, and soil 
quality is determined by the nature and historical state boundaries. As such land ceiling sizes 
can be considered exogenous. The results from our empirical analysis are supportive of the 
conjecture that India’s land ceiling legislations lead to lower corporate investment in capital. 
We also find that the negative on corporate investment is larger in the states with more stringent 
land ceiling size. We also show that more stringent land ceilings in a state are associated with 
lower number of registered firms and lower industrialisation. To the best of our knowledge, 
ours is the first study to assess the impact of land ceilings legislations on corporate investment 
in fixed and total capital. In this respect, we contribute to the industrial location literature 
(Deichmann et al. (2008); Lall and Chakravorty (2005); Mukin and Nunnenkamp (2010)), 
highlighting that greater transaction cost of accessing land in states with lower ceiling size 
(because of their more fertile land) is a key driver of investors’ choice of industrial location, 
thus explaining the current pattern of industrialisation in modern India. The results also 
highlights the importance of local rather than a national policy of land acquisition, e.g., Land 
Bill 2013, 2015, for industries in India; it thus contributes to the ongoing debate on land 
acquisition policies in other land scarce populous countries as well.  
 Overall hundred percent compliance with the corporate regulations has not been 
achieved anywhere in the world. But the most developed countries, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Canada have come the closest to full compliance. In contrast, 
despite ongoing reforms and some progress, investors and creditors are encountering problems 
of lack of transparency and disclosure, weak protection of minority shareholders or weak 
creditor rights in many emerging countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Russia and Turkey. Our analyses of the impact of corporate governance reforms in 
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India (paper 1) and UK (paper 2) may thus offer a comparative perspective for the success of 
these regulatory reforms.    
 
1.5. Plan of the dissertation 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 analyses the effect of increased disclosure on 
corporate capital structure in India while Chapter 3 assesses the impact of executive 
compensation on corporate capital structure measures. Chapter 4 examines the impact India’s 
historical land ceiling legislations on average cultivable land holding size and also on corporate 
investment in fixed and total capital. The final chapter 5 concludes.   
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Chapter 2: Increased Disclosure and Firm Financing: Assessing the 
Impact of Clause 49 in India 
 
 
Chapter Summary: This chapter provides new evidence of the effect of increased disclosure 
on corporate capital structure. Using the Clause 49 regulations introduced by the Security and 
Exchange Board of India in 2000 as a potential exogenous natural experiment, we assess the 
impact of the introduction as well as the completion of the reform on selected financial leverage 
measures of listed Indian firms. The reform particularly strengthened investor protection 
through introduction of various transparency and disclosure rules as well as securing board 
independence. Difference-in-difference estimates using firm-level panel data for the period 
1996-2014 suggest that the introduction and completion of Clause 49 has led to a greater (lower) 
reliance on equity (debt) and also a reduction in reliance on bank loans among domestic listed 
(relative to cross-listed) Indian firms in our sample. These effects are more pronounced when 
we consider the completion rather than the introduction of the reform. We argue that these 
results can be attributed to the reduced information asymmetry between managers and investors 
that enhanced increased investor protection in the post-regulation years. The chapter also 
identifies heterogeneous impact of the reform among firms affiliated to business groups who 
have access to the group’s internal market; the latter challenges the effectiveness of the reform 
among this subgroup.  
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2.1. Introduction  
 
Access to finance is the key to assist the formation of new firms, which allows firms, 
new and old, to take advantage of opportunities to invest and grow. Firms strategically choose 
a combination of debt and equity finance in order to finance its daily activities with an aim to 
lower the cost of capital and maximize the value of the firm. 
Recent literature has emphasized the role of firm’s corporate governance measures 
including board composition, board size, outside directors, ownership concentration, CEO 
duality as possible determinants of firms’ capital structure decisions, as opposed to traditional 
determinants such as size, age, growth, non-debt tax shield, liquidity, intangibility, profitability 
etc.  (see Frank & Goyal, 2009 for a recent survey of the existing literature). Establishing a 
causal relation between corporate governance and firm financing is difficult. This is because a 
firm’s corporate governance measures are chosen by the firm itself and as such are likely to be 
potentially endogenous, making the resultant estimates to be biased. In this chapter, We try to 
redress this problem and exploit the exogenous variation in a firm’s corporate governance 
standard arising from the introduction of a new law, namely, Clause 49 in India.  
There has been enormous change in the Indian corporate governance framework over 
the past 15 years. Contributing to this change is India's rapid growth together with an increase 
in foreign direct investment, an increased presence of institutional investors, and a growing 
need of Indian companies to access capital markets. Clause 49 was first introduced in 2000 and 
amended in 2004 while its implementation was completed in 2006. The law has various 
components pertaining to board composition necessitating the appointment of independent 
directors, transparency and disclosure of financial and operational information, related party 
transactions and also appointment of an independent audit committee.1 But arguably the 
effectiveness of these regulations would remain unknown if transparency and disclosure rules 
                                                          
1 See further discussion in section 2.2. 
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were not in place and hence we consider this to be the key component of Clause 49. As such, 
we expect the reform to reduce the asymmetry of information between controlling and non-
controlling owners or other dispersed investors (later we also test this) with a view to assure the 
latter. With the reduction of asymmetric information after the reform, we expect that equity 
becomes a cheaper source of financing relative to debt. We thus argue that the equity financing 
is likely to increase while debt financing is likely to decrease after the introduction of Clause 
49 which in turn is likely to lower financial leverage of listed firms. We also hypothesize that 
the reform that strengthened investor’s protection through its various components discussed 
above is likely to enhance the relative attractiveness of public as opposed to private debt. 
Further we explore the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of the reform between firms that 
are members of business groups and those that are not. The underlying idea is that the business 
group firms tend to be opaque and also have access to the internal capital market within the 
group, thus limiting the impact of the reform on capital structure of firms belonging to business 
groups.  
We primarily use Orbis firm-level data for 1996-2014 to test these hypotheses. We use 
the difference-in-difference method to compare the capital structure of treated domestic listed 
Indian firms with the cross-listed ones. We use the cross listed Indian firms as our control group 
because these firms, being regulated by foreign stock exchanges, have already been subject to 
requirements similar to the ones in Clause 49. Cross-listed firms are thus less likely to be subject 
to the changes in regulation, making domestic listed firms the prime targets of Clause 49.  
Our empirical strategy has thus been to compare the capital structure of the treated 
domestic listed firms with the cross-listed firms (control group) before and after the 
introduction/implementation of the reform. The rationale for doing this is to exploit the 
variation in the effect of exogenous introduction of CG reform between treatment and control 
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group before and after Clause 49 with a view to identify the causal impact of the reform on 
selected capital structure measures. 
Results suggest that following the passage of the reform domestically listed Indian firms 
have lower leverage as compared to cross listed Indian firms.  This is consistent with our view 
that debt becomes suboptimal after the reform. We also show that the reform improved the 
earnings quality of treated firms in the post-2006 years in our sample, which in turn supports 
our conjecture that the increase in equity after the reform is due to better information being 
available to all investors. Consistent with the decrease in information asymmetry between 
controlling owners and dispersed investors, we also find some evidence of a greater reliance on 
public debt instead of private debt, though this effect has been rather weak in our sample.  
Finally, the effectiveness of the reform was limited among the sub-sample of firms affiliated to 
business groups who continued to have greater reliance on debt through access to their internal 
capital market; there is also no change in public equity or public debt. Results are robust to 
alternative specifications and samples.  
These results contribute to a sizeable literature on empirical capital structure that 
primarily focuses on the role of various firm characteristics (Frank and Goyal, 2009). However 
since the Asian Crisis of 1997, international and donor organisations have emphasized the role 
of various corporate governance reforms to promote growth. Using the case of Clause 49 we 
explore different channels through which this reform may impact different components of 
capital structure differently, which remains rather unexplored in the literature (see further 
discussion in section 2.2). It helps us not only to address the identification issue that the use of 
firm level corporate governance measures suffer from within the empirical capital structure 
literature, but also to identify the specific mechanism(s) through which Clause 49 affected the 
capital structure of treated domestic listed (relative to cross-listed) firms in our sample. 
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Although it is a case of India, results of this study have important implications beyond India’s 
border and especially for other emerging countries undertaking similar reforms.  
 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the literature, background and 
hypotheses while Section 2.3 explains data and methodology. Section 2.4 discusses the results 
while the final Section 2.5 concludes.  
 
2.2. Literature, background and hypotheses 
 
2.2.1. Literature 
 
The capital structure theory dates back the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). According to their capital structure irrelevance theory, value of the firm is independent 
of how firms choose to invest their investments and what mix of debt and equity they maintain.  
However, unrealistic simplified assumptions raised concerns and in Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) the perfect market assumption was relaxed and corporate taxes were included. As a 
result, an increase in the level of debt led to an increase in the value of the firm since interest 
paid is tax- deductible. 
However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) did not take into account bankruptcy‐related 
costs. The findings in Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) encouraged many researchers to 
explore further the drivers of corporate capital‐structure decisions. Until now, there has been 
no general agreement about the capital‐structure debate. As a result, it is still unclear as to what 
drives capital‐structure decisions. 
There are two competing theories of capital structure. The trade-off theory where 
various costs and benefits are evaluated to achieve the optimal debt equity ratio and pecking 
order theory, where firms prioritize their sources of financing, first preferring internal financing, 
and then debt, lastly raising equity as a “last resort” (Myers, 1984). He examined various capital 
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structure theories and called it the capital-structure puzzle as there was no general consensus to 
what drives financing decisions. Taxes, agency conflicts, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, 
varying financial market opportunities are various elements used in various models to 
determine capital structure measures.  (See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey of the 
development of this theory as of 1991).  
Myers and Majluf (1984) then tried to explore the role of asymmetric information and 
capital structure decisions and found that leverage increases with the extent of the informational 
asymmetry and that cost of financing increases with asymmetric information and equity capital 
is more information sensitive than debt. “Firm-level asymmetric information considerations are 
important determinants of the cross section of level and change in leverage of U.S. firms over 
the past three decades” (Bharath et al. 2008). Petacchi (2015) display a positive relationship 
between information asymmetry and debt. This model of capital structure including the role 
information asymmetry in financing decisions is particularly important to us since the main aim 
of the corporate governance reform (Clause 49) was to enhance investor protection via 
transparency and disclosure. Increase in transparency and disclosures is expected to reassure 
investors, who are then less hesitant which has makes debt financing sub-optimal and results in 
decreased corporate leverage.  
La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 2000) initiated the law and finance literature that highlights 
the role of rules of law, investor protection and enforcement and show that countries with poorer 
investor protection (measured by both legal rules and the quality of enforcement) tend to have 
smaller and narrower capital markets. They also established the role of Sharholders’ rights, 
antidirectors’ rights on various measures of external finance. 
Recently, a growing amount of literature has focused on the possible roles of various 
corporate governance measures such as board size, outside directors, ownership concentration, 
CEO duality, remuneration of directors on capital-structure choice of a firms.  For instance, 
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Berger et al. (1997) found a significant and negative relationship between board size and 
leverage while Wiwattanakantang (1999) found a negative relation between board size and 
leverage although the relevant coefficient was statistically insignificant. Further Abor (2007) 
showed a direct relationship between board size and capital structure while Wen et al. (2002) 
found a positive, but insignificant relationship between board size and leverage.  
This ambiguity may arise from potential endogeneity of these corporate governance 
measures board size, outside directors etc. A firm’s corporate governance is likely to be 
potentially endogenous since these decisions are internally taken by the firm management 
themselves: just as board size may affect leverage, size of leverage may also affect board size, 
thus making these estimates potentially biased. Pal et al. (2016), for example, argue that firm-
level corporate governance measures are likely to be potentially endogenous to determining 
firm performance. Accordingly they used the Russian transparency and disclosure reform to 
identify the causal effect of CG on various firm performance measures.  In a similar vein, we 
use the introduction/completion of Clause 49 as a natural experiment to break this simultaneity 
between corporate governance measures and firm leverage, thus departing from the existing 
literature. The underlying argument is that the introduction of the reform Clause 49 introduced 
by the government is exogenous to the firm financing policies, which in turn provides a natural 
experimental framework to overcome the problem of endogeneity.  Accordingly, we develop 
our methodology to identify the differential performance of treated domestic listed (relative to 
crosslisted) firms after the introduction/completion of Clause 49 (see section 2.3.2. on 
methodology). 
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2.2.2. Introduction of Clause 49 of the listing Agreement 
 
Over the past two decades there has been a revolutionary change in the Indian corporate 
governance. The growing presence of institutional investors, the increasing number of cross 
listed Indian companies and growing access to global capital markets have all propelled the 
Indian regulatory authorities (the Securities Exchange Board of India, SEBI) to amend the 
corporate governance system. Corporate scandals further spurred the need for stricter law and 
its enforcement.  In 2000 SEBI, on the persuasion of leading industrial groups and large firms 
introduced a set of rules and regulations via Clause 49 for listed companies in India. With the 
prime objective of investor protection, the Clause 49 laid a range of governance requirements 
(Afsharipour, 2014).  
In 1999, SEBI appointed a committee (the Birla Committee, under Shri Kumar 
Mangalam Birla), whose prime focus was to define the function and structure of the board and 
increase shareholder disclosure. Recommendations were also made regarding the role and 
composition of the audit committees, disclosure and transparency issues mainly amongst 
shareholders. This was to be stated in the company’s annual report. 
Birla Committee’s proposals was implemented by SEBI in 2000, thereby revising the 
current Listing Agreement. Clause 49 was thus incorporated as a new section in the previous 
Listing agreement. These rules—contained in Clause 49, a new section of the Listing 
Agreement—took effect in phases between 2000 and 2003. Initially, the reforms applied to 
newly listed and large companies, then to smaller companies, and ultimately to the vast majority 
of listed companies.  
After the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (as a consequence of the Enron Scandal 
in the United States), SEBI felt the need to evaluate the adequacy of the extant Clause 49 and 
appointed the Narayana Murthy Committee to amend the Clause 49 and further elevate 
transparency and insure compliance materialistically. Keeping the recent corporate governance 
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frauds and irregular compliance with the Clause 49 in mind the Murthy Committee was 
compelled to recommend stricter reform. The committee investigated a variety of governance 
issues mainly related to board structure and composition, composition of the audit committees 
and disclosure to shareholders. Apart from what the previous committee emphasised on, the 
Murthy Committee also altered the definition of independent directors in the then-existing 
Clause 49, in a view to set up a code of conduct for insiders. Further additions that the 
committee recommended were regarding nominee directors; financial literacy of the audit 
committee; and whistle-blowers. 
Directors nominated by financial institutions i.e. nominee directors were recommended 
to be excluded from the definition of independent directors. They had the same liabilities as any 
other director. Board members were also recommended to receive training on business risk 
management and the business model of the company. The committee gave considerable 
attention to the roles and responsibilities of the audit committees. All members of the audit 
committee were required to be “financially literate”. Whistle-blowers were given access to the 
audit committee without first having to inform their supervisors. All this was to be disclosed in 
the annual report of the company along with the compliance report. Table A 4 in the Appendix 
summarizes the key requirements of all components of the clause 49.  
  SEBI further amended Clause 49 in response to the Murthy Committee’s 
recommendations in 2004. However, implementation of these changes was delayed until 
January 1, 2006 due primarily to industry resistance and lack of preparedness to accept such 
wide-ranging reforms. 
One might argue that the introduction (in 2000) and implementation (in 2006) of the 
reform happened years apart and is not a sudden change in the Indian Corporate governance. 
To distinguish between the introduction and implementation of the reform, we construct two 
reform variables:  
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1) Introduction is captured by a binary variable Clause49_00 that takes a value 1 for t ≥ 
2000 when the reform was introduced and 0 otherwise. 
2) Completion is captured by a second binary variable Clause49_06 which takes a value 
1 for t ≥ 2006 when the reform was implemented and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Clause 49 reform: A timeline  
       1996                            2000                                      2004                                          2006                                            2014 
   
                         
 
 
                           Introduction of Clause 49        Amendments in the Clause 49       Implementation of the clause 49 
 
Without much loss of generality, one can argue that the introduction of transparency 
and disclosure rules was the crucial component of the reform. This is because in the absence of 
transparency and disclosure, adoption of the different components of Clause 49 by Indian firms 
would not be known to investors. As such, our hypotheses is closely linked to the introduction 
of transparency and disclosure that helped reduce the information asymmetry between 
shareholders and investors, thus inducing investors to make informed decisions.  
 
Implementation of the Reform  
 
The Clause 49 regulations were intended to protect investors through introduction of 
mandatory transparency and disclosure rules. Three main components of the reform which are 
likely to affect the financing decisions of the firm relate to changes in board composition, 
disclosure of financial statements, ownership and board management information and also 
appointment of an independent and qualified audit committee. But as we argued, T&D remains 
  
22 
 
its central tenets as the effectiveness of these regulations would remain unknown if transparency 
and disclosure rules were not in place.  
The reform was not mandatory, rather it adopted a ‘comply or explain’ approach to its 
implementation. The question therefore arises as to what drives the adoption of the reform. 
While the organisational literature has focused on efficiency and legitimacy (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo,2008) highlighting the role of common law vs civil 
law in a cross-country set-up, the corporate governance literature (e.g., Berglof and Pajuste, 
2005) has highlighted the role of  firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, ownership, leverage, 
market to book ratio).   
In order to understand the adoption of the reform, we consider published data on listed 
companies from Orbis and Prowess. It is evident that firm balance sheet and ownership 
information are available for all the listed firms in our sample. While balance sheet information 
has been available since the early 1990s as it is an essential listing requirement, ownership and 
board-composition information is available for the post-2006 years. We then collect the board 
composition data of the sample firms from Orbis that only provides the information for the 
latest year, i.e., the financial year ending 2015. There is confirmation that some level of T&D 
in financial/operational, ownership and board composition information is displayed by all firms. 
But the actual content of disclosure seems to vary somewhat across firms, especially when it 
comes to ownership and board composition. Most transparency is observed in financial 
information, which we consider to be the key component of Clause 49. However, least 
transparency appears to be observed with respect to board composition. Further analysis of the 
Orbis board composition data suggests that there is at least one independent director in 2,145 
out of our total sample of 2,493 companies, which makes up about 86% of the sample. l. Note 
that the Clause 49 has more specific requirement in terms of the number of independent 
directors:  at least one-third of the Board should comprise of independent directors, in case the 
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Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director and in case he is an executive director, at 
least half of the Board should comprise of independent directors. In 2015, less than 6% of the 
sample companies satisfied this condition. As such, it is fair to conclude that T&D in board 
management is least implemented. While we have information about different groups of 
shareholders, we were unable to trace information about related party transactions in published 
data.   
In terms of composition of the audit committee the Clause 49 requires companies to 
have a qualified and independent audit committee. The audit committee shall have a minimum 
of three directors as members and two-thirds of the members of audit committee shall be 
independent directors. It is difficult to examine this from the available Orbis data as it does not 
publish the composition of the audit committee. All we note is that at least one member from 
the audit committee is also a board member in most of the sample companies. Overall, we infer 
that most sample firms had adopted Clause 49, but only partially. 
 
2.2.3. Hypotheses 
 
In the light of our discussion in section 2.2.2, it is fair to argue, without any loss of 
generality, that the implementation of Clause 49 has improved T&D in various components, 
even if imperfectly. Accordingly, we develop our hypotheses in this section.  
Debt is optimal in the presence of asymmetric information between managers and 
bondholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This is because the payoff on debt contracts is less 
information sensitive as compared to the payoff on equity finance. Moreover, equity financing 
is generally expensive as stock prices are generally overpriced as good and bad firms are pooled 
in the capital market and it is expensive for firms as well as investors to distinguish the two 
types (Tirole, 2006).  
  
24 
 
 The pertinent question for us is why the introduction of Clause 49 would alter the choice 
between debt and equity. We argue that it is because it strengthened investor protection, which 
is central for boosting external financing. In many countries, expropriation of minority 
shareholders and creditors by the controlling shareholders is pervasive. When outside investors 
finance firms, they therefore face a risk, and sometimes near certainty, that the returns on their 
investments will never materialize because the controlling shareholders or managers simply 
keep them. La Porta et al. (1997, 2000) argue that the legal rules and the effectiveness of their 
enforcement shape these rights. When there are rules concerning shareholder rights, creditor’s 
rights and also bankruptcy laws (see Section 2.2.2 for further details in this respect) and when 
these laws are well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to finance firms. In 
this context, we argue that the Indian reform in terms of Clause 49 was aimed at reducing the 
asymmetric information between shareholders and investors, thus making debt sub-optimal in 
the post reform years. Since equity financing is more information sensitive, we expect that the 
reform is likely to boost the equity finance more relative to debt. Second, debt financing is a 
substitute mechanism to mitigate agency problems. As such debt serves as a disciplining device 
for mangers (Jensen 1986, Zwiebel, 1996). Increased board independence and disclosure 
enacted through Clause 49 is likely to enhance monitoring of mangers and hence would reduce 
the value of debt as a disciplining device, which may further lead to a decrease in firm leverage.   
Taken together we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis H1: Equity (debt) financing is likely to increase (decrease) with stronger 
corporate governance after Clause 49.  
 Investor protection is central for boosting external financing. When the rules, such as 
the voting rights of the shareholders and the reorganization and liquidation rights of the 
creditors are extensive and well enforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to finance 
firms. To a significant extent, potential shareholders and creditors finance firms because their 
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rights are protected by the law. Thus firm’s reputation alone is not sufficient to raise funds; law 
and its enforcement too are essential to securing firms. As such variation in law and its 
enforcement across countries explains the cross-country variation in access to external 
financing. In this respect, Perotti and Volpin (2007) show that an increase in investor protection, 
increases access to finance. Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) too argued that firms that operate 
in better and stronger legal environment find it easier to obtain finance. The pertinent question 
here is whether/how the introduction of Clause 49 can strengthen investor protection in India. 
On the one hand more transparency means that insiders’ opportunistic behaviour becomes less 
efficient so that they expropriate less and their private benefits of control diminish. On the other 
hand, greater transparency and disclosure of firms’ financial, managerial and governance 
decision means that investors are making more informed choices. In this respect, the crucial 
regulations pertain to disclosure and accounting rules, which provide investors, especially 
creditors with the information they need to exercise other rights. Laws protecting creditors deal 
with bankruptcy procedures, and include measures that enable creditors to repossess collateral, 
to protect their seniority, and to make it harder for firms to seek court protection in 
reorganization. Taken together introduction of Clause 49 makes it easier to co-ordinate 
dispersed shareholders and assess the risks involved, which in turn may encourage public debt. 
As such it is apt to determine which source of finance becomes relatively attractive following 
Clause 49.  
A number of studies Brealey et al. (1977), Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), Boyd and 
Prescott (1986) etc. suggest that banks and other private lenders are more efficient and effective 
monitors than are “arm's-length” investors. Hence, firms with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry will borrow privately, while firms with lower information asymmetry prefer public 
debt. Since we argue that the reform led to a decrease in the level of information asymmetry, 
public debt is likely to be preferred following Clause 49.  
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Krishnaswami et al. (1999) examine firms that rely only on private debt. They argue 
that these firms are typically smaller, have smaller issue sizes, have greater contracting costs 
due to moral hazard, are younger, and have a higher degree of information asymmetry than 
firms that access the public debt market. Examining the choice among bank debt, non-bank 
private debt, and public debt, Denis and Mihov (2003) suggested that firms with the lower level 
of information asymmetry tend to borrow from public sources. 
Taken together, we hypothesize:  
H2: Clause 49 is likely to increase the relative attractiveness of public (as opposed to 
private) debt. 
However, firms are likely to be heterogeneous and in this respect we distinguish 
between firms that belong to business groups and others who do not. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) 
define a business group as “a set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound together 
by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.” 
There is an extensive literature on business groups (e.g., see Granovetter (2005), Khanna and 
Yafeh (2007), Khanna & Palepu (2000a) argued that underdeveloped and inefficient capital 
market is the prime reason for the formation and existence of a business group. A particular 
advantage of belonging to a business groups is that it serves as an internal financial market and 
capital can be allocated amongst affiliated firms through it. Easy access to finance is particularly 
important where external finance is difficult. Due to their ability to overcome market frictions, 
affiliates of the most highly diversified Indian business groups may outperform stand-alone 
firms (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a). Due to the presence of an internal capital market, the 
working and the finance seeking ability of firms belonging to a business group is likely to be 
different. He et al. (2013) argued that the formation of an internal capital market within business 
groups can somewhat replace the capital allocation function of external market. Business 
affiliates can pool funds and reallocate them within the group, creating value in this way. Intra-
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group loans may help alleviate financial constraints and also possibly have implications on the 
capital structure of the firm as they are a cheap source of fund.  Risk sharing is another important 
role of business groups according to Khanna and Yafeh (2005). Lin et al.  (2013) argue that the 
group affiliation also helps avoid undue reliance on outside investors. Buchuk et al. (2014), 
suggest that being a group affiliated firm allows a firm to increase their debt levels beyond the 
levels permitted by financial markets. Subject to less stringent financial constraints, these firms 
can invest more and increase ROE and dividends. They use data from the Chilean regulation of 
intra-group loans which is stronger than in other emerging markets such as China or India. Their 
results are consistent with the idea that better regulation can reduce the risk of expropriation in 
the internal capital markets of pyramids without cancelling their financing benefits.  
In case of a financial distress, intra-group loans are easier to renegotiate compared to 
other sources. The payments on intragroup loans are likely to be postponed in the case of 
financial distress so there are enough funds to serve other debts and avoid default. In order 
words, they are soft loans. This also helps maintain a good reputation of the group and the 
controlling shareholder in the market. Gopalan et al (2007) study the negative spill-over effects 
of bankruptcy within groups. This is another reason why financial intermediaries are willing to 
lend group affiliated firms first. 
 Business groups can also destroy value through tunnelling resources (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2000). Agency issues arising in business groups are hard to monitor by outside 
investors as they tend to be opaque. However, the financial advantage that business groups get 
from intra-group loans is different from that of tunnelling. In case of intra-group lending, the 
controlling shareholders do not benefit from hurting the interest of the minority shareholders; 
instead they act as a benevolent (Buchuk et al, 2014).  Masulis et al. (2011) argue that the 
financing advantage of business groups outweighs the costs of tunnelling in their sample of 
business group firms taken from 45 countries. Apriori, however, it is hard to draw a clear-cut 
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conclusion regarding the net advantage of business group affiliation for external financing of 
its members.   
Given the natural opacity of business group firms, the question is how they are going to 
react to the introduction of Clause 49. While there is limited literature in this respect, Kim 
(2012) study the aspect of corporate transparency among business group firms. He compares 
business group firms and standalone firms with respect to an opacity index and conclude that 
business group affiliation makes a firm more opaque. Furthermore, their unwillingness to reveal 
information and hold back information makes them untrustworthy in the market. The market 
may not value them favourably as they are known to be opaque. The resultant effect is likely to 
reduce reliance on equity (or no change at all), which in turn means an increased reliance on 
debt. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis H3: Business group firms are likely to have lower reliance on equity even after 
the introduction of Clause 49. 
 
 
2.3. Data and Methodology 
 
2.3.1. Data  
 
 
We gather firm level panel-data from Orbis available from Bureau van Djik from 1996 to 
2014. We obtain ownership information for the same firms from Prowess database available 
from CMIE. We have a total of 1903 firms out of which 83 firms are internationally listed 
Indian firms mainly listed in London Stock Exchange, NYSE, Luxemburg and NASDAQ, 
while the rest are domestically listed Indian firms.  We split our data into two subgroups i.e. 
domestically listed Indian firms and Cross listed Indian firms. All cross listed firms in our 
sample are either listed on or before 2000. We drop 2008 from our analysis to minimise the 
impact of the subprime crisis, if any. 
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1. Dependant variables for testing H1: Leverage Measures 
We construct several measures of financial leverage for each of the two samples. Rajan 
& zingles (1995), argue that the choice of the measure depends on the objectives of the analysis. 
We choose total liability/total assets as in case of a liquidation, which is used as a proxy to what 
shareholders get. Long-term debt/total assets is argued to be unaffected by trade credits and is 
therefore appropriate to measure financing decisions. Net debt/net assets where net assets are 
total assets minus accounts payable and other liabilities; as such it might be affected by factors 
not related to financing and hence it best represents past financing decisions. Shareholders’ 
funds/total assets and Market capital/shareholder’s funds relate to book value and market value 
of equity respectively. Table A 1 provides definitions of these measures. 
 
2. Dependant variable for H2: bank loan ratio 
Within the class of debt securities, firms typically choose between public and private 
debt. A private debt refers to firm’s borrowing from a bank or a non-bank intermediary such as 
an insurance company. The focus of hypothesis 2 is on the firm’s choice public debt. In the 
absence of any better measure, we construct the ratio of bank loan to total loan so that its 
complement, i.e., one minus the bank loan ratios would reflect the share of public debt that the 
firm holds.  
 
3. Treatment and Control Groups 
One of the challenging issues to carry out our analysis using the difference-in-difference 
approach is the identification of the treatment and control groups. During the last two decades 
growing number of Indian firms got listed in various international stock exchanges such as 
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London Stock Exchange (LSE), Luxemburg Stock Exchange, and NYSE etc. mainly to get 
access to developed capital markets. These foreign exchanges have their own set of regulations 
(stricter) set up by their respective regulatory authorities. As such Indian companies listed there 
have to abide by these regulations and are not affected by the Clause 49 reform, therefore we 
define our control group as cross listed Indian firms.  
We therefore exploit the variation between domestic and foreign listed firms by defining 
cross listed Indian firms as our control group and domestically listed firms as our treatment 
group to analyse the impact of the reform on capital structure decisions of the firm. 
Accordingly, we constructed a dummy variable Domestic that takes a value 1 if a sample firms 
is domestically listed in the Indian stock exchange (treatment Group) and zero if it cross listed 
internationally (Control Group).  
Another set of dummy variables that we created are Clause49_00 & Clause49_06 to 
distinguish between the introduction and the implementation of the reform Clause 49 
respectively. As discussed earlier the Clause 49 was introduced in 2000 but completed in 2006 
after a series of amendments, we therefore create two cut-off points and accordingly create two 
reform variables: 
• Clause49_00 is a dummy that takes a value 1 for t ≥ 2000 when the reform was 
introduced and 0 otherwise 
• Clause49_06 is a dummy which takes the value 1 for t ≥ 2006 when the reform was 
implemented/completed and 0 otherwise. 
This allows us to use a difference-in-difference (DID) regression model to assess the impact of 
the Indian corporate governance codes on capital structure, by comparing capital structure of 
domestic and cross listed Indian companies before and after 2000 (introduction of the reform) 
& also before and after 2006 (completion of the reform). We do this because this distinction 
between introduction and implementation of the reform may bear important implications for 
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testing our results. For one thing, it would suggest if there has been any differential response 
among sample firms in this respect. 
 Table 2. 1 reports the summary statistics of key regression variables. On an average, 
firms in the treatment group are younger, smaller and also have lower level of Non-Debt Tax 
Shield as compared to those in the control group but otherwise show similar trend in terms of 
various measure of leverage created in this study. 
 
Table 2. 2 compares the leverage measures in the pre and post reform years for the 
treatment and control group. It seems to highlight that in the pre-reform years these measures 
were generally comparable between treatment and control groups (barring SFTA and BLTL for 
2000 cut-off and net debt to net assets ratio for 2006). However, the reform seems to have a 
significant impact as the mean differences in these leverage measures (with the exception of 
market to book and SFTA) between treatment and control groups turn out to be significant in 
the post reform years. Later we shall consider multiple regression analysis if the differential 
effect in leverage between the treatment and control groups after the reform holds, after 
controlling for all other factors.  
Note that our data sample includes the 2008 financial crisis. So the question naturally 
arises is whether it is likely to affect corporate leverage in the post 2006 years. Sinha (2010) in 
a report to the RBI on crisis suggests that the impact of the global financial crisis on Indian 
banking system and the financial market was almost negligible due to restricted exposure to 
troubled assets, limited  presence of foreign banks in the Indian banking system and judicious 
policies imposed by the reserve bank. The Indian financial markets, especially banks, have 
continued to operate normally. He further reports that any nominal effect settled largely by 
2009. Although the impact of the crisis on the Indian financial system has been minimal, we 
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drop the crisis year 2008 from our analysis to account for any possible effects. Nevertheless, 
we test the robustness of our estimates by excluding the year 2008-09.  
 
2.3.2. Methodology: Difference- in- Difference (DID) Model: Its essential 
components 
 
The difference in difference method widely came into acceptance ever since Ashenfelter 
and Card (1985). The effect of the reform is observed for two groups for pre and post reform 
years. The DID estimation enables us to filter out influences on financing polices that cannot 
be attributed to the Clause 49 reform. As indicated earlier, we define domestically listed firms 
as the treatment group as it is exposed to the reform in the post reform years and cross-listed 
Indian (regulated by foreign exchanges) as the control group as it is not exposed to the reform 
in either (pre or post years) period and is comparable to treatment group. Comparability here 
means that the outcome variables of two groups followed a similar trend prior to the event.  
The basic regression model for determining leverage is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49𝑡) + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 +
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                                             (1)                                                               
Y is the set of selected leverage measures of firm i operating in sector j in the year t, t= 
1996-2014. Among various subscripts, t denotes year, 𝑖 denotes firm,  j denotes sector and 
domestic is the dummy that takes the value 1 for treated domestically listed firms and 0 
otherwise(cross listed). 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the set of control variables (please see below for further details). 
We do not consider firm-level fixed effects as our empirical strategy relies on a comparison 
between treatment and control group firms. But we include.𝜑𝑗 , which refers to the sector 
dummies, accounting for unobserved industry level (time invariant factors) that may influence 
leverage choice; further  𝜏𝑡 captures unobserved year-specific factors that may also influence 
leverage. 
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As indicated in section 2.3.1., we use two reform variables to differentiate between the 
introduction (Clause49_00) and the implementation/completion (Clause49_06) of the reform.  
Accordingly we have two comparable specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49𝑡_00 + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49𝑡_00) + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 +
𝜏𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                         (2) 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49𝑡_06 + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49𝑡_06) + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 +
𝜏𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                  (3) 
  
The coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽3 is of particular interest to us, which captures 
the average treatment effect of CG reform on financial leverage among domestic listed firms 
(relative to cross-listed firms which form our control group).  
Control variables X:  We choose a set of firm characteristics conventionally used to 
determine a firm’s leverage ratio choices in the previous literature. We start with the 
contemporaneous Y and X variables. However, given the likelihood of simultaneity bias 
between X and Y variables, later we also use lagged X variables (see further discussion in 
section 2.4.4). 
Size for instance has an ambiguous effect on firm leverage. While size is positively 
related to leverage according to the trade-off theory, it is inversely related to leverage according 
to the pecking order theory (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Empirical evidence also provides mixed 
results. For example Rajan and Zingales (1995); Friend and Lang (1988) etc., find a positive 
relation between size and leverage, while others Kester, (1986); Kim & Sorensen, (1986) and 
Titman & Wessels, (1988), report a negative relation. We use the natural logarithm of total 
assets as a proxy for firm size and explore the nature of this relationship in our sample. 
Tangibility is expected to have a positive effect on leverage, simply because tangible 
assets can be used as collateral Rajan & Zingales, (1995), Friend & Lang, (1988) and Titman 
& Wessels, (1988) provide evidence of this. Risk of the creditors decreases and value of the 
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assets in case of bankruptcy increases as tangibility increases. Contrary to this, Booth et al. 
(2001) and Huang (2006) encounter a negative relation between tangibility and leverage. We 
use the ratio intangible fixed assets over total assets which is a complement to the measure of 
tangible assets ratio with a view to explore its effect in our sample.  
Non-Debt tax Shield: empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between 
relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage. Large non debt tax shield leads to a 
decrease in the value of interest tax savings and tax advantage of debt financing (Downs (1993)) 
there analysis is supported by Huang (2006) and Titman & Wessels, (1988). However, for 
example Bradley et al. (1984) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) observe a positive 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. We use depreciation divided by total 
assets to proxy for non-debt tax shields in this study. 
Industry Classification: Bradley et al. (1984), Long & Malitz (1985), and Kester 
(1986) provide empirical evidence on statistically significant relationship between industry 
classification and leverage. Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that different firms have different 
access to finance and so have different debt equity mix. Firms belonging to the same category 
say manufacturing tend to display similar leverage. Titman (1984) also provides evidence on 
the same. Table A 1 provides a list of variables and their definitions used in this study. 
Considering the manufacturing sector, we include subsector dummies to account for 
unobserved industry-level heterogeneity, if any, within the manufacturing sector.  
The consistent estimate of 𝛽3 necessitates the satisfaction of the “parallel trend” 
assumption i.e. there is same average change in the outcome variable for both the treatment and 
Control Group in the absence of the reform. This condition is difficult to directly test since the 
counterfactuals are unobservable. We use the two-period firm-level data to compare the means 
of pre- and post-reform leverage measures between treated (domestically listed) and control 
(cross–listed) in our sample as summarised in Table 2. 2. Evidently, most of the mean 
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differences remained insignificant in the pre-reform years, suggesting that the leverage 
difference was not significantly different between treatment and control firms before the 
reform; we take this evidence as indicative of the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption.    
Before carrying out the regression analysis, we further test this assumption using our data. 
Table 2. 3 reports the regression estimates of chosen measures of capital structure among cross-
listed firms in our sample. Given that the Post dummy is insignificant, there is no significant 
change in the capital structure estimates in the post reform years for cross- listed firms, thus 
justifying our selection of cross- listed firms as our control group. 
 
2.4. Results 
 
 
This section reports and analyses the estimates of our regression equations (2) and (3) 
respectively using the two cut offs i.e. pre and post 2000 (the introduction of the Clause 49) and 
pre and post 2006 (the implementation/completion of the Clause 49). Section 2.4.1 discusses 
the difference-in-difference estimates of leverage with cut-off as reform introduction i.e. 2000 
while section 2.4.2 discusses the difference-in-difference estimates of on leverage with cut-off 
as reform implementation/ completion i.e. 2006. Section 2.4.3 analyses results for robustness 
tests and section 2.4.4 checks for any heterogeneous effect of the reform.  
 
2.4.1. Introduction of the reform (2000): Difference-in-difference 
estimates of leverage  
 
Table 2. 4 reports the regression results of equation (2).  Holding other factors constant, we 
focus on the estimate of the interaction term 𝛽3,  which captures the average treatment effect of 
Clause 49 on financial leverage measures among domestic listed firms (relative to cross-listed 
firms which form our control group). This coefficient is negative and significant for total 
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liability ratio in column (1), thus suggesting some reduced reliance on liability among treated 
firms in the post-2000 years (relative to pre-2000 years). However, the same effect is not found 
for neither long term debt (column 2) nor net debt to net assets (column 3): the estimate of the 
interaction term is positive and weakly significant for net debt ratio, but significant at 5% for 
long-term debt. We next consider if there is any evidence of increased reliance on equity 
financing and consider the leverage measures related to equity (market or book value). Note 
that the interaction term is insignificant for market to book ratio (column 4), but positive for 
book value of equity (column (5)). We thus have rather mixed evidence when we consider post-
introduction years; it appears that the reform has not deepened far enough at this point. Later 
we shall consider the effect of the completion of the reform to explore if it yields stronger 
impact on capital structure measures along the lines hypothesized in the paper.  
Next, we test the validity of our hypothesis 2 and to this end examine the coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term for the bank loan ratio variable column (6). Note that this 
estimate is positive and insignificant (column 6 of the Table). In other words, there is no 
significant change in bank loan ratio among the treated firms after the introduction of the 
reform. 
 
2.4.2. Completion of the reform (2006): Difference-in-difference estimates 
of leverage 
 
In this subsection, we consider the impact of the completion (rather than introduction as 
in section 5.1) of the reform in the post-2006 years. Table 2. 5 reports the regression results of 
equation (3) to see if the completion of the reform in 2006 had a more significant impact on the 
selected leverage measures along the lines hypothesized in the paper.  As before, ceteris paribus, 
we focus on the estimated coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽3, which captures the average 
treatment effect of completion of Clause 49 in our sample.  
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Considering the effect of the reform completion on measures using debt and liability, we 
find that the estimated coefficient is negative for total liability ratio (column 1), long-term debt 
ratio (column 2) and net debt ratio (column 3), but the estimated coefficient is only statistically 
significant for the total liability ratio. In contrast, the estimated coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant for market to book ratio (column 4) and also book value of equity ratio 
(column 5). Thus it follows that in the post 2006 years when the reform has deepened, there is 
an increasing reliance on equity finance among treated domestic listed Indian manufacturing 
firms (relative to those crosslisted ones). This is accompanied by reduced reliance on total 
liability; but reliance on long-term debt and net debt appeared to have remained unchanged.  
Column (6) of the Table reports the estimated 𝛽3 coefficient for the bank loan ratio. 
Unlike the reform cut-off point at 2000, we now find that the estimated coefficient is negative 
and weakly significant at 10% level. This suggests that share of bank loans (a measure of private 
debt) is lower among the domestic listed firms in the post 2006 years, which in turn means a 
greater reliance on public debt among treated firms after the completion of Clause 49 that 
enhanced investors’ protection. Although the regression results for cut off 2000 rejected our 
hypothesis 2, cut off 2006 has led to the acceptance of our hypothesis 2.  
 
Inferences:   
Taken together, these results provide some support to our hypotheses H1 and H2: clearly 
the evidence is stronger only after the completion (rather than the introduction) of Clause 49 
when all firms adopted these reform. In view of our discussion in Section 2.2.1, we argue that 
this result can be attributed to the adoption of transparency and disclosure requirement which 
was mandatory for all firms, while other aspects of the reform was not fully implemented. 
Accordingly, there is likely to be a decline in the asymmetric information that makes debt 
suboptimal, but lowers the cost of equity, thus enhancing the firm’s reliance on equity.  
  
38 
 
Further in the absence of a better option, we consider some indirect evidence pertaining 
to measures of earnings management (e.g., see Dechow et al. 1995; 2010) among treated 
domestic listed firms in our sample in a bid to account for aspects of reduced information 
asymmetry after the completion of Clause 49. In particular, we consider two common measures 
of earnings management: EM1 is the ratio of EBIT to cash flow while EM2 is the ratio of 
standard deviation of EBIT to standard deviation of cash flow (Dechow et al. 1995 and 2010). 
The Appendix Table A 2 compares the mean earnings management measures as well as EBIT 
shares among treated domestic firms before and after the introduction as well as completion of 
the reform. Considering the reform completion cut-off point of 2006, there is evidence that 
firms were under-reporting EBIT in the pre-2006 years, which was no longer possible in post-
2006 years when transparency and disclosure rules were mandatory; as a result EBIT increased. 
But total assets also increased in the post-2006 years and as such EBIT/TA remains unchanged, 
thus indicating a proportional increase in total assets. Further, we find that the average earnings 
management measures were significantly lower in the post reform completion years and as 
before this trend was more pronounced for the reform completion rather than the reform 
introduction.  
In Appendix A, Table A 3 further shows the regression results for the two earning 
management measures EM1 & EM2 and use the same specification as in Table 2. 4 and Table 
2. 5. As before, the interaction term 𝛼3 captures the average treatment effect of Clause 49 on 
EM1 and EM2 among the treated domestic listed firms (relative to cross-listed firms). After 
controlling for all other factors that may influence earnings management, both the estimated 
interaction coefficients turn out to be negative and statistically significant in our sample. The 
latter suggests a drop in earnings management (in terms of both EM1 and EM2) among treated 
domestic (relating to the control group) firms after the reform completion. These results help 
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us to identify the mechanism through which the reform affects capital structure of sample firms, 
thus validating our hypotheses.  
 
 
Other results: 
Both Table 2. 4 and Table 2. 5 also include controls for firm characteristics such as 
firm size, age and non-debt shield. As per Table 2. 4 the coefficient of firm size is positive but 
insignificant for market to book ratio, positive and significant for total liability ratio, negative 
and significant to long term debt ratio, positive and insignificant to net debt to net asset ratio 
and negative and significant for book value of equity ratio. We find similar results in Table 2. 
5 where we consider the effect of the completion of the reform.  This ambiguity of the relation 
between size and financial leverage is in line with the existing literature. 
Age of the firm is, however, negative and significantly related to almost all measures of 
leverage suggesting that older and mature firms tend to have lower levels of leverage. 
Non debt tax shield is expected to be negatively related to capital structure of a firm 
according to existing literature. While it is negative and significant for long term debt ratio, Net 
debt to net asset ratio and book value of equity ratio, it is positive and significant for market to 
book and total liability ratio (see Table 2. 4) in our sample. 
    
2.4.3. Heterogeneous treatment effect  
 
In this section, we test hypothesis H3 and in doing so, we re-estimate equation (3) to 
determine selected  leverage measures for firms belonging to a business group. These results 
summarised in Table 2. 6  allow us to compare the results for the firms belonging to business 
groups with those for the full sample results analysed in Section 2.4.1 & 2.4.2. As before, 
  
40 
 
controlling for all other factors we focus on the estimate of the interaction term 𝛽3. Evidently, 
the coefficient estimate of the interaction term for total liability ratio and long term debt ratio 
are positive and significant, indicating an increased reliance on debt among the firms affiliated 
to business groups even after the reform completion. In contrast, the interaction coefficient for 
the book value of equity is negative and significant, while that for market-to-book ratio turns 
out to be positive but insignificant. Further the interaction term remains insignificant for bank 
loans, indicating that there was no change in the reliance on bank loans for domestic firms 
affiliated to business groups after the reform. Taken together, these results lend support to our 
hypothesis H3 that the treated domestic business group firms continue to rely more on loans 
and less on book equity (or no change in the equity as per its market value) after the reform and 
we attribute the latter to their greater opacity and continued reliance on the internal capital 
market within business groups. It is possible that business group membership and access to the 
internal capital market allowed these firms to flout the Clause 49 requirements, e.g., having 
independent audit committee or employment of independent directors. 
 
2.4.4. Robustness tests 
 
 
Finally we test the robustness of our baseline estimates and perform four further tests. 
Each of these tests are done using the completion of the reform in 2006 primarily because this 
is more meaningful comparison after  all domestic listed firms adopted  the Clause 49 
regulations by the end of 2006.  
First, we consider the estimates of leverage as a function of lagged control variables. 
This is important as it would minimise the simultaneity bias, if any, in our estimates. Results 
shown in Table 2. 7 suggest that the signs of the estimated interaction coefficients are generally 
similar to those shown in Table 2. 4, but their significance levels are higher when we use the 
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lagged explanatory variables. As before, we obtain negative and significant estimate of the 
interaction term 𝛽3 for the total liability ratio and also the long term debt ratio, indicating 
reduced reliance on debt among domestic listed firms after 2006. Second, we obtain positive 
and significant estimate of this interaction term for market to book ratio and book value of 
equity ratio, thus suggesting increased reliance on equity finance. These two sets of results, one 
for debt variables and the other for the equity variables, lend support to H1. However, the 
interaction term although negative remains insignificant in the determination of the bank loan 
ratio, thus indicating bank loans share were continued to be similar for domestic firms even 
after the completion of the reform in our sample. 
Second, we augment our baseline specifications (2) and (3) by another widely accepted 
firm-level determinant of leverage in our list of controls, namely, profitability. We then re-
estimate the leverage measures including lagged profitability within the set of other lagged X 
variables. Results as reported in Table 2. 8 are generally quite similar to those in Table 2. 7 
although the lagged profitability variable on its own is negative and significant for most 
leverage measures (except net debt to net assets). 
Third, we exclude foreign firms from our sample because foreign firms are less likely 
to be regulated by the newly introduced Clause 49 regulations. Table 2. 9 reports the leverage 
results for this subsample of Indian firms only (both domestic and cross-listed) – estimates of 
the interaction term remain rather comparable to those in Table 2. 8. Also, for this subsample, 
the estimate of the interaction term for the bank loan ratio turns out to be weakly significant. 
Fourth, we consider the subsample of large firms who are in the top quartile of the 
distribution of total assets of the sample firms. As discussed earlier the effect size of the firms 
on capital structure is ambiguous. We re-estimate equation (3) for the largest group of firms 
only and summarise the results in Table 2. 10.  Controlling for all other factors, the estimate of 
the interaction tern turns out to be negative and significant for total liability ratio and long term 
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debt ratio negative, indicating reduced dependence of domestic listed Indian firms on 
debt/liability; the corresponding effect is, however, positive and significant of the market to 
book ratio and book value of equity ratio. However the absolute size of the estimated interaction 
term is somewhat smaller for the largest sample firms. These two sets of results together tend 
to support that the reform was successful to lower (increase) the reliance of debt (equity). There 
is however no significant indication that the reliance on bank loans was lower in the post-2006 
years even among larger sample firms.  
Finally, we explore the nature of the inter-state variation in the effect of the new Clause 
49 regulations in our sample. To this end, we classify the Indian states into pro-business and 
pro-worker. This is done by using two sets of existing measures initiated to regulate the use of 
land and labour in the Indian states. First we consider the state-level land reform legislation 
measures available from Besley and Burgess (2000). In particular, states with more land-reform 
legislations tend to have smaller plots of land which in turn may pose greater burden for 
acquiring land for industrialisation. This is because acquisition of new land for industrialisation 
would require permission from larger number of landholders, which may pose more challenges 
relative to that in states with less land reform legislations. Second, we use the labour regulations 
indices developed by Besley and Burgess (2004). The labour regulation variable comes from 
specific text amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The variable was coded as 
follows: 1 denotes a change that is pro-labour or anti-employer, 0 denotes a change that we 
judged not to affect the bargaining power of either workers or employers and -1 denotes a 
change which we regard to be anti-worker or pro-employer. The underlying idea is that more 
pro-labour states may struggle to attract new industries for fear of labour problems which may 
in turn affect productivity and growth in the state.  
We combine these two measures to define a state as pro-business and pro-worker as 
follows: a state is treated pro-business if it has lower land-reform legislations and also lower 
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labour legislations; otherwise it is a pro-worker state. Unfortunately, only a limited number of 
firms located in   states like Andhra, Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal are parts of the pro-
worker states, which is an evidence in itself that these states are unable to attract enough listed 
companies.  
 
Table 2. 11 and Table 2. 12 reports the effects of the completion of the reform on 
measures of leverage for two leading pro-business states, namely, Maharashtra and both 
Maharashtra and Gujarat taken together respectively. The estimates of the interaction term are 
highly significant for all the measures of leverage for this sub-sample. There is evidence that 
the completion of the Clause 49 reform had very strong effects on most measures of capital 
structure among treated firms in our sample and the size of these effects has been much bigger 
than those shown in Table 2. 8  for the full sample. In other words, these results show that the 
effect of the reform may differ across the Indian states characterized by pro-business 
regulations. 
Overall these results are rather similar to the baseline results presented in section 2.4.1, 
thus confirming the robustness of our results. 
 
2.4.4.1. Placebo Test  
 
This section presents a placebo test as an additional robustness check. Since the Indian 
corporate governance regime has undergone a series of reforms to control for fraudulent 
practices, it is possible, that our findings are influenced by some pre-policy trend. To check if 
this underlying trend had any effect on our results, we conduct the difference-in-differences 
technique for the pre-policy period of 1996–1999, following Imberman and Kugler (2012).  
Specifically, instead of the Clause 49 taking place after 2000 (when it was 
implemented), suppose it took place from 1998 onwards. If there are any pre-existing trends, 
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then there should be a significant impact of the Clause 49 on measures of capital structure. On 
the other hand, if we fail to identify any significant effects for these placebo time periods, then 
this lends support to the credibility of the chosen treatment period in our analysis. Table 2. 13 
presents the results which demonstrate the insignificance of the interaction terms and hence an 
insignificant impact of the Clause 49 initiative on various measures of leverage among treated 
firms. In other words, the test strengthens the validity of the empirical strategy and the key 
results. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter provides new evidence of the casual effect of corporate governance reforms 
on corporate capital structure measures. Using the Clause 49 regulations introduced by the 
Security and Board Exchange of India in 2000 as a potential exogenous natural experiment, we 
assess the impact of the introduction as well as the completion of the Clause 49 reform on 
selected financial leverage measures of domestic listed (relative to cross-listed) Indian firms. 
Difference-in-difference estimates using firm-level panel data for the period 1996-2014 suggest 
that the introduction and completion of Clause 49 has led to a greater (lower) reliance on equity 
(debt) and also a reduction in reliance on bank loans among domestic listed (relative to cross-
listed) Indian firms in our sample and these effects are more pronounced when we consider the 
completion rather than the introduction of the reform. We argue and also show that these results 
can be attributed to the reduced information asymmetry between managers and investors and 
increased investor protection in the post-regulation years. The Chapter also identifies 
heterogeneous impact of the reform among firms belonging to the business groups with access 
to internal capital market, larger firms and also those located in pro-business (as opposed to 
pro-worker) states; the latter highlights the possible role of supporting regulations guiding land 
as well as labour use in the Indian states. The fact that the impact of the reform varies across 
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different subsamples considered has important implications for policy makers in their bid to 
improving the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations including Clause 49. 
As far as we are aware, ours is the first study to assess the causal impact of corporate 
governance on corporate capital structure in India, using Clause 49 as a natural experiment. 
Access to finance is key to corporate growth and enhancing corporate growth is key to boosting 
India’s economic growth. Addressing the potential simultaneity between firm-level corporate 
governance and firm’s choice of capital structure, we exploit the variation in corporate capital 
structure between treated and control firms before/after Clause 49 within a difference-in-
difference framework. While completion of the Clause 49 generally strengthened the investor 
protection that boosted access to market financing for average domestic listed firms and 
strengthened their,  we also identify some cases for concern, especially for the firms belonging 
to the Business Groups, thus requiring further policy interventions.  
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Tables 2 
 
 
Table 2. 1 Summary Statistics 
Panel  A. Treatment Groups (Domestically Listed Indian Firms) 
Variables Obs. Mean  Std. dev. 
Total liability ratio  35788 .6052553 .3011837 
Long-term debt ratio  29266 .3287867 .306385 
Net debt ratio  35783 1.196491 3.009549 
Market to book equity ratio  31078 .219623 .2607811 
Book equity ratio  35788 .3948106 .3014106 
Bank loan ratio  32127 .5353525 .6121704 
Firm size 35788 8.308156 2.159445 
Age 35767 30.02052 16.2353 
NonDebtTaxShield 35719 .0263529 .0325489 
Profitability  14,480 .0693726 .2373542 
EM1 11,393 4510.064 65065.4 
EM2 13,165 4887.894 18293.85 
Panel B. Control Group (Cross-listed Indian Firms) 
Variables Obs. Mean  Std. dev. 
Total liability ratio  507 .6220712 .2498128 
Long-term debt ratio  497 .3159809 .1972514 
Net debt ratio  507 1.067162 1.449358 
market to book equity ratio  375 .1941877 .1921693 
Book equity ratio  507 .3779284 .249813 
Bank loan ratio  204 .8792611 .7052346 
Firm size 507 13.58328 1.796414 
Age 507 39.97239 25.41916 
NonDebtTaxSheild 506 .0323566 .020978 
Profitability  507 .0804696 .0912403 
EM1 424 41249.57 92034.32 
EM2  472 72726.53 128143.4 
Note: This Table provides and compares the summary statistics of the measures of leverage for the treatment and 
control group. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is measured by the number of years since the firm’s 
establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total 
assets; Profitability is the ratio of EBIT/Total Assets; EM1 is EBIT / Cash Flow; EM2 is the ratio of std (EBIT) to 
std (Cash Flow). Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and 
defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 2 Comparisons of leverage measures between treatment and control groups 
before and after introduction/completion of Clause 49 
 
 
Variable 
Pre-2000 Post-2000 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 
t-stat 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 
t-stat 
Total liability ratio .5580379 .4983326 -1.9613 .6040632 .6345412 1.6935** 
Long term debt ratio .2959154 .324647 0.9302 .3086211 .2827286 1.7148** 
Net debt ratio .9201505 .9838975 0.4001 .7822341 1.087069 3.9705*** 
Mkt to book equity .3734227 .317912 -0.9441 .2056594 .172842 -0.9214 
       
Book Equity Ratio .4419687 .5016676 1.9611** .3959267 .3654583 -1.6930 
Bank loan ratio .4808646 .8380442 2.1002*** .5354693 .883548 5.2637*** 
 
 Pre-2006 Post-2006 
 Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 
t-stat 
Treatment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
 
t-stat 
Total liability ratio .6166597 .5868016 -1.2359 .5956314 .6446242 2.1311*** 
Long term debt ratio .3626322 .3407043 -1.0056 .2397572 .2821518 2.3709*** 
Net debt ratio .8529098 1.161129 3.0320*** .7542924 .9934465 2.4112*** 
Mkt to book equity .2843778 .2929979 0.2330 .1671968 .0531955 -2.1747 
Book Equity Ratio .3833503 .4131977 1.2354 .4043494 .3553757 -2.1304 
Bank loan ratio .6015193 .6081508 0.0503 .5264793 .9784756 6.3298*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Table compares means of various measures of leverage we generated between the firms in the treatment and 
control group. The sample period is 1996-2014. The cut-off is 2000 & 2006 which is when the reform was 
implemented and completed respectively. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their 
empirical distribution and defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 3 Estimates of leverage for cross- listed (control group) with cut-off as reform 
completion i.e. 2006. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt ratio Market to 
book ratio  
Book equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
Post_Clause49_06 -0.0732 -0.0632 0.0220 0.032 0.0423 -0.299 
 (0.0216) (0.0185) (0.141) (0.0406) (0.0216) (0.195) 
Firmsize t-1 0.00270 -0.00291 0.0961*** 0.0118* -0.00266 0.0873*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00185) (0.00725) (0.00647) (0.00218) (0.00846) 
Age t-1 -0.000154 -0.00144*** -0.00787*** -0.000159 0.000154 -0.00129* 
  (0.000167) (0.000139) (0.000739) (0.000420) (0.000167) (0.000692) 
Non Debt Tax Shield t-1 0.511 0.251 -0.926* 0.288 -0.512 3.905*** 
 (0.399) (0.213) (0.506) (0.401) (0.399) (0.912) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.505*** 0.536*** 0.441** -0.121 0.495*** -0.0645 
 (0.0430) (0.0464) (0.185) (0.136) (0.0430) (0.376) 
       
Observations 502 510 494 492 501 498 
R-squared 0.077 0.114 0.074 0.402 0.077 0.191 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Post_Clause 49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Firm size is 
measured as Log (total assets); Age is measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= 
current year- date of incorporation); NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Sample period 
is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. 
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Table 2. 4 Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage with cut-off as reform 
introduction i.e. 2000.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio 
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.245*** -0.189*** -1.029*** 0.152*** -0.245*** -0.304 
 (0.0278) (0.0325) (0.183) (0.0395) (0.0278) (0.278) 
𝛽2:Clause49_00 0.120*** -0.0148 0.161 -0.141*** -0.120*** -0.102 
 (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.182) (0.0338) (0.0290) (0.278) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_00 -0.240*** 0.0829** 0.388* -0.0389 0.240*** 0.190 
 (0.0293) (0.0358) (0.212) (0.0397) (0.0293) (0.286) 
Firmsize 0.0251*** -0.00560*** 0.0206 0.00415 -0.0252*** 0.0964*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00192) (0.0166) (0.00592) (0.00142) (0.00864) 
Age -0.00151*** -0.00343*** -0.0284*** -0.000204 0.00152*** -0.00147** 
 (0.000156) (0.000178) (0.000926) (0.000407) (0.000156) (0.000747) 
NonDebtTaxShield 0.253*** -1.626** -14.99*** 1.046** -0.256*** 4.973*** 
 (0.0767) (0.677) (5.774) (0.419) (0.0773) (0.886) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.189*** 0.686*** 2.557*** 0.0973 0.811*** 0.112 
 (0.0395) (0.0487) (0.244) (0.0853) (0.0395) (0.408) 
       
Observations 32,080 31,766 32,077 31,053 32,080 32,138 
R-squared 0.239 0.293 0.348 0.342 0.238 0.185 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_00 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2000 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_00 is the  
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49 _00. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Sample period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 5 Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage with cut-off as reform 
completion i.e. 2006. 
  (1) (2)       (3)          (4)   (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
liability ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book 
equity ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1: Domestic 0.121*** -0.0873*** -0.731*** 0.109*** -0.122*** 0.102 
 (0.0162) (0.0178) (0.126) (0.0373) (0.0162) (0.150) 
𝛽2: Clause49_06 0.0270 -0.0626*** -0.109 -0.256*** -0.0269 0.291* 
 (0.0217) (0.0201) (0.156) (0.0375) (0.0217) (0.161) 
𝛽3: Domestic*Clause49_06 -0.111*** -0.000198 0.112 0.110*** 0.112*** -0.320* 
 (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.162) (0.0394) (0.0220) (0.172) 
Firm size 0.0323*** 0.000713 0.0132 0.0156*** -0.0324*** 0.0936*** 
 (0.00153) (0.00166) (0.0135) (0.00597) (0.00153) (0.00874) 
Age -0.0014*** -0.0034*** -0.027*** 3.14e-05 0.00142*** -0.0016** 
 (0.000156) (0.000177) (0.000961) (0.000386) (0.000156) (0.000739) 
NonDebtTaxShield 0.0603 -1.332** -13.76*** 0.642 -0.0634 4.826*** 
 (0.0751) (0.535) (5.122) (0.444) (0.0747) (0.904) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.183*** 0.610*** 2.792*** -0.0748 0.818*** -0.135 
 (0.0328) (0.0429) (0.226) (0.0833) (0.0328) (0.340) 
       
Observations 32,080 35,766 32,077 31,053 32,080 32,138 
R-squared 0.237 0.295 0.341 0.383 0.236 0.187 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49_06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets.. Sample period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 6 Heterogeneous Effect of the reform: Difference-in-difference estimates of 
leverage for firms belonging to a business group. The cut-off is reform completion i.e. 
2006.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book 
equity ratio  
Bank 
loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.0739*** 0.00758 -0.0290 0.125*** -0.0739*** 0.405 
 (0.0235) (0.0268) (0.122) (0.0408) (0.0235) (0.363) 
𝛽2:Clause49_06 -0.121*** -0.141*** -0.251 -0.210*** 0.121*** -0.198 
 (0.0283) (0.0209) (0.155) (0.0364) (0.0283) (0.356) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 0.0790*** 0.0612*** -0.0403 0.0549 -0.0790*** 0.435 
 (0.0288) (0.0227) (0.161) (0.0385) (0.0288) (0.367) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.598*** 0.260*** 1.689*** 0.533*** 0.402*** 0.198 
 (0.0940) (0.0831) (0.479) (0.152) (0.0940) (0.836) 
       
Observations 2,692 2,653 3,098 2,692 2,692 2,522 
R-squared 0.362 0.388 0.193 0.471 0.362 0.426 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic*Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49_06. Sample period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 7 Robustness: Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage with lagged control 
variables and cut-off as reform completion i.e. 2006.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.0368** -0.0101 -0.0820 0.113*** -0.0366** 0.116 
 (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.109) (0.0420) (0.0155) (0.178) 
𝛽2:Clause49_06 0.0602*** -0.0444** -0.162 -0.250*** -0.0603*** 0.211 
 (0.0204) (0.0173) (0.138) (0.0380) (0.0204) (0.185) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 -0.0832*** -0.0732*** 0.0220 0.109*** 0.0832*** -0.299 
 (0.0216) (0.0185) (0.141) (0.0406) (0.0216) (0.195) 
Firm sizet-1 0.00270 -0.00291 0.0961*** 0.0118* -0.00266 0.0873*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00185) (0.00725) (0.00647) (0.00218) (0.00846) 
Aget-1 -0.000154 -0.00144*** -0.00787*** -0.000159 0.000154 -0.00129* 
 (0.000167) (0.000139) (0.000739) (0.000420) (0.000167) (0.000692) 
 NonDebtTaxShieldt-1 0.511 0.251 -0.926* 0.288 -0.512 3.905*** 
 (0.399) (0.213) (0.506) (0.401) (0.399) (0.912) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.505*** 0.536*** 0.441** -0.121 0.495*** -0.0645 
 (0.0430) (0.0464) (0.185) (0.136) (0.0430) (0.376) 
       
Observations 11,328 10,114 11,327 11,916 11,328 11,955 
R-squared 0.077 0.114 0.074 0.402 0.077 0.191 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49 _06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Sample period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and defined in Table A1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 8 Robustness: Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage with lagged control 
variables, including lagged profitability and cut-off as reform completion i.e. 2006.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
liability ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.0423*** -0.00444 -0.0722 0.135*** -0.0422*** 0.108 
 (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.108) (0.0415) (0.0153) (0.177) 
𝛽2:Clause 49_06 0.0584*** -0.0464*** -0.165 -0.232*** -0.0585*** 0.219 
 (0.0201) (0.0168) (0.137) (0.0363) (0.0201) (0.185) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 -0.0829*** -0.0727*** 0.0225 0.0865** 0.0829*** -0.293 
 (0.0213) (0.0180) (0.141) (0.0386) (0.0213) (0.195) 
Firmsize t-1 0.00481** -0.000683 0.0998*** 0.0204*** -0.00477** 0.0866*** 
 (0.00223) (0.00196) (0.00737) (0.00658) (0.00223) (0.00849) 
Age t-1 -0.000106 -0.00138*** -0.00779*** -0.000153 0.000105 -0.00129* 
 (0.000167) (0.000138) (0.000737) (0.000416) (0.000167) (0.000691) 
NonDebtTaxShield t-1 0.390 0.0855 -1.139** 0.447 -0.390 3.962*** 
 (0.434) (0.265) (0.461) (0.386) (0.434) (0.909) 
Profitability t-1 -0.141*** -0.178*** -0.247** -0.663*** 0.141*** 0.197 
 (0.0483) (0.0579) (0.0988) (0.134) (0.0483) (0.125) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.503*** 0.536*** 0.439** -0.283 0.496*** -0.0920 
 (0.0416) (0.0444) (0.181) (0.193) (0.0416) (0.377) 
       
Observations 11,328 10,114 11,327 11,516 11,328 11,955 
R-squared 0.087 0.128 0.076 0.438 0.087 0.192 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49 _06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of EBIT/Total Assets; 
Sample period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical 
distribution and defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 9 Robustness - Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage with a sub-sample 
excluding foreign firms and cut-off as reform completion i.e. 2006.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
market to 
book ratio  
book equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.0452*** -0.00242 -0.0611 0.120*** -0.0451*** 0.106 
 (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.108) (0.0403) (0.0153) (0.178) 
𝛽2:Clause49_06 0.0579*** -0.0467*** -0.168 -0.228*** -0.0579*** 0.220 
 (0.0201) (0.0168) (0.138) (0.0359) (0.0201) (0.185) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 -0.0838*** -0.0739*** 0.0218 0.0835** 0.0838*** -0.294 
 (0.0213) (0.0180) (0.141) (0.0384) (0.0213) (0.195) 
Firm size t-1 0.00526**  -0.000323 0.102*** 0.0117* -0.00521** 0.0859*** 
 (0.00224) (0.00196) (0.00740) (0.00697) (0.00224) (0.00847) 
Age t-1 -6.86e-05 -0.00136*** -0.00772*** -0.000537 6.81e-05 -0.00141** 
 (0.000168) (0.000138) (0.000741) (0.000408) (0.000168) (0.000682) 
NonDebtTaxShield t-1 0.391 0.0908 -1.130** 0.174 -0.392 3.972*** 
 (0.434) (0.267) (0.463) (0.393) (0.434) (0.910) 
Profitability t-1 -0.140*** -0.177*** -0.243** -0.538*** 0.140*** 0.185 
 (0.0481) (0.0577) (0.0974) (0.145) (0.0481) (0.125) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.496*** 0.531*** 0.400** 0.0779 0.504*** -0.0778 
 (0.0417) (0.0444) (0.181) (0.109) (0.0417) (0.376) 
       
Observations 11,214 10,049 11,213 11,815 11,214 11,948 
R-squared 0.086 0.128 0.076 0.431 0.086 0.194 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic*Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49_06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of EBIT/Total Assets. Sample 
period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and 
defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 10 Robustness- Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage for large firms. 
The cut-off is reform completion i.e. 2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.0363** -0.0233 -0.0290 0.0960** -0.0363** 0.00909 
 (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.122) (0.0404) (0.0150) (0.186) 
𝛽2:Clause49_06 0.0215 -0.0536*** -0.251 -0.159*** -0.0215 0.288 
 (0.0194) (0.0161) (0.155) (0.0384) (0.0194) (0.194) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 -0.0448** -0.0472*** -0.0403 0.0223 0.0448** -0.241 
 (0.0204) (0.0178) (0.161) (0.0407) (0.0204) (0.204) 
Firmsize t-1 0.0168*** -0.00566 0.0851*** -0.0290** -0.0168*** 0.0351 
 (0.00514) (0.00344) (0.0325) (0.0125) (0.00514) (0.0253) 
Age t-1 -0.000686*** -0.00157*** -0.00841*** -0.00125*** 0.000686*** -5.44e-06 
 (0.000150) (0.000151) (0.00101) (0.000481) (0.000150) (0.00108) 
NonDebtTaxShield t-1 0.661** -0.0889 -1.524 0.232 -0.661** 2.463 
 (0.269) (0.244) (1.467) (0.743) (0.269) (1.846) 
Profitability t-1 -0.455*** -0.572*** -2.521*** -1.180*** 0.455*** 0.00151 
 (0.138) (0.105) (0.797) (0.255) (0.138) (0.550) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.502*** 0.771*** 1.689*** 0.676*** 0.498*** 0.892 
 (0.0724) (0.0666) (0.479) (0.189) (0.0724) (0.597) 
       
Observations 3,098 2,900 3,098 3,509 3,098 3,815 
R-squared 0.267 0.357 0.193 0.552 0.267 0.165 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49_06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of EBIT/Total Assets. Sample 
period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and 
defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 11 Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage for firms located in a pro-
business state Maharashtra. The cut-off is reform completion i.e. 2006.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book equity 
ratio  
Bank 
loan ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.433*** 0.243* 6.620*** 0.318** -0.433*** - 
 (0.0950) (0.126) (0.586) (0.131) (0.0950)  
𝛽2:Clause49_06 -0.103*** -0.121*** -0.525*** -0.307*** 0.103*** -1.004** 
 (0.0322) (0.0375) (0.152) (0.0633) (0.0322) (0.358) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 0.120*** 0.0757* 0.224 0.210*** -0.120*** 0.578 
 (0.0364) (0.0420) (0.183) (0.0671) (0.0364) (0.462) 
Firmsize t-1 0.0158 -0.00436 0.329*** 0.0516*** -0.0158 -0.138 
 (0.0134) (0.0230) (0.0918) (0.0191) (0.0134) (0.169) 
Age t-1 -0.00298 -0.00286 -0.0467*** -0.00417 0.00298 0.0218 
 (0.00222) (0.00325) (0.0146) (0.00281) (0.00222) (0.0268) 
NonDebtTaxShield t-1 0.214 0.654 -0.953 0.210 -0.214 -13.76 
 (0.576) (0.501) (4.499) (0.997) (0.576) (17.19) 
Profitability t-1 -0.629*** -0.661*** -2.992*** -0.661** 0.629*** -4.248 
 (0.198) (0.186) (1.061) (0.256) (0.198) (3.581) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.378** 0.526 -5.467*** -0.246 0.622*** 4.601 
 (0.154) (0.323) (1.098) (0.246) (0.154) (2.979) 
Observations 141 127 141 141 141 123 
R-squared 0.696 0.591 0.729 0.714 0.696 0.752 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49 _06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age= current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of EBIT/Total. Sample 
period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and 
defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 12 Difference-in-difference estimates of leverage for firms located in two pro-
business states Maharashtra & Gujarat. The cut-off is reform completion i.e. 2006.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book 
equity 
ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.433*** 0.243* 6.620*** 0.318** -0.433*** - 
 (0.0950) (0.126) (0.586) (0.131) (0.0950)  
𝛽2:Clause49_06 -0.103*** -0.121*** -0.525*** -0.307*** 0.103*** -1.004** 
 (0.0322) (0.0375) (0.152) (0.0633) (0.0322) (0.358) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_06 0.120*** 0.0757* 0.224 0.210*** -0.120*** 0.578 
 (0.0364) (0.0420) (0.183) (0.0671) (0.0364) (0.462) 
Firmsize t-1 0.0158 -0.00436 0.329*** 0.0516*** -0.0158 -0.138 
 (0.0134) (0.0230) (0.0918) (0.0191) (0.0134) (0.169) 
Age t-1 -0.00298 -0.00286 -0.0467*** -0.00417 0.00298 0.0218 
 (0.00222) (0.00325) (0.0146) (0.00281) (0.00222) (0.0268) 
NonDebtTaxShield t-1 0.214 0.654 -0.953 0.210 -0.214 -13.76 
 (0.576) (0.501) (4.499) (0.997) (0.576) (17.19) 
Profitability t-1 -0.629*** -0.661*** -2.992*** -0.661** 0.629*** -4.248 
 (0.198) (0.186) (1.061) (0.256) (0.198) (3.581) 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.378** 0.526 -5.467*** -0.246 0.622*** 4.601 
 (0.154) (0.323) (1.098) (0.246) (0.154) (2.979) 
       
Observations 141 127 141 141 141 135 
R-squared 0.696 0.591 0.729 0.714 0.696 0.752 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.TLTA is Total liability ratio;  
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; Clause 
49_06 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. Domestic *Clause 49_06 is the 
dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49 _06. Firm size is measured as Log (total assets); Age is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age=current year- date of incorporation); 
NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of EBIT/Total Assets. Sample 
period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution and 
defined in Table A1. 
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Table 2. 13 Placebo test  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total liability 
ratio 
Long term 
debt ratio 
Net debt 
ratio 
Market to 
book ratio  
Book 
equity ratio  
Bank loan 
ratio  
       
𝛽1:Domestic 0.0874*** -0.0779** 0.458*** 0.173*** -0.0874*** -0.536 
 (0.0312) (0.0336) (0.133) (0.0510) (0.0312) (0.538) 
𝛽2:Clause49_98 0.167*** 0.0106 0.370*** -0.0934*** -0.168*** -0.212 
 (0.0291) (0.0292) (0.117) (0.0356) (0.0291) (0.536) 
𝛽3:Domestic*Clause49_98 -0.109 0.00135 -0.551 -0.0686 0.109 0.420 
 (0.0325) (0.0343) (0.146) (0.0490) (0.0326) (0.540) 
Firm size -0.00103 -0.00809*** 0.103*** 0.00146 0.00107 0.0967*** 
 (0.00213) (0.00176) (0.00694) (0.00593) (0.00213) (0.00864) 
Age -2.47e-05 -0.00155*** -0.00739*** -0.000255 2.40e-05 -0.00148** 
 (0.000159) (0.000134) (0.000696) (0.000417) (0.000159) (0.000740) 
NonDebtTaxShield 0.804** 0.589* 0.105 1.049** -0.806** 4.805*** 
 (0.388) (0.308) (0.740) (0.430) (0.389) (0.922) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.396*** 0.548*** -0.128 0.0872 0.603*** 0.224 
 (0.0503) (0.0509) (0.188) (0.0881) (0.0503) (0.615) 
       
Observations 13,371 11,999 13,368 11,053 13,371 12,129 
R-squared 0.079 0.081 0.064 0.316 0.079 0.187 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Domestic is the dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms and 0 for cross listed firms; the 
Placebo year is 1998 so Clause 49_98 is dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 1998 to 2014 and 0 otherwise. 
Domestic *Clause 49_98 is the dummy for the interaction of Domestic and Clause 49 _98. Firm size is measured 
as Log (total assets); Age is measured by the number of years since the firm’s establishment (Age=current year- 
date of incorporation); NonDebtTaxShield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets; Profitability is the ratio of 
EBIT/Total Assets. Sample period is 1996 to 2014. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their 
empirical distribution and defined in Table A1. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A 1 Definition of key variables 
This Table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Abbreviation   Definitions 
  
Measures of Leverage:  
Total liability ratio Total Liability Ratio= total Liabilities/ Total assets 
Long Term Debt Ratio  Long Term Debt Ratio = Long Term Debt/ Total Assets 
Net Debt Ratio  Net Debt Ratio = Net Debt / Net Assets  
Mkt_bk Market to Book Ratio 
Book Value of equity ratio  Book Value of equity ratio =Shareholders’ Funds/ Total Assets 
Bank Loan Ratio  Bank Loan Ratio=Bank Loans/ Total Loans 
  
Firm-Specific Controls:  
Fsize Ln (total assets) 
Age  Age is measured by the number of years since the firm’s 
establishment. Age= current year- date of incorporation. 
NonDebtTaxShield Depreciation / Total Assets 
 
Profitability  EBIT/Total Assets 
  
Treatment & Control Group 
Dummies: 
 
Domestic Dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a domestic listed firms 
and 0 for cross listed firms.  
Cross listed Dummy which takes the value 1 if it is a cross listed firm and 0 
for otherwise. The control group. 
Clause49_00 Dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2000 to 2014 and 0 
otherwise 
Clause49_06 
 
Measures of Earnings 
Management 
 
EM1 
EM2 
 
Dummy that takes the value 1 for the years 2006 to 2014 and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
 
EBIT / Cash Flow 
sd(EBIT)/ sd (Cash Flow) 
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Table A 2 Mean comparison of measures of earnings management before/after the 
introduction/completion of Clause 49 
Variable                         Domestic Domestic 
Pre-2000 Post-2000 t-stat Pre-2006 Post-2006 t-stat 
       
EM1= EBIT/ Cash flow 3371.389 4547.752 -0.3398 2251.39 5468.426  -2.4141** 
EM2= sd (EBIT) /sd 
(cash flow)  
10389.37 4706.152 -6.281*** 5384.666  4669.99 2.0638* 
EBIT 16898.7 18083.51 -0.2257 10829.57 21156.89 -5.2982*** 
TA 142051.1 193546.4 -0.8604 100665.2 231377.9 -5.8840*** 
EBIT/TA .1252811 .0676451 4.9864*** .0739126 .0674173 1.5106 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A 3 Effects of Clause 49 on Earnings Management 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES EM1 EM2 
   
𝛼1: Domestic 17,168*** -0.126* 
 (5,542) (0.118) 
𝛼2: Clause49_06 48,101*** 0.189 
 (7,060) (0.153) 
 𝛼3: Domestic_clause49_06 -47,545*** -0.273* 
 (7,068) (0.162) 
Firmsize 4,137*** -0.0852*** 
 (1,166) (0.0253) 
Age 80.26*** 0.0114*** 
 (23.14) (0.00138) 
NonDebtTaxShield -15,348 0.205 
 (15,845) (0.853) 
Constant -63,407*** 1.719*** 
 (16,388) (0.331) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 12,668 13,282 
R-squared 0.126 0.057 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
This Table shows the DID estimates of earnings management of Indian domestic listed (compared to 
cross-listed Indian firms). We use two measures of earnings management: EM1 is the ratio of EBIT to 
cash flow while EM2 is the ratio of sd of EBIT to sd of cash flow. There is evidence that the EM1 and 
EM2 was significantly lower among domestic firms after the reform completion. 
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Table A 4 Main components of the Clause 49 are summarized below:  
Component  Requirement 
I. Board Composition   
Number of Directors on the 
Board 
Optimum combination of executive and non-executive 
directors 
Independence • 50 percent independent directors if Chairman is 
anexecutive director or 33 percent if Chairman is a non-
executive. 
• Definition - no material pecuniary relationship or 
transactions with the company, its promoters, its 
management or its subsidiaries, not related to Board or 
one level below Board and no prior relationship with the 
Company for the last three years. 
• Nominee Directors of Financial Institutions - 
considered independent 
Board Requirements & 
Limitations 
 
• Meet four times a year (maximum three months 
between meetings). 
• Director may be on at most 10 committees and chair 
of at most five. 
• Code of Conduct (Ethics) required 
II. Audit Committee  
Composition  • At least three directors (two-thirds must be 
independent). 
• All members must be “financially literate” and at least 
one of them must have “accounting or related financial 
management expertise.” 
• Chairman of the committee should be an independent 
director, who should be present at Annual General 
Meeting to answer shareholder queries. 
III. Disclosures •Listed companies must periodically make various 
disclosures regarding financial and other matters in 
their Annual reports to ensure transparency. Also 
disclose a compliance report in the Annual Reports  
•Related party transactions: placed before the audit 
committee. 
•Accounting treatments: true and fair accounting 
treatments as per the accounting standards, reporting 
any deviation.  
•Board Disclosures – Risk management: inform Board 
members about the risk assessment and minimization 
procedures.  
•Personal interest that may have a potential conflict 
with the interest of the company at large. 
•Monitoring and management. 
•Remuneration of Directors 
IV. Certification •The CEO and CFO of listed companies must  
(a) certify that the financial statements are fair and (b) 
accept responsibility for internal controls. 
V. Other recommendations •Optional Whistleblower policy 
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Chapter 3: Effect of Managerial Compensation on Capital 
Structure and Performance - Evidence from a natural experiment 
in the UK 
  
Chapter Summary: In the context of the recent public debate on excessive executive 
compensation in the UK, the Chapter examines the effects of executive compensation on 
corporate capital structure and performance. Given the potential endogeneity of executive 
compensation, we use the introduction of Director’s Remuneration Regulation (DRR2013) as 
a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of executive compensation on corporate capital 
structure in the UK. Results from our analysis suggests that an increase in equity based 
compensation to total compensation ratio decreases firm’s reliance on debt and improves firm 
performance while an increase in bonus to total compensation ratio leads to an increase in 
reliance on debt but doesn’t seem to have a significant effect on performance. There is evidence 
in support of the debt agency theory. Results are robust to different proxies of capital 
structure/performance and corporate governance.  
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Standard theories of corporate capital structure suggests that firms choose capital 
structure to maximise firm value. Yet there is now a growing literature claiming that many firm 
decisions are driven not by considerations of firm value maximisation, but by CEO’s personal 
interest (e.g. see Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Cadenillas et al. (2004), Malmendier and Tate 
(2005), and the survey by Baker et al. (2007).  In this context, the present Chapter examines the 
effect of CEO compensation on corporate capital structure and firm performance. The 
importance of understanding the effect of the structure of managerial compensation on firm 
choices has greatly increased in recent years since the manner in which executive compensation 
is structured has changed dramatically over the past decades giving rise to a huge pay gap 
between workers and managers, thus being subject to close political and media scrutiny. We 
consider the effects of different components of executive compensation including cash, bonus, 
equity separately as each component has different implications for executive risk taking attitude 
and therefore on capital structure composition. In particular, we argue that an increase in equity 
compensation share would lower reliance on debt because it aligns the interests of the 
executives with the shareholders thus lowering the size of risky debt; in contrast, a higher share 
of bonus component would increase debt because bonus payments encourages taking more risks 
to enhance project returns. We do not find any significant effect of cash compensation on 
corporate capital structure. We also consider the corresponding effects on firm performance 
respectively in case of higher equity and bonus compensation shares.  
We compile firm-level panel data from Datastream and BoardEx over 2010-2016 and 
focus on firms listed in the UK. Using the introduction of the 2013 Directors’ Remuneration 
Regulation as a natural experiment, we use two stage least squares instrumental variable IV 
method to determine the effect of executive compensation on selected corporate capital 
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structure measures including total debt to total assets, debt to equity ratio, total liabilities to 
total assets. Since the DRR2013 directly targeted the UK domestic listed (as opposed to cross-
listed) companies only, we consider them as the treated firms and exploit the exogenous 
variation in executive compensation before/after the introduction of the DRR2013 among 
treated and control firms to identify the causal effect of the compensation components on 
selected corporate capital structure measures. We find that the introduction of the 2013 reform 
induced an increase in equity and bonus share of compensation among the treated firms though 
there was no effect on cash compensation share.  Accordingly, we use these first stage estimates 
to obtain the predicted values of equity and bonus compensation ratios only to use as 
instruments for determining capital structure measures at the second stage to minimise any 
estimation bias. 
Results from our analysis provides support to our hypotheses suggesting that (a) an 
increase in equity based compensation ratio decreases firm’s reliance on debt and improves 
firm performance. (b) Increase in bonus ratio, however, leads to an increase firm’s reliance on 
debt (compared to equity) but doesn’t seem to have a significant effect on performance. We 
argue that these results are mainly driven by the disclosure of the executive compensation that 
informs company creditors which in turn strengthens the debt-agency theory. The 
implementation of the DRR2013 shows the reform has had a rather limited impact as 
shareholders and a small minority firms voted against the remuneration proposal – less than 
10% votes were cast against in 2015-16 (Appendix C). Results are robust to different proxies 
of capital structure/performance,  corporate governance and also after controlling for executive 
behavioural characteristics .  
This analysis contributes to different strands of the existing literature. First, 
management pay has been a mainstream news topic in recent years. It has stimulated substantial 
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political debate among politicians, CEOs, and academics, especially since the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009. Critiques often attribute the crisis at least in part to incentive pay that purportedly 
encouraged excessive risk taking of executives.  There has been substantial public outcry over 
‘fat cat’ salaries, particularly those against high-profile management failings like those in the 
City which contributed to the economic crash. As a result, the Government has edged towards 
reforms aimed at strengthening the hand of shareholders to challenge directors’ pay. A 
particular issue has been the ‘reward for failure’. Regulators in the UK, Europe and the US have 
proposed, and in some cases even implemented, regulation that monitors or modifies the level 
and the structure of executive compensation in the financial services industry. UK was in fact 
the first country to adopt the “Say on Pay” on executive compensation (See Appendix C for a 
background of the reform adopted by the UK).  This rising income inequality, excessive risk 
taking and regulatory attempts to control the situation makes UK an important case in point. 
Excessive compensation not only escalated the wage gap but also led to excessive risk taking, 
which is believed to have contributed to the financial crisis [(Bebchuk et al. (2010), Bhagat and 
Romano (2010)]. The differential effects of equity and bonus components on capital structure 
and firm performance in our analysis gives further weight to this argument as equity and bonus 
compensation have arguably generated differential risk-taking attitudes. 
Second, a number of studies have tried to assess the relationship between 
compensation and capital structure decisions directly (e.g., see Jensen and Meckling (1976); 
John and John (1993); Bryan et al (2000), Hassan and Hoshino (2008), Andrikopoulos (2009) 
and Sepe (2011); Berger et. al (1997), MacMinn and Page Jr. (2006), Coles et. al (2006) and 
Tchistyi et. al (2011)). While some consider compensation as the dependent variable, others 
use capital structure as the dependant variable to examine the relationship between the two. The 
empirical challenge is that both of these variables, compensation and capital structure, are 
simultaneously determined by the firms’ themselves, which is likely to introduce estimation 
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bias if simple OLS is used. There are problems of measurement error, reverse causality and 
endogeneity involved in determining a causal relationship between the compensation structure 
and capital structure. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the cause of this relation. In order to 
redress the potential endogeneity concerns, we use the 2013 director’s remuneration reform in 
the UK (DRR 2013) as a natural experiment to break the simultaneity between executive 
compensation, capital structure and performance. This is because UK firms were unlikely to 
influence the DRR2013 regulations and as such these regulations are likely to be exogenous for 
the firms.  The new regulation (DRR2013) significantly enhanced the information available to 
investors regarding executive pay and incorporated a requirement for the board to seek approval 
from the shareholders. As such, it can be argued that the IV estimates of capital structure and 
performance obtained in this chapter offer a causal identification of the effects of executive 
compensation. 
The standard capital structure literature does not take into account the executive 
behavioural perspectives. However recent studies (de Meza and Webb, (2007), Nosic and 
Weber (2008); Chang and al (2009); Azouzi and Jarboui’s (2012) etc. suggest that executive 
behaviour can have an effect on the capital structure of a firm. We therefore also take account 
the behavioural aspect of executives . In particular we take into account CEO overconfidence 
to assess if managerial irrationality may also affect our capital structure estimates. 
Taken together, the value-added of this chapter are primarily two-fold: First, unlike 
much of the existing literature, we study the impact of different components of pay package on 
capital structure and performance. More importantly, we aim to identify a causal effect of 
various compensation components on capital structure, as we redress the simultaneity between 
executive compensation shares and corporate capital structure. We provide a clear identification 
by using a natural experiment to address the circularity between executive compensation and 
leverage. Unlike the bulk of the empirical capital structure literature, these results identify   
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components of CEO compensation package as  important determinants of firm-level capital 
structure and thus provide further justification for policy intervention. The debate on executive 
compensation is not only a corporate issue in the UK, recent debates has seen it being extended 
to the higher education sector as well (e.g., see 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/jan/09/universities-vice-chancellors-excessive-
pay-new-guidelines) – thus our analysis yields important implications for the ongoing public 
policy debate on executive pay not only in the private sector but also for the public sector. 
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows: I provide a review of the literature and 
develop the hypothesis in Section 3.2; data description and the methodology used is discussed 
in Section 3.3; Section 3.4 discusses the results. Section 3.5 test for robustness of the results. 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature review and Hypotheses  
 
In this section, we review and integrate different strands of the literature to develop our 
hypotheses. 
3.2.1. Composition of Executive compensation  
 
 Generally, there are four basic components of executive pay package. First, a base salary 
in cash, which are generally determined through competitive “benchmarking” based on general 
industry surveys. Second, annual bonus plan, which is based on accounting performance 
measures. Third, stock option which is a right to purchase share in future at some pre-specified 
exercise price. Fourth, additional compensation such as restricted stock, long-term incentives 
plans, and retirement plans (Murphy, 1999).  
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Optimal compensation contract plays a number of important roles; this includes: 1) 
aligning the interest of the managers with that of the shareholders to reduce potential 
asymmetric information inherent between managers and shareholders due to the separation of 
ownership and management; 2) Executive compensation also acts as a sorting mechanism to 
attract the best CEO, and 3) provides incentives for effort and the retention of human capital 
which in turn helps boost firm performance. Therefore, firms aim to design the most efficient 
compensation package in order to attract, retain and motivate CEOs. The principal - agent 
theory of executive compensation supports that firms aim to design the most efficient 
compensation package in order to attract, retain and motivate CEOs. In the agency theory 
shareholders set pay; however in practice compensation committee determines pay on the 
behalf of shareholders. Remuneration committees became common in the UK following the 
Cadbury committee’s 1992 report. The role of the committee is to develop proposals on the 
level and structure of compensation to top managers, which have to be approved by the full 
board. Most US and UK firms have a compensation committee comprising at least two 
“outside” directors. In most companies the final decision related to executive pay is made by 
“outside directors” who are 1) neither current nor past employees, 2) do not have any string ties 
with the companies and 3) fully aware of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers.  
An alternative theory is that CEOs set their own pay (Bebchuk & Fried, (2003)). 
Bertrand Mullainathan (2001) consider managers as self-serving, since they extract funds from 
shareholders for their own benefits.  There is no controversy about the fact that CEOs and other 
top managers exert some influence on the level and structure of their pay. The compensation 
committee seldom initiates the new incentive plans or conducts market studies of competitive 
pay and it is typically the company’s human resource department that commences 
recommendation for pay levels. These recommendations are then sent to executives for 
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approval before they are submitted to the committee for consideration. The recommendations 
are either accepted or sent back for revision by the committee. Once accepted the 
recommendations are sent to the board of directors for approval.  
Empirical evidence on whether or not CEOs influence the decision of compensation 
committees is limited. Conyon and Peck (1998); Boyd (1994); and Westphal & Zajac (1994) 
find that the presence of the committee is not associated with lower pay levels, thus 
strengthening the idea of self-serving CEOs.   
Chief executive officer’s (CEO) contract design plays a number of important roles. It 
acts as a sorting mechanism to attract the best CEO. It provides incentives for effort and the 
retention of human capital which in turn helps boost firm performance. If the CEO package is 
incentive-compatible, it will deliver the good they are expected to deliver. Early study by Harris 
and Raviv (1979) argued that an optimal incentive contract is determined to minimize the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. However, asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders and the separation of ownership and management leads to conflicts 
of interest between managers and shareholders. Financial literature has given much attention to 
this inherent agency problem. Early research by Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the 
potential conflicts between owners and managers, and suggested that if managers' wealth is not 
tied directly to firm value by stock ownership, the managers may lack incentives to expend the 
effort desired by shareholders, or they may seek to consume perquisites at the expense of the 
firm. Haugen and Senbet (1981), Hall and Liebman (1998), amongst others, suggest that 
incentive compensation contract can be an important instrument with which shareholders can 
mitigate managers’ incentive problem. They introduced the need for equity linked 
compensation. Jensen and Murphy (1990) however argue that the CEOs hold trivial functions 
of their firms’ stock that reduce the pay performance sensitivities. They found that the size of 
equity compensation held by mangers is rather less.  Hall and Liebman (1998) however find 
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evidence of increasing share of CEO pay in equity in recent years. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
suggested that one effect of this growth has been a substantial increase in the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock prices.  
To the extent that managers are undiversified with respect to firm-specific wealth, they 
are exposed to more risk that diversified shareholders. The latter may encourage them to be risk 
averse. Option based compensation may help here as it provides convex payoffs. Employee 
stock options (ESOs) have been used widely as an efficient device to align the interest of the 
managers with that of the shareholders in an attempt to mitigate agency problems [Defusco et 
al., (1991); Hall and Murphy, (2002)]. For Instance, Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) show that firms with greater investment opportunities have higher executive 
compensation and a higher incidence of ESO plans. They argue firms facing severe agency 
problems grant more ESOs. 
 
3.2.2. Regulation and Executive compensation  
 
Traditionally shareholders have had no say in the compensation packages of its executives. 
Their power and opinion on executive pay has been inconsequential. Shareholders have long 
complained regarding excessive executive remuneration around the globe. Mullerat (2005) 
mentioned numerous examples of shareholders complaining about excessive managerial 
compensation and overpaid top executives irrespective of their performances. Initial UK 
research by Conyon and Leech (1994) investigates the effect of shareholder power on CEO 
remuneration. They found weak evidence that greater shareholder control, lowered CEO pay 
but growth in pay doesn’t seem to be affected by shareholder power. However, continuous 
pressure on the government to change their status on the existing situation resulted in the 
adoption of the “Say on Pay” legislation in 2002, requiring UK listed firms (see Appendix C 
for further details of the reform) to get shareholders concession on the company’s remuneration 
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policy through a mandatory, non-binding vote on the compensation of their top executives. 
Since then there has been a plethora of Say on Pay legislations in countries around the world. 
The expectation was that regulation, if implemented effectively, would lower total or at least 
some components of executive compensation. Market trend on voting and existing studies on 
the effects of Say on Pay however suggest that the reform did not significantly affect pay levels. 
Among the limited literature on the impact of the Say on Pay regulation, Carter and Zamore 
(2007) used UK data on FTSE350 firms from 2002 to 2006 to estimate a shareholder voting 
model. They found that shareholders disapprove of higher salaries. Boards respond to past 
negative votes by reducing excess salary and dilution of stock option grants and also by 
improving pay for performance links. Alissa (2015) examines how the ‘Say on Pay’ regulation 
affected the behaviour of shareholders and boards using a sample of FTSE350 firms over a 
period of 2002-12. Evidence from his study suggests that shareholder dissatisfaction increases 
with excess CEO compensation.  Boards respond by reducing the excessiveness of CEO 
compensation when performance is poor. The probability of CEO turnover increases with 
shareholder dissatisfaction 
Conyon and Sadler (2010) investigated the determinants of shareholders voting and 
its relation to CEO pay. Using a large sample of over 50,000 voting resolutions of UK firms 
from 2002 to 2007, they find that the absolute level of shareholders dissent is quite low and 
shareholders seem to be satisfied with the pay policy. Only 7 to 10 percent of the shareholders 
abstain or vote against the DRR resolution and 90 percent vote in favour of the DRR. They also 
found that companies likely to attract greater shareholder’s dissent are the ones with high 
executive pay. However, consistent with other studies (Alissa, 2015; Carter & Zamore, 2007), 
they find little evidence that the relation (negative) between voting and consequent CEO pay 
levels.  
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Ferri and Maber (2013) find that the introduction of the Say on Pay regulation resulted 
in a positive stock market reaction among firms with weak penalties for poor performance. Firm 
responded by removing disputed CEO practices as rewards for failure. They find a significant 
increase in the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance. Whereas Larcker et al. (2011) find 
a no significant stock market reaction for firm with the highest level of excess cash 
compensation on the first day the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation in the US, Cai 
and Walking (2011) find a positive stock market reaction.  
Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) study the impact of the ‘Say on Pay’ regulation on voting 
dissent. They find that executive compensation and dissent on remuneration committee report 
are positively correlated. According to them, dissent plays a role in moderating future executive 
compensation levels. Iliev and Vitnova (2015) found no evidence that Say on Pay constrained 
CEO pay in the US. In addition to regulation of executive pay in UK and US, the European 
Union also implemented regulation on executive compensation as of January 2014. For 
instance, Murphy (2013) study the European Union bonus caps and find that bonus caps would 
increase risk taking incentives and result in a loss of value in the EU banking sector. Correa and 
Lel (2013) study the effect of Say on Pay in 38 countries and find evidence on restrained CEO 
salaries following Say on Pay regulation.  
The market tracker trend report prepared by Lexis PSL Corporate at LexisNexis for 
the AGM season 2014 reports the details of the resolutions proposed by the FTSE 350 
companies. They found that 233 out of 234 companies reviewed complied with the DRR2013. 
In fact majority of the FTSE 350 companies (around 92%) adopted the remuneration policy 
with immediate effect. Their analysis of the voting results reveals that there were 11 out of 234 
companies with over 30% of votes against the non-binding remuneration report resolution and 
only 5 out of the 234 companies analysed had voted against the new, binding resolution on 
directors’ remuneration policy with over 30% of no votes. This low level of votes against the 
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remuneration policy indicates a level satisfaction with the company’s remuneration policies 
and/or a lack of inertia to change things.  
Overall, the impact of the reform/regulation on executive compensation is rather 
limited, if at all. This is because shareholder’s dissent against executive pay package has been 
rather limited and dissent only arises in case of very high remuneration and when there is 
negative operating performance. What explains this? One possibility is to argue that the ‘say 
on pay’ is not sufficient to restrict CEO compensation. Further, methodological concerns cannot 
be ruled out here. For example, Conyon and Sadler (2010) regresses CEO pay on voting dissent, 
firm performance and some other control variables. Although lagged, reverse causality from 
firm performance to CEO pay cannot be ruled out. Gregory- Smith et al. (2014) too include 
potentially endogenous control variables such as shareholder’s return or board structure to 
estimate executive compensation, which are likely to produce biased estimates. At best, these 
estimates provide correlations and not causal effects of the ‘say on pay’ regulations. 
 
 
3.2.3. Effect of executive compensation on firm financing and 
performance 
 
Since the early 80s, there have been studies on the relation between executive 
compensation and financing decisions [(Agrawal and Mandelkar (1987); John & John, (1993)]; 
executive compensation and investment decisions [(Lambert, (1986); Smith and Watts, (1992); 
Hirshleifer and Suh, (1992); Coles et. al. (2006)]; compensation and performance [Murphy, 
(1985); Jensen and Murphy, (1990)]; Pay and takeovers [Agrawal (1981)]. Given our 
objectives, we shall primarily review the literature on executive compensation and firm 
financing and also executive compensation and firm performance as we develop the hypotheses 
of our interest in these respects.    
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Theory (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985) suggests that both executive stock options and the 
bonus components of compensation affect corporate risk-taking. However, the focus of the 
academic research on the relation between executive stock options and risk has mainly led to 
mixed results. Although theory suggests that option-based compensation should encourage risk-
taking because the convex compensation scheme mitigates the effect of managerial risk-
aversion, other studies have argued that its validity depends on the managerial utility function. 
For example, Guay (1999) shows that the convexity of the payoff structure from options may 
not provide the CEO with increased incentives to take on risky projects because it can be offset 
by the concavity of the risk-averse manager's utility. 
 
Similarly, empirical evidence on the relation between options and managerial risk-taking 
is mixed. On one hand studies such as Coles et al., (2006) find a positive relationship between 
option-based compensation incentives and firm leverage, others such as Graham et al. (2004) 
find lower debt levels for firms with more option-based compensation.  
 
A nascent literature recognises that the bias of loss aversion is a significant determinant of 
manager financing decisions. More recently, a growing literature examines the effects of 
managerial irrationality on corporate capital structure. Theoretically this literature tends to 
show the role of  CEO emotional biases (e.g., optimism, loss aversion, overconfidence) to 
explain firm’s capital structure choice, which is also supported by their data analyses. In 
particular, Azouzi and Jarboui (2012) argued that CEO optimism level is positively correlated 
with a preference for internally generated resources and debt but negatively associated with 
capital increase. Optimistic CEOs are reluctant to ask the market to avoid being evaluated risk. 
Empirical literature on the effects of CEO overconfidence on their decision and firm 
performance is mixed.  Women are considered more risk averse than men, while young 
investors are overconfident and take more risk compared to older CEO’s.  
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3.2.4. Hypotheses Development 
 
With a view to assess the impact of the executive compensation on capital structure and firm 
performance, we integrate various strands of the literature to develop the following hypotheses 
in this section.  
3.2.4.1. Executive compensation and capital structure 
 
 There is some disagreement in the literature about the nature of the relationship between 
capitals structure and executive pay, particularly looking at its different components. In his free 
cash flow hypothesis, Jensen (1986) acknowledged the presence of agency costs of debt, which 
is an owner-creditor phenomenon; but he argues that the benefits of debt in reducing the owner-
manager conflicts over cash-flow payout may outweigh the owner-creditor agency costs of 
debt. The strength of debt financing in this regard arises due to its contractual payout 
commitments, which mitigate shareholder concerns over managers' discretionary use of cash 
flow. For firms with high discretionary cash balances or cash flow, leverage may be an 
alternative to incentive pay as the governance mechanism. Additionally, use of debt improves 
observability of performance in the sense that a firm's ability to meet contractual obligations 
provides signals about the financial status of the firm, reducing the advantage of using incentive 
pay to align owners' and managers' interests [Ross (1977)].  In contrast, studies such as Jensen 
and Meckling (1976); John and John (1993); Bryan et al. (2000), Hassan and Hoshino (2008), 
Andrikopoulos (2009) and Sepe (2011) argue that there is a negative relationship between the 
option pay and firm leverage: these studies report a decreasing impact of CEO option 
compensation on leverage highlighting the role of debt agency theory.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that stock options tie the wealth of the CEO and equity holders together and 
mitigate agency problems between them (e.g. free cash flow theory). When debtholders are 
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informed of this CEO compensation structure, they become reluctant to grant funds and ask for 
higher returns. It is because they know the option payments have no downside for the CEO due 
to the convex payoff structure. The CEO with a high option pay wants to increase stock price 
volatility by investing in more risky projects, which will increase the risk of default. In that 
case, debtholders bear the risk of those investments while the CEO and shareholders get the 
majority of the return. So, the wealth is shifted away from debtholders to shareholders. 
Consequently, debtholders demand higher returns; which potentially creates the agency cost of 
debt. To keep the cost of debt at minimum, the firm with large option based compensation 
optimally chooses less debt, thus lowering leverage.  
John and John (1993) provide an alternative explanation to the negative relationship 
between pay‐performance sensitivity and leverage. According to them, increases in leverage 
should lead to a lower pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay. They consider the owner-
creditor conflicts arising from compensation contracts strongly align managers' interest with 
shareholders' interest. Such contracts induce managers to shift into higher risk projects to the 
detriment of debtholders, thereby increasing the agency costs of debt. They conclude that 
shareholders of highly levered firms can benefit from adopting a compensation contract with 
lower sensitivity to firm performance, and that this might explain the low pay-for-performance 
sensitivity found in many empirical studies.  
Berger et. al (1997), MacMinn and Page Jr. (2006), Coles et. al (2006) and Tchistyi et. 
al (2011), however, support the managerial agency theory and argue that the relationship 
between CEO option pay and leverage is likely to be positive. CEO avoids equity funding and 
turns to debtholders if shares are under-priced and creditors are not well informed. Executives 
compensated highly with options are willing to increase volatility and engage in risk taking 
decisions [Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1991)]. If 
debtholders are not fully aware of this option pay and its wealth shifting implications, the CEO 
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with large option pay can borrow more from debtholders. By doing so, the CEO may boost 
stock price volatility and extract more wealth from the option compensation as the shares 
become riskier. This may destroy the firm value and harm the shareholders. Consequently, as 
the CEO receives more options, excessive amount of debt is raised that increases the leverage 
ratio.  
The above arguments seem to rest on one common assumption that financial market 
participants as well as company managers always act rationally. However, an emerging 
literature on human psychology and behavior shows that most people, including investors and 
managers, are subject to important limits in their cognitive processes and tend to develop 
behavioral biases that can significantly influence their decisions.  
A nascent literature recognises that the bias of loss aversion is a significant determinant 
of manager financing decisions. Psychological studies document that loss aversion causes 
people to overestimate risk, be more uncertain about forecasts and opt for making it safer to 
limit the likelihood of his removal. Helliar et. al. (2005), argue that loss averse leaders seek to 
avoid the worst-case scenarios. They not only use the tools of risk management to reduce the 
variance of cash flows but rather to avoid the worst scenarios that influence the risk of 
bankruptcy or preventing the company to take advantage of profitable investment. They refuse 
to debt financing (to avoid the risk of bankruptcy) and prefer self-financing. 
 Kisgen (2006), shows that the level of debt affects the credit rating in a negative way. 
Thus, a downpour in the loss leader that seeks the minimization of the probability of loss for 
him and are firm to promote his business interests in the financial market. It avoids as soon as 
possible its use of debt financing to improve the rating and the performance of its business.  
Moores & Chang (2009), assume that the volatility of the securities is an important 
determinant of ownership structure. Thus, managerial loss aversion and awareness of the 
variation in stock returns of the business (or their value on the market) reduces its financing by 
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issuing shares to avoid a loss under evaluation. They opts for the issuance of shares if the market 
overestimates the business. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), argue that leaders can be 
encouraged not to invest so as not to be challenged in their "quiet life". This kind of 
conservatism is a way to counteract the risk of loss of control (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). Thus, 
the loss aversion of the manager due to a hostile takeover bid (hostile takeover) may force him 
not to invest in projects with positive returns if financed by issuing shares. 
Nosic and Weber (2008), analyze the risk-taking determinants and note that perceptions 
of risk and expected returns affect the behavior of risk-taking. They show that uncertainty 
regarding the expected returns of the company affects the individual’s risk-taking. Indeed an 
uncertain leader of productive capacity of his company engages in conduct designed to respect 
the interests of the firm. It seeks to make themselves heard and be respected by the main 
shareholders. Loss averse CEO’s that seeks the maximization of shareholder wealth has an 
interest to fund growth opportunities through internal funding. These studies suggest that the 
introduction of the behavioral dimension in the analysis of funding decision confirms the 
pecking order theory (POT). 
Azouzi and Jarboui’s (2012) research examines the determinants of firms’ capital 
structure introducing a behavioral perspective. Theoretically they show that CEO emotional 
biases (e.g., optimism, loss aversion, overconfidence) can explain firm’s capital structure 
choice, which is also supported by their data analyses. In particular, CEO optimism level is 
positively correlated with a preference for internally generated resources and debt but 
negatively associated with capital increase. Optimistic CEO is reluctant to ask the market to 
avoid being evaluated risk. They prefer to fund projects primarily through internal capital, debt 
and then finally external equity (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012), thus supporting the pecking order 
theory. Also CEO loss aversion level is negatively correlated with firms’ leverage ratios and 
capital increase.  
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Taken together, we hypothesize, 
H1 a): Greater share of equity linked compensation ratio is likely to lower firm’s 
reliance on debt provided CEOs act rationally. 
Note that most empirical studies [e.g., Coles et al., (2006); DeFusco et al., (1991); Knopf 
et al., (2002); Rajgopal and Shevlin, (2002); Tufano, (1996)], have focused almost exclusively 
on stock options, leaving a gap in the literature with respect to the relationship between CEO 
bonus compensation and capital structure of the firm. As such the effects of other components 
of the executive pay package, e.g., cash salary or bonus, is relatively less explored; we attempt 
to bridge this gap in the literature. 
Theoretically, one can argue that an increase in executive bonus component is likely to 
encourage managers to take riskier projects with higher returns. This is because bonuses are 
linked to higher returns from the project choice, which in turn, would encourage more debt even 
if it increases the risk of bankruptcy. The empirical evidence on the effect of executive bonuses 
on risk-taking, however, remains rather sparse. The 2009 UK Treasury Select Committee 
Report on bank pay has slammed bonus schemes for encouraging risk-taking at the expense of 
shareholder interests and the long-term health of the banks themselves. The same argument is 
applicable to the executive compensation packages for the non-financial firms as the bonus 
schemes inherently introduces a short-termism in project planning and choice by company 
executives with a view to maximise current returns.2 Recent controversies related to Wall Street 
bonuses have redirected attention toward executive bonus plans. One of the few studies in this 
respect is by Duru et al. (2012) who examine the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions 
and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Their results suggest that that because of a 
greater default risk and higher agency costs of debt, a highly leveraged firm is likely to switch 
                                                          
2 https://www.ft.com/content/4a8c1298-66c5-11dd-808f-0000779fd18c  
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from an ROE-based bonus compensation system to ROA-based compensation, thus lending 
support to the efficient contracting hypothesis.  
H1 b): Greater share of bonus in executive compensation is likely to boost firm’s 
reliance on debt rather than equity provided CEOs act rationally. 
 
3.2.4.2. Executive compensation and Performance 
 
 Pay for performance is an important element of good management. The question 
however gets more complex when we try to consider what kind of pay for what kind of 
performance. The history of research on the effect of executive compensation on firm 
performance dates back to the 1980s. The separation of ownership and control was a classic 
example of agency problem. Optimal contracting3 and performance linked compensation is 
believed to minimise agency problems by aligning the interest of the self-interested risk averse 
executive with the shareholders [Hart & Holmstrom, (1987)]. Initial research in this respect 
focuses on reporting the relation between executive pay and firm performance [Murphy, (1985); 
Jensen and Murphy, (1990)].  
 Empirical evidence on the relationship between executive compensation and 
performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, optimal contracting predicts a positive relation 
between executive compensation and performance [Jensen and Murphy, (1990); John et al., 
(2010)] due to the assumption that executives have limited control in determining their pay 
[Dong et. al., (2010); Borisova et. al. (2012)]. On the other hand, compensation packages are 
considered to be an outcome of close personal contacts and negotiation between the CEO’s and 
weak corporate board. The latter is likely to worsen agency problems by increasing the 
divergence of interest between employees and shareholders [Bebchuk and Fried, (2003); Van 
                                                          
3 See Holmstron (1979); Hart & Holmstron (1987) for a survey on optimal contracting literature. 
  
81 
 
Essen et. al. (2012)]. This view does not necessarily predict a relation between compensation 
and performance.    
 The increasing pay levels and the lack of its link with performance has recently gained a 
lot of attention. The board of director’s inability to structure executive pay, has led to research 
examining the effects of board composition and board structure. Many empirical papers have 
examined the relation between top executive compensation and board composition and there 
have been mixed findings.  While some document a positive relation between CEO 
compensation and the percentage of the board composed of outside directors, Lambert et al. 
(1993) and Boyd (1994) others find that compensation is unrelated to the percentage of outside 
directors on the board [Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989)].  
Core et. al. (1999) find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a 
significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for 
standard economic determinants of pay. Their results suggest CEOs earn greater compensation 
when governance structures are less effective and that firms with weaker governance structures 
have greater agency problems. Also CEOs of firms with greater agency problems receive 
greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse. 
More recently studies have been done to explain the recent trends in executive 
compensation. Several explanations including principal-agent theory, managerial rent 
extraction, the heterogeneity in the firm size, competition for managerial talent etc. are offered 
for explaining excessive executive compensation. In particular, Studies suggest that managers’ 
ability to extract rents can be one explanation of the recent trends in compensation [Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, (2001); Bebchuk and Fried, (2003); Kuhnen and Zwiebel, (2009)]. Mangers 
can skim profits from the firm in the presence of a weak corporate governance and hence get 
overpaid. Acharya et. al. (2011) examine the link between corporate governance, pay for 
performance and scarcity of managerial talent. They suggest that better corporate governance 
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could indeed reduce managerial pay. However, when there is an active market for scarce 
managerial talent, firms are forced to choose weaker corporate governance and to leave rents 
for managers. Firms use a weak corporate governance as a substitute for executive 
compensation to attract better managers. They also link the level of executive pay to the 
heterogeneity in firm size and suggest that investment size can be a feasible way to attract better 
managers. They find that firms that invest more, attract better mangers and will choose worse 
corporate governance. Conversely, firms that invest less attract worse managers and will choose 
better corporate governance. 
Another potential explanation is the change in the demand and supply of managerial 
talent which can have a profound effect on executive pay. An increase in the demand for skilled 
managers will increase pay. CEO pay has risen because of increase in general managerial skills 
relative to firms-specific abilities (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007).  
Existing literature however tend to overlook the effects of different components of 
compensation of firm performance. Generally speaking, one needs a holistic approach that 
would favour compensation schemes designed to reward long-term as well as short-term 
performance, encourage retention, recognize special needs of an organization, be based on the 
achievement of both financial and non-financial objectives, and in general create value for 
shareholders. Since equity based compensation links up the wealth of the CEO and equity 
holders together, it not only mitigates agency problems between them but also motivates 
managers to invest in value adding projects in their own self- interest. This automatically 
increases firm performance. Hence, firms that offer more equity based compensation are likely 
to perform better. 
 
 
 
  
83 
 
 
Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H2a: Higher share of equity-linked compensation is likely to improve firm 
performance. 
There are four possible theoretical reasons in favour of positive effects of bonuses on firm 
performance [Han & Shen, (2007)]. First relates to motivation: it is argued that bonuses are 
likely to induce employees to exert greater effort or develop innovative ways to improve 
operational efficiency, thereby enhancing organizational performance [(Ben-Ner and Jones, 
(1995); Blasi et al., (1996); Fakhfakh and Perotin, 2000)]. The expectation of high future cash 
and/or stock bonuses which are dependent on a firm’s profitability and stock prices motivates 
its employees to work harder and smarter [Bhargava, (1994); Kruse, (1993); Kumbhakar and 
Dunbar, (1993); Weitzman and Kruse, (1990)]. Second, cash and stock bonuses can mitigate 
agency problems inherent in a fixed-wage employment contract and reduce the impact of any 
conflict of interests between the owner and employees [Blasi et al., (1996); Kruse, (1993)]. 
With this realignment of interests, it can be expected that employees become more committed 
to the firm’s objectives and aim to achieve the ultimate goals of higher profitability and boost 
firm performance. Third, when the payment of cash and stock bonuses is an ‘add-on’ portion 
of the total remuneration of an employee, this portion may have an ‘efficiency-wage’ effect that 
can reduce employees’ shirking, decrease turnover problems, attract better qualified job 
applicants and foster increased reciprocity in social exchanges between the firm and its 
employees [Akerlof and Yellen, (1986); Yellen, (1984)]. Collectively, these benefits facilitate 
the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and organizational competencies, thus 
improving overall firm performance [Ben-Ner et al., (2000)]. Fourth, providing cash and stock 
bonuses can create peer group pressure and motivate employees to monitor their co-workers in 
order to ensure that high performance standards the firm are the rule [(FitzRoy and Kraft, 
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(1986); Kruse, (1993); Levine and Tyson, (1990)]. More importantly, the interdependent nature 
of these group incentives at the same time encourages cooperation among employees 
(Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). Cooperation may foster the evolution of a group norm and, 
therefore, enhance firm performance (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). It is likely that cooperation 
may facilitate information flow within the firm and, in all likelihood, increase flexibility in 
management, thus again contributing to improved firm performance (Kruse, 1993; Putterman, 
1982; Strauss, 1990). 
  
Theoretical arguments that are not in favor of the positive performance effects of cash 
and stock bonuses relate to problems associated with group incentives. For one, it is claimed 
that such group incentives as cash and stock bonuses may induce ‘free-rider’ problems among 
employees according to which an individual employee may have a tendency to shirk his/her 
responsibilities, particularly in the event that group incentives are shared equally and the 
connection between individual efforts and personal reward is a weak one (Blasi et al.,1996). If 
the free-rider problem prevails, then the overall performance of the firm with group incentives 
could even deteriorate, as participants in the so-called ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ game will lead to 
a sub-optimal equilibrium (Kruse, 1993). The second argument against the positive 
performance effects of these group incentives draws on the theory of team production (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972). This theory posits that optimal monitoring requires that the management 
of the firm be the ‘residual claimant’ of the equity of the firm. If profits are shared with 
employees under group incentives, then management’s motivation to supervise employees may 
be diluted. And thus, firm performance may be reduced accordingly (Jensen and Meckling, 
1979). 
. 
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While empirical evidence in this matter is scanty, an online forum discussion of the 
Harvard Business School4 concluded that compensation schemes should focus more on the 
long-term health of the firm. Thus there seems to be a consensus in favour of reasonable 
incentives for short-term performance and higher incentives for long-term performance. The 
underlying rationale is that a CEO must develop and implement strategies that provide long-
term sustainable outcomes to the benefit of shareholders. Since the cash bonus (as opposed to 
equity) component of a CEO is likely to focus more on the short-term performance of the firm 
to which it is inherently linked, it is likely that the positive incentive effects of bonuses may be 
outweighed by its negative effects, especially if it is linked to group incentive mechanism that 
fails to recognise individual efforts. 
Taken together, we hypothesize the following:  
H2b: Higher share of bonus compensation is likely to have an ambiguous effect on 
firm performance depending on whether the positive incentive effect is greater than, equal to 
or less than the negative disincentive effects. 
Using the data compiled from various official sources, we shall now assess the validity 
of these hypotheses. In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature in two ways. First, we 
focus on the role of different components of executive pay package rather than total executive 
compensation on firm financing decisions and performance as reflected in our hypotheses 
above. Empirically, unlike the bulk of the literature, we address the simultaneity issue between 
executive compensation on the one hand and capital structure/performance on the other; 
otherwise the estimates are likely to be biased.  We provide a clear identification by using a 
natural experiment to address the circularity between executive compensation and leverage in 
our analysis. This is explained in the methodology section below. 
 
 
                                                          
4 https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/how-should-pay-be-linked-to-performance  
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3.3. Data & Methodology  
 
 3.3.1. Data Description 
 
We compile data on compensation and executive characteristics from BoardEx and 
other firm specific information is obtained from Datastream. Data contains a list of quoted 
companies for period of 2010 to 2016, as defined by the Companies Act 2006. Our sample 
contains 1,076 companies registered in the UK and with equity listed on the main market in the 
UK, in another state in the European Economic Area or on the New York Stock Exchange or 
NASDAQ, which forms our treated group as it is mandatory for these listed UK firms to comply 
with the DRR 2013. The group of treated firms are listed in of FTSE 100, FTSE250, FTSE 
TECHMARK ALL-SHARE, FTSE SMALL CAP, ISEQ OVERALL, BCN GLOBAL 100, 
IBEX, EUROTOP 100, HANG SENG, Stoxx Euro, S&P 500, Stoxx Europe 50, RTS Index, 
S&P/ASX100, S&P/ASX200, and TecDAX. Note that 4,05 UK companies were cross-listed 
or listed as AIM companies who were not required to comply with the DRR 2013 form our 
control group; the latter includes  firms listed in  FTSE AIM, ASX ALL ORDINARIES, ISEQ 
OVERALL, JSE ALL SHARE, S&P/ASX300, and S&P/TSX COMPOSITE. We winsorize all 
the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution to avoid that outliers 
drive our results. 
Dependent variable: 
1. Capital structure ratios: 
We consider three measures of leverage which are: 1) total debt to total assets 2) total 
liabilities to total assets and 3) debt to equity. These are widely used measures of leverage 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995, Boothe et al., 2001; Frank and Goyal, 2009) 
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2. Performance of the firm :   
We consider Tobins’ Q as a measure for market performance. It is constructed as the ratio 
of the sum of total debt and market capital to total assets. (Zeitun and Tian, 2007).  
Key explanatory variables: Compensation Ratios:    
For our analysis, we use five share compensation ratios: 1) Equity to total compensation ratio; 
2) Bonus to total compensation ratio; 3) Salary/cash to total compensation ratio; 4) Natural 
logarithm of total compensation. 
Table B 1 (in the Appendix B) reports the summary statistics and the definitions of all variables 
used in our analysis.  
 
3.3.2. Methodology 
 
To test our capital structure hypotheses [(H1a) & (H1b)], we aim to estimate the effect 
of various components of compensation to total compensation ratios (CR) on a set of capital 
structure (CS) measures. The basic OLS regression for doing so is as follows:   
              𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                          (1) 
The corresponding OLS equation to test our second hypothesis (H2) that assess the 
impact of various compensation ratios CR on firm performance (P) is: 
             𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                          (2) 
However CR is likely to be potentially endogenous in both equations (1) and (2); just 
as CR may affect CS or P, the latter may also influence CR and this simultaneity is likely to 
give rise to biases (upward/downward) while estimating equations (1) and (2) using OLS. In 
such a case establishing a causal relationship is difficult. A common remedy for endogeneity is 
finding an instrument for the endogenous compensation ratio variable, using a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) instrumental variable method. 
  
88 
 
An instrument for CR is a variable that satisfies two conditions i.e. the relevance and 
exclusion conditions (Robert & Whited, 2012). The first condition requires that the partial 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable not be zero. The second 
condition or the exclusion condition requires that zero covariance between the instrument (s) 
and the error terms   
In conjunction with the relevance condition, the exclusion restriction implies that the 
only role that the instruments plays in influencing the outcome variable is through its effect on 
the endogenous variable CR. 
 An instrument for CR needs to be correlated with CR, but uncorrelated with the error 
term  of the capital structure equation (1) & performance equation (2). In this respect, we 
exploit the exogenous variation pertaining to the introduction of the DRR2013 (see Appendix 
C) as a possible natural experiment because it was introduced by the government (where the 
companies did not have any influence), thus ensuring both its correlation with CR and 
exogeneity in determining capital structure measures Y.  This requires a two-step estimation as 
follows:  
1. First Stage: Estimate the predicted value CR as CR IV using Treated, PostDRR and 
Treated*PostDRR as the possible instruments using the following equation.  
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾3(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑡) + 𝛾𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                       (3)         
Where, 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the set of selected measures of compensation ratio (as a share a total 
compensation) of firm i operating in sector j in the year t, t=2000-2016. Among various 
subscripts, t denotes year, 𝑖 denotes firm, j denotes sector. Treated is the dummy that takes the 
value 1 for a list of UK quoted companies, as defined by the Companies Act 2006 and 0 
otherwise (Cross-listed and AIM companies). This comprises of companies registered in the 
UK and with equity listed on the main market in the UK, in another state in the European 
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Economic Area or on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. PostDRR is the dummy 
that take the value 1 for post DRR i.e. for t > 2013 when the voting on DRR became binding 
and 0 otherwise.  
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the set of control variables included to minimise the omitted variable bias, if any. We 
control for a set of firm characteristics, which are conventionally believed to affect 
compensation, capital structure and performance of a firm.  This includes size of the firm 
measured as the log of total assets; dummy for the age of the firm which take the value 1 for 
firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise, intangibility as measured by intangible fixed 
assets/total fixed assets and market power calculated as firm sales as a share of sector/industry 
sales. 
𝜑𝑗 refers to the sector dummies, accounting for unobserved industry level (time invariant) 
factors that may influence leverage choice; further 𝜏𝑡 captures unobserved year-specific factors 
that may also influence compensation ratios.  
The coefficient of the interaction term  is of particular interest to us, which captures the 
average treatment effect of DRR reform on the compensation structure of domestic listed firms 
(relative to cross-listed firms which form our control group).  
We use the first stage regression estimates to determine the predicted values of various 
compensation ratios CR which are then used as IVs to determine both capital structure CS 
(Equation 1) and performance P (Equation 2). 
2. Second stage: We replace the endogenous compensation variable CR with its predicted 
values from the first stage CR IV to determine the outcome variable 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 (as per 
Equation 1) to test H1a & H1b.         
 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐶𝑅 𝐼𝑉  𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                               (4) 
We follow similar method to determine firm performance with a view to test H2: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅 𝐼𝑉  𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                (5) 
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Where, 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡  (in equation 4) is the set of selected leverage measures and  𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 (in equation 
5) a measure of performance (to test H2) of firm i operating in sector j in the year t; 𝐶𝑅 𝐼𝑉  𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is the predicted value of CR from the first stage estimates of Equation (3). As before, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
set of control variables  that can also affect compensation and thus helps to minimise the omitted 
variable bias; 𝜑𝑗  refers to the sector dummies, accounting for unobserved industry level (time 
invariant) factors that may influence leverage choice; further 𝜏𝑡 captures unobserved year-
specific factors that may also influence leverage and 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the random error term. In other 
words, equation (4) and (5) provides the 2SLS IV estimates of CS and P respectively and we 
argue that these estimates are preferred to the simple OLS estimates of equation (1) & (2) 
respectively.  
Table 3. 1 reports the mean comparisons of the dependent variables i.e. capital structure 
measures; measures of firm performance and measures of turnover before and after the DRR 
2013. It compares the means of leverage, performance and turnover in the pre and post reform 
years between the treatment and control group. It seems to highlight that in the pre-reform years 
these measures were generally comparable between treatment and control groups for measures 
of leverage and performance. However the reform seems to have a significant impact as the 
difference in these leverage and performance measures becomes significant in the post reform 
years. Measures of turnover on the other hand seems to be different and incomparable in pre-
reform period. 
Table 3. 2 reports the mean comparison of capital structure/performance measures by the 
top quartile (Q4) in the distribution of equity shares and bonus share. Here we compare means 
of capital structure/performance of the top quartile of firms according to the distribution of 
equity and bonus share with the rest. While there is no significant difference in mean values of 
the measure of capital structure based on equity linked compensation, there is a significant 
difference in the means of two sets of results for bonus to compensation. 
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3.4.  Results 
 
This section reports the estimates of our regression equations with a view to test our 
hypotheses. Section 3.4.1 reports the first stage regression results and also checks for the 
validity of the instruments, followed the IV regression estimates of measures of capital structure 
to test the effect of compensation ratios (equity and bonus to total compensation ratio) on capital 
structure of the firm. Section 3.4.2 reports IV regression estimates of performance to test the 
effect of compensation ratios on the market performance.  
 
3.4.1. First – stage regression estimates of compensation ratios 
Table 3. 3 provide the first-stage estimates of equation (3) for four selected CR variables 
through column (1) to (4). We use three instruments i.e. treated, the postDRR dummy and their 
interaction postDRR*treated along with other controls to estimates equation 3. The variable of 
interest here is the coefficient of the interaction term that is 𝛾3 since it captures the average 
treatment effect of DRR2013 on the compensation structure of domestic listed firms (relative 
to cross-listed firms which form our control group). This is positive and significant for equity 
linked compensation to total compensation ratio (column 1) and bonus to total compensation 
ratio (column 2). Note however that the 2013 DRR reform failed to generate statistically 
significant effect among the treated firms either on cash component of compensation (see 
column 3) or on total compensation (see column 4); note that the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term remained insignificant in columns (3) and (4) respectively. In other words, 
there is confirmation that 2013 reform significantly affected only two of the CR variables, 
namely, equity linked compensation to total compensation ratio and bonus to total 
compensation ratio; accordingly, we only consider the effect of these two CRs on capital 
structure (CS) and performance in the second stage. 
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In this context it is also important to formally test the relevance of the instruments and we 
do so by using the partial R-square test, which is the "squared partial correlation" between the 
excluded instruments and the endogenous CRs. The null hypothesis here is that 𝛾3=0. Table 3. 
3 reports the F-statistic (p-value) for the null. The F-statistic is big and the respective p-values 
are 0, thus supporting the relevance of the instruments in our sample.  
Among other results, firm size is positive and significantly related to both equity and 
bonus CR and suggests that bigger firms pay out more equity linked compensation and also 
more bonuses. The proxy for market power of sales is also positive and significant for these 
two CRs which suggests that firms with more market power tend to rely more on equity linked 
compensation and bonuses. Intangibility and firm age seems to have to effect on CRs. 
We use the first stage estimates of equity and bonus compensation ratios to generate the 
IVs for estimating the capital structure and firm performance equations (4) and (5). 
IV validity tests:   
Before discussing the second stage IV estimates of capital structure and performance 
measures, we carry out the diagnostic tests for weak, under as well as over-identification.  
First, we conduct the under-identification test of included instruments. It is an LM test 
of whether the equations (4) and (5) are identified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are 
"relevant", meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. The test is essentially the test 
of the rank of a matrix: under the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. A 
rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., the model is identified. 
Table 3. 3 also reports the LM F-Statistic and p-values; since the p-values are quite low, we 
reject the null hypothesis of under identification against the alternative of identification. 
 
Second, the problem of weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are 
only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. Estimators can perform poorly when 
instruments are weak, and different estimators are more robust to weak instruments (e.g., 
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LIML) than others (e.g., IV). Stock and Yogo (2005) proposed testing for weak instruments. 
The null hypothesis here is that the estimator is weakly identified and a rule thumb for the 
rejection of the null is when the Cragg-Donald F statistic is greater than 10. The Cragg-Donald 
F statistic and its p-values are reported in Table 3. 3. The F-Stats are greater than 10  which 
exceeds the rule of thumb for strong instruments (F ≥ 10) proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) 
as well as 15% critical threshold value in Table 5.2 of Stock and Yogo (2005, p. 101). Thus, 
weak identification is unlikely to be of any concern in our analysis.  
Finally, the Hansen’s J statistic reported in Table 3. 3 is a test of over-identifying 
restrictions. This is required as we have three IVs for one potentially endogenous variable, 
namely, the particular compensation ratio variable. The joint null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is 
distributed as chi-squared in the number of (L-K) over-identifying restrictions. A rejection casts 
doubt on the validity of the instruments (Hayashi, 2000). As reported in the Table the p-values 
of the J- statistic are big enough, thus indicating that we do not reject the null hypothesis of IV 
validity. 
  
Instrumental Variable estimates of debt-to-assets ratio: Having tested the IV validity, 
we consider the Table 3. 4 estimates that summarise both the OLS estimates (Equation 1) and 
IV regression estimates of debt to assets ratio as a measure of capital structure (as per Equation 
4) with a view to compare them. The dependent variable here is total debt to total assets ratio 
which is our first measure of capital structure. The key explanatory variables are the 
compensation ratios and given the Table 3. 3 estimates we focus on equity compensation ratio 
[see column (1) for OLS estimates and column (2) for IV estimates] and bonus compensation 
ratio [see column (3) for OLS estimates and column (5) for IV estimates]. Both OLS and IV 
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estimates for the effect of equity linked compensation to total compensation ratio on total debt 
total assets seem to be negative and significant (column 1 & 2), controlling for all other factors. 
However, the magnitude of the effects is much stronger for IV estimates; in other words the 
OLS estimate equity compensation ratio tend to underestimate the true effect of compensation 
on pay structure. 
In other words, the IV estimate of total debt to total assets (column 2) declines 
significantly in response to increasing ratio of equity linked compensation to total 
compensation. This provide support to our hypothesis H1a) indicating that an increase in the 
equity linked compensation ratio aligns managers better with the shareholders (via the incentive 
effect), thus inducing them to lower the reliance on debt. This is because equity linked 
compensation ties the wealth of the mangers and the shareholders together, thereby reducing 
agency problems. Exactly, how equity compensation share affects debt to assets ratio, depends 
on implementation of DRR2013.  It follows from our discussion in Appendix C that the granting 
‘Say on Pay’ to shareholders has had a limited impact on executive compensation:  shareholders 
in a small minority firms voted against the executive remuneration proposal; in particular, less 
than 10% votes were cast against in 2015-16. So the main channel through which DRR 2013 
can affect compensation is through the 2013 rule requiring disclosure of the executive 
compensation that informs company creditors; the latter in turn strengthens the debt-agency 
view for H1a,  relating to the impact of the equity compensation share. 
We find that the effect of higher bonus compensation ratio on debt ratio contrasts with 
that for the equity compensation share. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. 4 report the OLS and IV 
estimates of effects of the bonus ratio on total debt to  total assets with a view to test our H1b. 
Evidently both OLS and IV estimates of bonus compensation ratio on debt ratio has been 
positive and statistically significant. However, OLS estimates are unreliable due to endogeneity 
of the CR. Further the magnitude of the effect is much stronger for the IV estimates. This result 
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therefore confirms the validity of our hypothesis H1b. In particular, higher bonuses tends to 
encourage managers to take more debt even if it increases the risk of bankruptcy.  
 Among other controls, only firm size and Market power index of sales are positive and 
significantly related to debt to assets ratio. This suggests that bigger firms and firms with a 
larger sales to industry ratio generally have a higher debt to assets ratio. Intangibility and firm 
age seems to have no effect on total debt to total asset ratio. These results are similar in columns 
(2) and (4) irrespective of whether we consider the effect of equity or bonus compensation 
shares 
 
3.4.2. Instrumental Variable estimates of Tobin’s Q 
Table 3. 5 reports the OLS and IV regression estimates of effect of selected CRs on tobin’s 
Q, a measure of market performance that we choose to focus on. As with the debt-to-assets 
ratio, IV estimates of Tobin’s Q use the predicted value of equity and bonus ratio from Table 
3. 3 as a relevant and valid IV for these variables to determine Tobin’s Q.  
While equity linked compensation ratio has a positive and significant effect on market 
performance (both OLS/IV; column 1&2 respectively), bonus to total compensation ratio 
doesn’t seem to have any significant effect on performance of the firm (both OLS/IV estimates 
are insignificant; column 3 & 4 respectively). This lends support to our  hypothesis H2 a)  and 
suggests that tying up managerial wealth to shareholders wealth via equity compensation 
incentives s encourages manages to put more efforts to maximise shareholder’s wealth. There 
is, however, no evidence to support hypothesis H2 b) in that the bonus compensation ratio 
remains statistically insignificant in determining Tobin’s Q, indicating that the positive 
incentive effects are exactly outweighed by negative disincentive effects. 
Amongst all the other control variables only size has a negative and significant effect on 
market performance which suggest that smaller firms perform better. 
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3.5.  Robustness 
 
We carry out four robustness tests. First, we repeat the same analysis using two other 
measures of capital structure, namely, debt to equity ratio and total liability to total asset. Table 
3. 6 reports and compares the OLS/IV estimates of debt to equity ratio while Table 3. 7 report 
reports OLS/IV estimates for total liability to total assets. 
Column 1 and 2 compare the OLS and IV estimates of the effect of increase in equity 
compensation ratio on debt-equity ratio, while column (3 & 4) OLS and IV estimates of the 
effect of bonus compensation ratio on debt-equity ratio. As before IV estimates shown in 
columns 2 and 4 of the Table are preferable to the OLS estimates shown in columns (1) and (3) 
respectively; these estimates also confirm the validity of our hypotheses H1a) and H1b): while 
higher equity compensation lowers debt, greater bonus tends to boost it. 
Similarly, In Table 3. 7 we compare the OLS (1 & 2) and IV estimates of the effect of 
equity to total compensation ratio on total liability to total assets, while column (3 & 4) OLS 
and IV estimates of the effect of bonus to total compensation ration on total liability to total 
assets controlling for all other factors. While OLS estimates (column 1&3) on the effect of 
equity to total compensation ratio on total liability to total assets are insignificant, IV estimates 
(column 3 & 4) are negative and significant for the effect of ratio of equity linked compensation 
to total compensation (confirming H1a: higher equity compensation lowers debt) and positive 
and significant for the effect of bonus to total compensation (confirming H1b: higher bonus 
component raises debt). 
Second, we want to assess that the observed effects of equity and bonus compensation 
ratios on selected capital structure ratios is not a derivative of the influence of the CEO on the 
remuneration committee. It follows from the literature that a reduction in CEO’s influence in 
determining their own compensation helps mitigate the managerial agency problems (Jiraporn 
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and Gleason (2007); Faulkender et al. (2011)). Not surprisingly, the presence/absence of a CEO 
as a member of the remuneration committee can influence remuneration committees’ decision. 
A firm with a strong CG will be the one with “CEO- free” compensation committee. We find 
that there are some sample firms where the CEO is a member of the compensation committee. 
In order to test the robustness of our estimates, we next drop firms with CEOs on remuneration 
committee and re-estimated the capital structure and performance equations for the subsample 
of firms with “CEO- free” remuneration committee.  
Table 3. 8 and Table 3. 9 report IV estimates of capital structure and performance 
respectively for this subsample. We still obtain the negative (positive) and statistically 
significant effect of share equity (bonus) compensation ratio on capital structure, thus 
confirming the robustness of these estimates. Further the performance estimates too remain 
robust: as before equity linked compensation share boosts firm performance while we do not 
see any significant effect of higher bonus share on Tobin’s Q.  
So far we have used contemporaneous explanatory variables. Therefore, our third test 
use lagged explanatory variables for all three measure of capital structure and performance in 
a bid to rule out any simultaneity bias in our estimates. Table 3. 10 and Table 3. 11 report the 
IV estimates of measures of capital structure and performance respectively, using lagged 
explanatory variables. As earlier equity linked compensation (bonus) has a negative (positive) 
and statistically significant effect on various measures of capital structure as reported in Table 
10. Also, as before equity linked compensation improves firm performance but bonus doesn’t 
seem to have any significant effect on firm performance (see Table 3. 11). 
 Finally, our baseline regressions assume that the managers are assumed to be rational. 
However, in reality managerial biases can affect their decisions (de Meza and Webb 2007). So 
we repeat analysis after controlling for measures of managerial overconfidence, if any. Tahir 
(2014) found that women are less overconfident and more risk averse than men, while young 
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investors are overconfident and more risk taker as compare to older. Following Tahir (2016), 
we therefore additionally control for CEO age and gender to account for cognitive bias of the 
CEOs, if any. Table 3. 12 Panel A  reports the estimates of CR and Panel B reports the IV 
estimates to capital structure measure. We still find confirmation of our baseline results that the 
treated firms tend to have more equity and bonus after the 2013 reform; the interaction dummy 
remain statistically insignificant for cash component and total compensation as before. Note 
also that both the age and the gender of CEOs are statistically significant in both equity and 
bonus component determination, among others. As before, our second stage IV estimates of 
capital structure remain unchanged confirming that greater equity compensation lowers reliance 
on debt while greater bonus compensation increases it.  
Overall, these robustness tests further strengthen the fitness of our empirical strategy 
and also confirm the validity of our hypotheses. 
 
3.5.1. Placebo Test  
 
The UK corporate governance regime has undergone a series of regulations over the years as 
such it is plausible that our results are influenced by some pre policy trends. Therefore, this 
section presents a placebo tests as an additional robustness check. To check if this underlying 
trend had any effect on our results, we conduct our analysis for the pre-policy period of 2010- 
2012. 
Specifically, instead of the DRR taking place from 2013 onwards, it is assumed that it 
took place from 2011 onwards. If there are any pre-existing trends, then there should be a 
significant impact of compensation ratios on measures of capital structure and firm 
performance. On the other hand, if we fail to identify any significant effects for these placebo 
time periods, then this lends support to the credibility of the chosen treatment period in our 
analysis. Table 3.13 reports first stage regression results or estimates of compensation ratio 
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using the placebo reform year. The coefficient of the interaction terms of treated and the placebo 
year 2011 are all insignificant, as such the instrument (Treated*post2011) fails the relevant 
condition of being correlated to the endogenous compensation ratios. We therefore conclude 
that insignificance of the interaction term (Treated*post2011) strengthens the validity of our 
empirical strategy and results. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion  
 
We assess the casual impact of different components of pay package on capital structure 
and performance. We hypotheses that different components of the pay package effect firms’ 
reliance on debt/equity and firm performance differently. While Greater share of equity linked 
compensation ratio is likely to lower firm’s reliance on debt and improve firm performance, 
greater share of bonus in executive compensation is likely to boost firm’s reliance on debt rather 
than equity and is likely to have an ambiguous effect on firm performance depending on 
whether the positive incentive effect is greater than, equal to or less than the negative 
disincentive effects. 
We find evidence that the regulation has been rather ineffective in directly controlling 
excessive executive compensation. Share of equity based compensation and bonuses have in 
fact increased following the DRR2013. This is expected considering limited shareholder’s 
dissent (see Appendix C); it seems to suggest that the DRR has been a symbolic action of the 
government that failed to address the excessive compensation issue effectively.  
However, the reform generated some indirect effects- beneficial as well as not so 
beneficial. Different components of the pay package seem to affect capital structure and 
performance differently. On the one hand, an increase in equity linked compensation to total 
compensation ratio reduces reliance on debt and improves market performance of firms as 
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reflected in Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, increase in bonus to total compensation ratio 
increases capital structure and doesn’t affect performance significantly.  In other words, these 
results indicate that excessive executive compensation not only worsen the income inequality, 
but also has longer term impact for corporate well-being. In particular, our analysis highlights 
the relative benefits of equity based compensation; in contrast cash-based bonus compensation 
seems to generate some undesirable effects on corporate capital structure as it increases firms’ 
reliance on debt while failing to boost firms’ market performance. We argue that these results 
are mainly driven by the disclosure of the executive compensation that informs company 
creditors which in turn strengthens the debt-agency theory. We hope these results will inform 
the policy makers which in turn may shape future compensation policies in the UK.   
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Tables 3 
 
Table 3. 1 Mean comparisons of share compensation ratios; measures of capital 
structure; performance and turnover between the treatment and control group in pre 
and post DRR period.  
 
Variable PreDRR PostDRR 
Share Compensation Treated Control t-stat Treated Control t-stat 
Cash to total compensation  0.3375922 1.025666 6.4578*** 0.2676327 0.7866683 4.8265*** 
Bonus to total compensation  0.1050658 0.0857231 -2.5318 0.0977186 0.0719371 -2.6369 
Equity to total compensation  0.46161 0.43913 -2.3867 0.45234 0.40079 -4.0359 
       
Capital structure measures       
Total debt to total assets 0.1511352 0.1463532 -0.7509 0.1549424 0.1557188 0.0905 
Total liability to  total assets 0.4771981 0.4244578 -5.046*** 0.4643491 0.4177007 -3.455** 
Debt to equity ratio  0.179967 0.1945592 1.4648 0.1844487 0.1958566 0.8636 
Performance Measure       
Tobin’s Q 1.383336 1.278206 -1.9481** 1.518475 1.266685 -4.180*** 
       
Note: All variables are defined in Table B1 (Appendix B); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Treated is the dummy that takes the value 1 for a list of UK quoted companies and 0 otherwise; PreDRR is the 
period from 2010 to 2013, while postDRR is the period from 2014 to 2016. Variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution to avoid that outliers drive our results. 
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Table 3. 2 Mean comparisons of capital structure/performance measures by Q4=1/0 in the 
distribution of equity and bonus share  
 
Variables    Equity to total compensation    Bonus to total compensation 
Capital structure variable      Q4=0    Q4=1     t-stat      Q4=0      Q4=1      t-stat 
Total debt to total assets .1398 .1401 -0.0510 .1286 .1481 -4.055*** 
Total liability to total assets .4458 .4307 1.938 .4270 .4440 -2.186* 
Debt to equity .1657 .1662 -0.072 .1538 .1749 -2.909* 
Performance variable        
Tobins’ Q 2.059 6.874 -0.748 12.959 3.551 1.501 
Note: All variables are defined in Table B1 (Appendix B). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution to avoid that outliers 
drive our results. 
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Table 3. 3 First Stage estimates of compensation ratios (CR) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Equity/ total 
compensation 
bonus/ total 
compensation 
cash/ total 
compensation 
log(total 
compensation) 
     
Treated 0.0274 -0.0747*** -0.557*** 0.663*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0211) (0.207) (0.144) 
Post DRR -0.0630 -0.00149 -0.208 -0.171 
 (0.0436) (0.0292) (0.183) (0.302) 
Post DRR*Treated 0.0408** 0.0253* 0.116 0.137 
 (0.0184) (0.0134) (0.155) (0.131) 
Firm size 0.0103*** 0.00751** 0.00717 0.397*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00314) (0.0170) (0.0174) 
Age dummy 0.00579 0.00221 0.0169 -0.104 
 (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0960) (0.0686) 
Intangibility -1.67e-05 -7.44e-05 -0.000110 -6.14e-05 
 (0.000121) (8.75e-05) (0.000215) (0.000186) 
Market power 0.405** 0.378* 2.025 -3.372 
 (0.198) (0.208) (1.869) (2.066) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.261**  0.172** 0.599** 1.135*** 
 (0.116) (0.0674) (0.243) (0.418) 
Partial R-sq test: F- Stat(p-value) 16.34(0.000) 18.33(0.000) 11.43(0.000) 8.29(0.0000) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value) 15.552(0.0004) 13.58 (0.0035) 12.23(0.0004) 11.88 (0.000) 
Overid - Hansen J statistic (p-value)         0.814(0.6657) 1.232(0.4433) - - 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
15.87(0.0006) 13.24(0.000) 18.32(0.000) 11.34(0.003) 
     
Observations 2,925 2,901 2,924 2,920 
Root MSE .17804 .16072 1.2588 0.546 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports first stage regression estimates of compensation ratio as per equation 2 i.e equity to total 
compensation ratio and bonus to total compensation ratio used in our analysis. Variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Treated is 
the dummy that takes the value 1 for a list of UK quoted companies and 0 otherwise; PostDRR is the dummy that 
take the value 1 for post DRR i.e. for t > 2013 when the voting on DRR became binding and 0 otherwise; PostDRR 
*Treated is the interaction dummy of PostDRR and Treated; Firm size is the log of total assets; Age dummy is the 
dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the ratio of intangible fixed 
assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to industry sales.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
104 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 4 OLS/IV estimates of total debt to total assets.  
. 
VARIABLES 
Total Debt to Total Assets 
               OLS      IV OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Equity/ Total compensation -0.000937** -0.730*   
 (0.00218) (0.377)   
Bonus/ Total compensation   0.0477** 0.641* 
   (0.000311) (0.336) 
Firm size 0.0161*** 0.0232*** 0.0147*** 0.00962** 
 (0.00300) (0.00508) (0.00303) (0.00456) 
Age dummy 0.00423 0.0102 0.00299 0.00246 
 (0.0123) (0.0159) (0.0127) (0.0156) 
Intangibility 8.62e-05 7.38e-05 6.62e-05 0.000115* 
 (6.22e-05) (0.000110) (6.75e-05) (5.88e-05) 
Market power 0.266 0.553** 0.435** 0.165 
 (0.206) (0.278) (0.212) (0.280) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.0968* 0.118 -0.119** -0.169* 
 (0.0518) (0.164) (0.0552) (0.0881) 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
 14.986(0.000)  14.54(0.009) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value)  15.552(0.0014)  12.552(0.00) 
Observations 2,190 2,190 2,196 2,196 
     
Root Mean Square 0.211 .1931 0.178 0.179 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of total debt to total assets (one of the various measures of capital structure used 
in our analysis). Predicted values of  Equity to total compensation ratio and bonus to total compensation ratios is 
used from the first stage (Table 3.3, column 1 & 2 respectively ) to estimate the effect of Equity to total 
compensation and bonus to total compensation on total deb total assets. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Column (1) and (3) 
report OLS estimates of total debt to total assets, while column (2) and (4) report the IV estimates. Firm size is the 
log of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; 
Intangibility is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a 
share of sector to industry sales.  
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Table 3. 5 OLS/IV estimates of Tobins’ Q  
VARIABLES 
Tobins’ Q 
           OLS      IV OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Equity/ Total compensation 0.901*** .3453*   
 (0.142) (.1872)   
Bonus/ Total compensation   0.276 0.952 
   (0.208) (1.242) 
Firm size -0.118*** -0.148*** -0.107*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0263) (0.0179) (0.0217) 
Age dummy -0.0486 -0.0478 -0.0419 -0.0388 
 (0.0771) (0.0812) (0.0773) (0.0770) 
Intangibility 9.00e-05 8.23e-05 0.000386 0.000433 
 (0.000409) (0.000516) (0.000424) (0.000407) 
Market power 0.104 -0.752 0.342 0.102 
 (0.992) (1.321) (0.993) (1.082) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 2.199*** 1.473** 2.246*** 2.194*** 
 (0.359) (0.699) (0.282) (0.301) 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  15.63(0.000)  17.37(0.003) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value)  12.44(0.000)  11.33(0.000) 
Observations 1,951 1,951 2,002 2,002 
Root Mean Square 0.259 0.040 0.202 0.190 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of performance i.e. Tobins’ Q used in our analysis. Predicted Equity to total 
compensation ratio and bonus to total compensation ratio is used from the first stage (Table 3.3, column 3) to 
estimate the effect of Equity to total compensation (1) and bonus to total compensation ratio. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Column (1) and (3) report OLS estimates of Tobins’ Q (measured as the ratio of sum of total debt and market 
capitalization to total assets), while column (2) and (4) report the IV estimates. Firm size is the log of total assets; 
Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the ratio 
of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to industry 
sales. 
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Table 3. 6 OLS/IV estimates of debt to equity ratio.  
 
Debt to equity ratio 
           OLS      IV OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Equity/ Total compensation 1.140* -1.302**   
 (0.598) (0.660)   
Bonus/ Total compensation   0.0689* 1.152** 
   (0.00461) (0.586) 
Firm size -0.100 0.0216** 0.00746 -0.00190 
 (0.0858) (0.00886) (0.00499) (0.00825) 
Age dummy -0.235 0.0168 -0.000156 -0.00112 
 (0.343) (0.0275) (0.0223) (0.0281) 
Intangibility -0.00170 8.95e-05 0.000133 0.000222* 
 (0.00118) (0.000195) (0.000133) (0.000125) 
Market power 1.925 0.889* 0.486 -0.00677 
 (4.204) (0.462) (0.335) (0.479) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 3.920*** 0.365 -0.0421 -0.133 
 (1.341) (0.272) (0.0764) (0.131) 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  14.986(0.000)  14.63(0.0001) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value)  15.55(0.0014)  11.44(0.0011) 
Observations 2,003 2,190 2,196 2,196 
Root Mean Square 0.061 .3186 0.113 4.400 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The table reports IV estimates of debt to equity ratio (one of the various measures of capital structure used in our 
analysis). Predicted values of  Equity to total compensation ratio and bonus to total compensation ratios is used 
from the first stage (Table 3.3, column 1 & 2 respectively ) to estimate the effect of Equity to total compensation 
and bonus to total compensation on total deb total assets. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Column (1) and (3) report OLS 
estimates of total debt to total assets, while column (2) and (4) report the IV estimates. Firm size is the log of total 
assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the 
ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to 
industry sales.  
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Table 3. 7 OLS/IV estimates of total liability to total assets.  
 
VARIABLES 
Total liability to total assets 
           OLS      IV OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Equity/Total compensation  -0.0518 -1.136*   
 (0.0352) (0.618)   
Bonus/Total compensation   0.0334 0.831* 
   (0.0490) (0.501) 
Firm size 0.0186*** 0.0293*** 0.0170*** 0.0103 
 (0.00467) (0.00822) (0.00461) (0.00687) 
Age dummy 0.0129 0.0223 0.00252 0.00371 
 (0.0204) (0.0243) (0.0205) (0.0241) 
Intangibility 6.86e-05 5.42e-05 5.82e-05 0.000118 
 (0.000108) (0.000153) (0.000117) (0.000106) 
Market power 1.269*** 1.698*** 1.485*** 1.118** 
 (0.335) (0.464) (0.365) (0.435) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.241*** 0.559** 0.223*** 0.155 
 (0.0893) (0.260) (0.0813) (0.119) 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
 15.04(0.002)  15.85(0.000) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value)  16.104(0.0011)  17.094(0.00) 
Observations 2,220 2,220 2,230 2,230 
Root Mean Square 0.243 .2972 0.212 2.032 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of total liability to total assets (one of the various measures of capital structure used 
in our analysis). Predicted values of  Equity to total compensation ratio and bonus to total compensation ratios is 
used from the first stage (Table 3.3, column 1& 2 respectively ) to estimate the effect of Equity to total compensation 
and bonus to total compensation on total liability to total assets. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Column (1) and (3) report 
OLS estimates of total liability to total assets, while column (2) and (4) report the IV estimates. Firm size is the log 
of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility 
is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector 
to industry sales.  
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Table 3. 8 IV estimates of capital structure measures for the subsample of firms without 
CEOs on compensation committee. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Totaldebt/tot
alassets 
Totaldebt/totalas
sets 
Totliab/ta Totliab/ta Debt/equity Debt/equity 
       
Equity/total compensation -1.087*  -1.854*  -1.934**  
 (0.560)  (0.947)  (0.985)  
Bonus/total 
compensation 
 0.611*  0.811  1.126* 
  (0.350)  (0.526)  (0.613) 
Firm size 0.0232*** 0.0101** 0.0293*** 0.0106 0.0216** -0.00158 
 (0.00492) (0.00475) (0.00788) (0.00717
) 
(0.00861) (0.00863) 
Age dummy 0.00888 0.00221 0.0201 0.00341 0.0148 -0.00126 
 (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0231) (0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0277) 
Intangibility 8.04e-05 0.000113* 6.48e-05 0.000117 9.97e-05 0.000220* 
 (9.84e-05) (5.96e-05) (0.000135) (0.00107
) 
(0.000177) (0.000126) 
Market power 0.540** 0.181 1.678*** 1.130** 0.870** 0.00641 
 (0.267) (0.283) (0.438) (0.442) (0.440) (0.484) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Constant 0.105 -0.159* 0.538** 0.165 0.346 -0.126 
 (0.153) (0.0888) (0.239) (0.123) (0.255) (0.133) 
       
Observations 1,477 1,529 1,505 1,561 1,477 1,529 
R-squared -0.259 -0.144 -0.137 -0.019 -0.592 -0.376 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of three measures of capital structure i.e. total debt to total assets (1) & (2); total 
liabilities to total assets (3) & (4) and debt to equity ratio (5) & (6). Predicted Equity to total compensation ratio 
and bonus to total compensation ratio is used from the first stage (Table 3.3) to estimate the effect of Equity to 
total compensation and bonus to total compensation ratio on capital structure. We control for CG by dropping 
firms with a CEO on remuneration committee and carry out the analysis for a sample of firms with CEO – free 
remuneration committee. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm size is the log of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take 
the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total 
fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to industry sales.  
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Table 3. 9 IV estimates of measure of performance for the subsample of firms with 
CEOs not on the compensation committee.  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tobins’Q Tobins’Q 
   
Equity/ total compensation .3497*  
 (1.893)  
Bonus/ total compensation  0.942 
  (1.228) 
Firm size -0.148*** -0.115*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0217) 
Age dummy -0.0488 -0.0347 
 (0.0815) (0.0768) 
Intangibility 8.42e-05 0.000416 
 (0.000519) (0.000408) 
Market power -0.739 0.0861 
 (1.322) (1.078) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes 
   
Constant 1.460** 2.208*** 
 (0.706) (0.301) 
   
Observations 1,551 1,992 
R-squared 0.033 0.192 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of Tobins’ Q. Predicted Equity to total compensation ratio and bonus to total 
compensation ratio is used from the first stage (Table 3.3) to estimate the effect of Equity to total compensation 
and bonus to total compensation ratio on capital structure. We control for CG by dropping firms with a CEO on 
remuneration committee and carry out the analysis for a sample of firms with CEO – free remuneration committee. 
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Tobin’s is measured as the ratio of sum of total debt and market capitalization to total 
assets; Firm size is the log of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years 
and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio 
of firm sales as a share of sector to industry sales.  
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Table 3. 10 IV estimates of measure of capital structures using lagged explanatory 
variables.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Totaldebt/t
otalassets 
Totaldebt/tot
alassets 
Totliab/ta Totliab/ta Debt/equit
y 
Debt/equit
y 
       
Equity/total compensation -0.728*  -1.129*  -1.298**  
 (0.376)  (0.616)  (0.658)  
Bonus/total compensation  0.685**  0.875*  1.224** 
  (0.339)  (0.506)  (0.596) 
Firm size t-1 0.0231*** 0.00925** 0.0292*** 0.00988 0.0215** -0.00254 
 (0.00506) (0.00464) (0.00819) (0.00696) (0.00885) (0.00842) 
Age dummy t-1 0.00977 0.00180 0.0217 0.00330 0.0161 -0.00209 
 (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0274) (0.0287) 
Intangibility t-1 8.10e-05 0.000117** 7.10e-05 0.000120 0.000104 0.000226* 
 (0.000112) (5.97e-05) (0.000153) (0.000106) (0.000199) (0.000126) 
Market power t-1 0.546** 0.183 1.684*** 1.140*** 0.877* 0.0250 
 (0.276) (0.283) (0.460) (0.429) (0.459) (0.477) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.01000 -0.147 0.312 0.142 0.158 -0.132 
 (0.144) (0.0970) (0.235) (0.140) (0.234) (0.146) 
       
Observations 2,198 2,194 2,198 2,228 2,188 2,194 
R-squared -0.417 -0.228 -0.285 -0.058 -0.788 -0.464 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of three measures of capital structure i.e. total debt to total assets (1) & (2); total 
liabilities to total assets (3) & (4) and debt to equity ratio (5) & (6). Predicted Equity to total compensation ratio 
and bonus to total compensation ratio is used from the first stage (Table 3.3) to estimate the effect of Equity to 
total compensation and bonus to total compensation ratio on capital structure. All explanatory variables are 
lagged. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level.Firm size is the log of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for 
firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; 
Market poweris the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to industry sales. 
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Table 3. 11 Lagged explanatory variables - IV estimates of measure of performance.  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tobins’ Q Tobins’ Q 
   
Equity/total compensation 0.475*  
 (1.731)  
Bonus/total compensation  0.989 
  (1.228) 
Firmsize t-1 -0.281*** -0.115*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0217) 
Age_dummy t-1 -0.0586 -0.0347 
 (0.0815) (0.0768) 
Intangibility t-1 6.42e-05 0.000416 
 (0.000519) (0.000408) 
Market power t-1 -0.739 0.0861 
 (1.322) (1.078) 
Year FE Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y 
   
Constant 1.641** 2.208*** 
 (0.706) (0.301) 
   
Observations 1,549 1,990 
R-squared 0.083 0.157 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports IV estimates of tobins’ q. Predicted Equity to total compensation ratio and bonus to total 
compensation ratio is used from the first stage (Table III-3) to estimate the effect of Equity to total compensation 
and bonus to total compensation ratio on capital structure. All explanatory variables are lagged. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level.Tobin’s is measured as the ratio of sum of total debt and market capitalization to total assets; Firm size is 
the log of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; 
Intangibility is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a 
share of sector to industry sales.  
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Table 3. 12: First Stage estimates of compensation ratios (CR) after controlling for CEO 
overconfidence :  
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Equity/ total 
compensation 
bonus/ total 
compensation 
cash/ total 
compensation 
log(total 
compensation) 
     
Treated 0.0274 -0.0747*** -0.557*** 0.663*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0211) (0.207) (0.144) 
Post DRR -0.0630 -0.00149 -0.208 -0.171 
 (0.0436) (0.0292) (0.183) (0.302) 
Post DRR*Treated 0.0408** 0.0253* 0.116 0.137 
 (0.0184) (0.0134) (0.155) (0.131) 
Firm size 0.0103*** 0.00751** 0.00717 0.397*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00314) (0.0170) (0.0174) 
Age dummy 0.00579 0.00221 0.0169 -0.104 
 (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0960) (0.0686) 
Intangibility -1.67e-05 -7.44e-05 -0.000110 -6.14e-05 
 (0.000121) (8.75e-05) (0.000215) (0.000186) 
Market power 0.405** 0.378* 2.025 -3.372 
 (0.198) (0.208) (1.869) (2.066) 
CEO age 0.0232*** 0.0101** 0.0293*** 0.0106 
 (0.00492) (0.00475) (0.00788) (0.00717) 
CEO Gender 0.0103*** 0.00751** 0.00717 0.397*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00314) (0.0170) (0.0174) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.261**  0.172** 0.599** 1.135*** 
 (0.116) (0.0674) (0.243) (0.418) 
Partial R-sq test: F- Stat(p-value) 17.34(0.000) 19.33(0.000) 10.43(0.000) 7.29(0.0000) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value) 15.552(0.0004) 13.58 (0.0035) 12.23(0.0004) 11.88 (0.000) 
Overid - Hansen J statistic (p-value)         0.814(0.6657) 1.232(0.4433) - - 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
15.87(0.0006) 13.24(0.000) 18.32(0.000) 11.34(0.003) 
     
Observations 2,925 2,901 2,924 2,920 
Root MSE .17804 .16072 1.2588 0.546 
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Panel : B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Totaldebt/tot
alassets 
Totaldebt/totalas
sets 
Totliab/ta Totliab/ta Debt/equity Debt/equit
y 
       
Equity/total compensation -1.347*  -1.651*  -1.431**  
 (0.560)  (0.947)  (0.985)  
Bonus/total compensation  0.577*  0.811  1.254* 
  (0.350)  (0.526)  (0.613) 
Firm size 0.0232*** 0.0101** 0.0293*** 0.0106 0.0216** -0.00158 
 (0.00492) (0.00475) (0.00788) (0.00717) (0.00861) (0.00863) 
Age dummy 0.00888 0.00221 0.0201 0.00341 0.0148 -0.00126 
 (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0231) (0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0277) 
Intangibility 8.04e-05 0.000113* 6.48e-05 0.000117 9.97e-05 0.000220* 
 (9.84e-05) (5.96e-05) (0.000135) (0.00107) (0.000177) (0.000126) 
Market power 0.540** 0.181 1.678*** 1.130** 0.870** 0.00641 
 (0.267) (0.283) (0.438) (0.442) (0.440) (0.484) 
CEO Age 0.0129 0.0223 0.00252 0.00371 0.559** 0.223*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0243) (0.0205) (0.0241) (0.260) (0.0813) 
CEO Gender 0.00423 0.0102 0.00299 0.00246 0.0106 0.0216** 
 (0.0123) (0.0159) (0.0127) (0.0156) (0.00717) (0.00861) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Constant 0.105 -0.159* 0.538** 0.165 0.346 -0.126 
 (0.153) (0.0888) (0.239) (0.123) (0.255) (0.133) 
       
Observations 1,477 1,529 1,505 1,561 1,477 1,529 
R-squared -0.259 -0.144 -0.137 -0.019 -0.592 -0.376 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Table reports IV estimates of three measures of capital structure i.e. total debt to total assets (1) & (2); total 
liabilities to total assets (3) & (4) and debt to equity ratio (5) & (6). Predicted Equity to total compensation ratio 
and bonus to total compensation ratio is used from the first stage (Table 3) to estimate the effect of Equity to total 
compensation and bonus to total compensation ratio on capital structure. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm size is the log 
of total assets; Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility 
is the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of 
sector to industry sales. 
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Table 3. 13 Placebo Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Equity/ total 
compensation 
bonus/ total 
compensation 
cash/ total 
compensation 
log(total 
compensation) 
     
Treated 0.0181 -0.105*** -0.879** 0.517** 
 (0.0318) (0.0270) (0.441) (0.232) 
Post2011 -0.124** -0.0602 -0.675 -0.363 
 (0.0552) (0.0533) (0.484) (0.302) 
Treated*Post2011 0.0284 0.0461 0.430 0.228 
 (0.0316) (0.0204) (0.458) (0.226) 
Firm size 0.0102*** 0.00753** 0.00713 0.397*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00314) (0.0171) (0.0174) 
Age dummy 0.00543 0.00215 0.0164 -0.104 
 (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0959) (0.0685) 
Intangibility -1.69e-05 -7.50e-05 -0.000111 -5.85e-05 
 (0.000121) (8.73e-05) (0.000216) (0.000184) 
Market power 0.410** 0.367* 2.034 -3.366 
 (0.198) (0.208) (1.860) (2.059) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.270** 0.198*** 0.886** 1.269*** 
 (0.117) (0.0693) (0.432) (0.460) 
Partial R-sq test: F- Stat(p-value) 10.34(0.971) 8.35(0.000)    1.43(0.000) 7.29(0.0000) 
Underid – LM F-stat (p-value) 5.463(0.894) 11.58 (0.9835) 2.453(0.0545) 6.563 (0.000) 
Overid - Hansen J statistic (p-value)         3.564(1.6657) 1.232(0.4433) - - 
Weakid: Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
5.71(0.000) 9.41(0.000) 8.32(0.000) 10.34(0.003) 
     
Observations 2,220 2,230 2,924 2,234 
Root MSE 0.065 0.93 0.509 0.743 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The table reports placebo test results for the first stage regression estimates of compensation ratio as per equation 
2. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Treated is the dummy that takes the value 1 for a list of UK quoted companies and 0 
otherwise; Post2011 is the dummy that take the value 1 for post 2011 years i.e. for t > 2011 and 0 otherwise; 
Treated*post2011 is the interaction dummy of Post2011 and Treated; Firm size is the log of total assets; Age 
dummy is the dummy take the value 1 for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise; Intangibility is the ratio of 
intangible fixed assets to total fixed assets; Market power is the ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to industry 
sales.  
 
  
 
 
  
115 
 
Appendix B 
 
Table B 1 Summary Statistics & definitions of various compensation ratios, measures of 
capital structure and market performance  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Definition  
Share Compensation    
 
 
Cash to total compensation  5,038 0.42177 1.491095 
Ratio of cash compensation to total 
compensation.  
Bonus to total compensation  5,375 .1903188 0.130128 Ratio of bonus to total compensation. 
Equity to total compensation  5,387 0.462064 0.196764 
Ratio of equity linked compensation to total 
compensation 
Ln(Total compensation ) 5,357 5.657273 1.47259 
Natural logarithm of total compensation 
which is the um of salaries, bonus, options 
and pensions 
Leverage measures    
 
Total debt to total assets 7,490 0.15204 0.165787 Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Total liability to total assets 7,595 0.463833 0.27181 Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Debt to equity ratio 7,489 0.183865 0.257893 Total debt to total assets  
Performance      
Tobin’s Q 7,627 1.396569 .9680779 
Ratio of sum of total debt and market 
capitalization to total assets 
Control Variables      
Firm Size  7,575 11.01299 2.45943 Log of total assets 
Age Dummy 8,623 .8559666 .351144 
Age dummy is the dummy take the value 1 
for firm older than 10 years and 0 otherwise 
Intangibility  8,623 44.54235 7.62827 
Ratio of intangible fixed assets to total fixed 
assets 
Market power 8,675 .0075121 .0281559 
Ratio of firm sales as a share of sector to 
industry sales 
Instruments     
Treated  8,623 .7754842 .4172873 
Treated is the dummy that takes the value 1 
for a list of UK quoted companies and 0 
otherwise; 
Post DRR 8,623 .391859 .4881938 
PostDRR is the dummy that take the value 1 
for post DRR i.e. for t > 2013 when the 
voting on DRR became binding and 0 
otherwise 
Post DRR * Treated 8,623 .3085933 .4619396 
PostDRR *Treated is the interaction 
dummy of PostDRR and Treated; 
Note: Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution to avoid that outliers 
drive our results. 
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In the following table we test the robustness of our baseline estimates by including net debt tax 
shield in the regression model. Results summarised in the following Table highlights the 
robustness of our baseline estimates: (i) treated firms tend to have higher equity and bonus 
shares paid to executives after the 2013 reform (Panel 1); (ii) higher equity share lowers debt, 
but higher bonus share increases it (Panel 2). 
 
Table B2, Panel 1: Regression results: Estimates of compensation ratios (CR) with net 
debt tax shield    
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    Wcash_total 
compn 
Wbonus_total
compn 
Wequity_total
compn 
log_totalcomp
n 
Treated -0.424* -0.103*** 0.057*** 0.574*** 
  (0.241) (0.022) (0.019) (0.159) 
postDRR -0.253 -0.005 -0.025 0.015 
  (0.204) (0.037) (0.048) (0.290) 
postDRR_treated 0.208** 0.069*** 0.005 -0.109 
  (0.505) (0.018) (0.023) (0.153) 
Firm size t-1 0.013 0.008** 0.009*** 0.363*** 
  (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) 
Age_dummy t-1 -0.026 -0.014 0.005 -0.050 
  (0.087) (0.015) (0.013) (0.072) 
 Net debt tax Sheild t-1 -0.203 -0.231 0.298 5.524*** 
  (0.922) (0.197) (0.221) (1.406) 
Intangibility t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power t-1 -0.891 0.386* 0.342* -0.018 
  (1.198) (0.228) (0.195) (1.340) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1957 1656 1635 1647 
R-squared  0.030 0.172 0.074 0.542 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B2, Panel 2: IV estimates of measure of capital structures with net debt tax shield   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Totaldebt/t
otalassets 
Totaldebt/tot
alassets 
Totliab/ta Totliab/ta Debt/equity Debt/equity 
       
Equity/total compensation -0.813*  -1.313*  -1.686**  
 (0.476)  (0.878)  (0.711)  
Bonus/total compensation  0.587**  0.923*  1.637** 
  (0.168)  (0.387)  (0.388) 
Firm sizet-1 0.0392*** 0.00645** 0.0345*** 0.00889 0.0218** -0.00254 
 (0.00506) (0.00464) (0.00819) (0.00696) (0.00885) (0.00842) 
Age dummyt-1 0.00977 0.00180 0.0217 0.00330 0.0161 -0.00209 
 (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0274) (0.0287) 
Intangibilityt-1 8.10e-05 0.000117** 7.10e-05 0.000120 0.000104 0.000226* 
 (0.000112) (5.97e-05) (0.000153) (0.000106) (0.000199) (0.000126) 
Net debt tax Sheild t-1 0.00877 0.00380 0.0517 0.00630 0.0611 -0.00503 
 (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0274) (0.0287) 
Market powert-1 0.546** 0.183 1.684*** 1.140*** 0.877* 0.0250 
 (0.276) (0.283) (0.460) (0.429) (0.459) (0.477) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.01100 -0.417 0.912 0.427 0.581 -0.372 
 (0.144) (0.0970) (0.235) (0.140) (0.234) (0.146) 
       
Observations 1,998 1,994 1,998 1,928 1,988 1,994 
R-squared -0.417 -0.228 -0.285 -0.058 -0.788 -0.464 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C 
 
UK Remuneration Reform: A background 
 
 The UK government introduced several form of legislations since 1990’s in order to 
improve the accountability, transparency and performance of the corporate governance 
scenario. For instance, following the sudden financial collapses of wallpaper group Coloroll; 
Asil Nadir's Polly Peck consortium and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the 
Cadbury report (1992) was issued to increase the accountability and function of the audit 
committee and a minimum number of outside (independent) directors was introduced. This was 
followed by the Greenbury report (1995), Hampel Report (1998) and Higgs Report (2003) 
which further addressing the growing concern about the level of director remuneration. 
However as pointed out by Murphy (2011) these regulatory initiatives have generally been 
either ineffective or counterproductive. According to him, the problem is that the regulation is 
often driven by political rather than shareholder agendas. 
 The UK government acknowledged this by increasing the level of corporate disclosures 
on compensation packages and policies, imposing tax policies to reduce pay level etc.  
 
SAY on PAY:  
The Say on Pay or the Director’s Remuneration Report (DRR) legislation came in force 
on 1st August 2002.  Anticipated excess remuneration and “rewards for failure” led to its 
evolvement in the UK. The UK was the first country to adopt a mandatory nonbinding 
shareholder votes on executive compensation. The new regulation significantly enhanced the 
information available to investors regarding executive pay and incorporated a requirement for 
the board to seek approval from the shareholders on the DRR. All UK listed companies were 
required to produce annual remuneration report and send it to shareholders inviting them to 
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vote on the remuneration report. The remuneration reports, amongst other things must contain 
the company’s remuneration policy; details of each director’s remuneration in the previous 
financial year including base salary, bonuses, share options, long-term incentives and pension 
entitlements and historic information of the company’s performance. The vote was expected to 
give shareholders the opportunity to examine the company’s remuneration policy and the actual 
remuneration paid to top executives in the previous year.  In this respect the voting rights were 
“backward” and not forward looking. In other words, vote was ‘advisory’ and non- binding and 
no aspects of an individual executives pay were conditioned on the resolution being passed.  
In 2003 shareholders at GlaxoSmithKline became the first to vote down their company’s 
remuneration policy by a small margin of 50.72%5 they objected to the golden parachute. 
 The market tracker trend report prepared by Lexis PSL Corporate at LexisNexis for the 
AGM season 2014 reports the details of the resolutions proposed by the FTSE 350 companies. 
They found that 233 out of 234 companies reviewed complied with the new regime. In fact 
majority of the 350 companies (around 92%) adopted the remuneration policy with immediate 
effect.  
Analysis of the voting results reveals that there were 11 companies (out of the 234 
companies) with over 30 % of votes against the non-binding remuneration report resolution and 
only 5 companies out of the 234 companies analysed had voted against the new, binding 
resolution on directors’ remuneration policy with over 30% of no votes. This low level of votes 
against the remuneration policy indicates a level satisfaction with the company’s remuneration 
policies.  
 
 
                                                          
5 See Naik, G. "Glaxo holders reject CEO's compensation package." Wall Street Journal (May 08, 2003) (2003).; 
Heather Timmons, Glaxo Shareholders Revolt Against Pay Plan for Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003. 
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Implementing Binding Say on Pay  
 
 To further regulate the executive pay for UK companies and strengthen the existing 
‘advisory’ vote, the department of Business, Innovation & Skill (BIS) proposed to introduce a 
‘binding’ vote on executive remuneration in 2012. All UK companies with shares on the 
Financial Services Authority’s Official List, UK Companies listed on the NYSE, the NASDAQ 
or with share listed in the EEA state will have to comply with the proposal from 1st October 
2013. UK companies will now be required to put an annual binding vote on its director’s 
remuneration policy (DRR) and its approach to termination payments as well. Mandatory 
compensation disclosure related to the limit and structure of top managerial pay packages where 
imposed in the modified 2013 Director’s remuneration reform.   
Companies are required to propose both: 
• A binding ordinary resolution to approve the director’s remuneration policy, and 
• An advisory ordinary resolution to the annual remuneration report  
For the purpose of this study, we consider the effects of the binding director’s remuneration 
reform (DRR 2013) on managerial decisions relating to leverage, the firms market performance 
and employee turnover. 
 
Director’s remuneration voting trends 
 
A report by Director Insight on the UK FTSE 100 Director’s Remuneration proxy voting results 
from 2016, suggests that over the years, the landscape has significantly changed and 
shareholders activism on executive pay proposals have risen. Shareholders have been 
increasingly engaging with their portfolio companies on governance matters, to understand the 
drivers and risks, for sustainable performance, and protect the long term value and interest of 
their investments.  
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Source: Director’s Insight. (June 2016) “FTSE 100 Say on Pay Voting Insight”.  
www.directorinsight.com.  
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Thomson Reuters provide an analysis of the voting trend and compare the voting results for 
2016 and 2017 on remuneration report and remuneration policy. 
Remuneration report 
2016 2017 
Average percentage of votes 
cast 
92.62% 94% 
Substantial votes against 
  
• 10-49.9% 
FTSE 100 - 14 
FTSE250- 20 
FTSE 100-10 
FTSE250- 23 
• 50%+ 
FTSE 100 - 2 
FTSE250- 1 
FTSE 100-1 
FTSE250- 1 
Failed resolution  
3 2 
 
Remuneration policy 
2016 2017 
Average percentage of votes 
cast 
89.65% 93.92% 
Substantial votes against 
  
10-49.9% 
FTSE 100 - 3 
FTSE250- 4 
FTSE 100-3 
FTSE250- 14 
50%+ 
FTSE 100 - 0 
FTSE250- 1 
FTSE 100-0 
FTSE250- 0 
Failed resolutions 
0 1 
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Chapter 4: Unintended Consequences of Land Ceiling 
Legislations - Theory and Evidence from the Indian States 
 
 
Chapter Summary: The paper assesses, both theoretically and empirically, the impact of the 
historical land ceiling legislations, largely implemented during 1960-85 to promote 
distributional equity, on capital investment and industrialisation in across Indian states. We 
argue that the implementation of the land ceiling legislations that increased the bargaining 
power of land owner had increased the transactions costs of buying land and also the price 
premium firms pay when acquiring land, thus inducing firms to invest less in land and capital 
which in turn determines the path to industrialisation in the Indian states. The detrimental 
ceiling effect is more pronounced when the ceiling size is more restrictive as for the most fertile 
land. Since the variation in land ceiling size across the Indian states over time was largely 
dependent on landowners’ choice of crops or soil fertility, ceiling sizes could be treated as 
independent of the decisions made by state authorities. Results lend support to our hypotheses: 
(i) smaller ceiling size lowers average size of cultivable land and also investment in fixed and 
total capital; (ii) states with more stringent land ceiling size tend to have less registered firms 
and (iii) also lowers share of state’s manufacturing output, controlling for landowners’ 
bargaining power. These results indicate the importance of a local rather than a national policy 
of land acquisition in India. 
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4.1. Introduction  
 
 Insecurity of land tenure is a socio-political issue predominant in most land scarce and 
pre dominantly agrarian countries and most land reform agendas are thus driven by both equity 
and efficiency considerations. Customary land rights offer access to land and security of tenure 
to many poor households that ensures equity in the distribution of land; it may also trigger more 
investment in land and thereby land productivity and efficiency. Access to industrial land and 
land acquisition for new factories and infrastructure has however become a major economic 
and political issue in many densely populated emerging economies striving for industrialisation 
and economic growth. In this context the paper examines whether and how effective 
implementation of land reforms may impact investment in capital as well as the process of 
industrialisation.  
  India is an important case in point. It is a land scarce country with immense pressure 
on land to feed its growing population. Land policy has thus been a major economic issue in 
India ever since independence. More recently, as India strives for becoming a global 
superpower through liberalization and industrialization, the tussle between farmers and 
industrialists/governments has often become a politically explosive issue, sometimes leading to 
political unrest and violence. The Tata Nano Singur has been a landmark controversy in this 
respect that highlights the problem of land acquisition for industrialisation. The project initiated 
in 2007 required takeover of 997 acres (4.03 km2) of farmland to have Tata build its factory. 
This was opposed by environmental activists, unwilling farmers and opposition parties in the 
eastern Indian state of West Bengal. To a large extent, farmer’s opposition was dictated by the 
undervaluation of multi-cropped land (Ghatak et al. 2013). Finally, Tata had to pull out and 
relocate to Sanand in Gujarat in 2008 where land could be made available quickly without 
further controversy. 
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 In this context, we assess whether and how the historical land ceiling legislations, as 
part of the broader land reform program, introduced after India’s independence have any effect 
on corporate capital investment and the process of industrialisation in the subsequent years. 
Land ceiling legislations had imposed a ceiling on the maximum amount of land a landowner 
can hold; the excess land over and above the ceiling was then redistributed among the landless. 
More importantly, the ceiling size has been lower for the more fertile land producing more 
crops. The impact of this ceiling legislation has thus been to redistribute land from a few big 
owners to numerous small owners. We first develop a simple theoretical model that is based on 
the idea that the effect of these legislations would be to increase the transaction costs of buying 
land. This is intuitive since, with smaller plot sizes, a firm looking to acquire a plot of a given 
size has to negotiate with a larger number of owners post the reform. 
 In a simple monopoly framework we show that an increase in the transaction cost of 
land purchase would reduce the profit of the firm. Accordingly, land ceiling legislation can, via 
an increase in transaction costs, slow down the pace of industrialization, and may even lead to 
exit of firms. Second, higher transaction costs and a consequent land price premium would dis-
incentivise firms from investing in land. Moreover this disincentive effect extends to capital 
investments whenever land and capital are complements, as is natural to assume . Interestingly, 
we find that such dis-incentivizing effects are likely to be larger in more fertile areas. This is 
because of two reasons. First, mandated ceiling sizes are lower in more fertile areas, so that the 
extent of fragmentation is likely to be larger in these areas. Second, in areas where land is more 
fertile, the opportunity cost of land is higher, pushing up land prices, and thus having an effect 
similar to that of an increase in transaction costs. These are predictions that we take to data. 
We then argue that bargaining between firms and landowners can provide a foundation for the 
transaction costs approach. To that end we consider a scenario where the firm bargains 
collectively with the landowners for purchase of land using an asymmetric Nash bargaining 
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solution. Arguing that land ceiling reforms would increase the bargaining power of landowners, 
we show that such legislation would have effects that are qualitatively similar to those following 
an increase in transactions costs. We also demonstrate that all the results extend even if one 
allows for competition among firms. 
 Using the historical state-level data from 1960-85, we test the validity of the testable 
hypotheses from the theoretical model. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the 
ceiling size is beyond the control of the state authority. This is because, by and large, land 
ceilings were determined by the share of food crops before 1971 and by soil quality from 1971 
onwards. Surely soil quality of a state is given exogenously and to some extent is determined 
by historical state boundaries. Also the decision about share of food crops grown on a plot is 
made by the landuser. As such, we argue that the state land ceiling sizes are exogenously given 
as it is beyond the influence of the state government. Results provide support to the hypotheses 
that we develop. We also test the robustness of the baseline results using extended state-level 
panel data over 1960-2015. 
 The paper integrates different strands of the literature, namely, the traditional corporate 
investment literature, the industrial economics literature and also the development economics 
literature identifying the factors that constrain investment and industrialisation (see Section 3 
for further details). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to assess the impact of 
historical land ceilings legislations on capital investment, on number of registered firms and 
also the rate of industrialisation in the Indian states. While the literature in this respect is rather 
disperse, Roy Chowdhury (2012) argued that, in the absence of politicization, more 
fragmentation increases the possibility that land owners refrain from selling their land and 
demand a premium above the market price of land. We extend this paper by linking it to the 
historical land ceiling legislations that help explaining variation in capital investment and 
industrialisation across the Indian states. In doing so, we identify an unintended consequence 
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of India’s historical land ceiling legislations that enhanced the bargaining power of land owners 
in states with more fertile land and created a bias against capital investment and 
industrialization. 
 Because of dearth of the relevant data, there is very little empirical evidence that can 
guide policies and we believe the present paper offers an important insight into the problems of 
land acquisition in India. Despite recent government attempts to amend the Land Acquisition 
Act of 1894 in 2013 and then again in 2015, there is no resolution; the process of land 
acquisition in India continues to be di¢ cult and costly not only for the industrialists, but also 
for the landowners and other poor (e.g., fishermen, landless labourers, artisans) 
directly/indirectly relying on earnings from land. A possible implication of our results is that a 
national policy of land acquisition as laid down in the recent Land Bill (2013, 2015) is unlikely 
to be successful. Instead, results from the present study point towards a local rather than a 
national policy, that needs to take account of the diversity in soil quality across regions to 
resolve the land conflicts more quickly and efficiently. 
 
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2. provides a brief background of 
the land reform policy in India, followed by a review of the literature and  development of the 
hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data and the variables generated for the analysis. The 
regression model is provided in section 4.4. Results and tests for robustness are produced in 
section 4.5. The final section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
 
 
We integrate different strands of the literature to develop our central hypothesis: the 
first is the traditional corporate investment literature that focuses on different firm-level 
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characteristics influencing corporate investment. The second is the industrial economics 
literature which explores the determinants of firms location choice and finally, the emerging 
development literature that examines the factors constraining investment and also the role of 
various public policy interventions on output, growth and poverty. 
 
4.2.1. Corporate Investment Literature  
 
Modigliani and Millier's (1958) theory of the irrelevance of financial structure and 
policy on real investment decisions suggest that under perfect market conditions and when all 
firms have equal access to the capital markets, external funds and internal capital are perfect 
substitutes and the structure of the firm does not affect investment decisions. Perfect market 
condition do not, however, exist in the real world, which in turn suggests that investment may 
be affected by financial factors such as availability of internal funds, access to credit market 
etc. Meyer and Kuh (1957) were the first among others to emphasize the significance of 
financial conditions of a firm on investment decisions. 
This finding when applied to capital investment led to the development of several 
theories of investment demand including the neoclassical theory of investment demand by Dale 
& Jorgensen (1967); Accelerator theory of Clark (1917) and Samuelsson (1939a and b), Q-
Theory of investment suggested by Brainard & Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969); Expected 
Profits (Jorgensen & Siebert, 1968), and Liquidity Theory (Meyer and Kuh (1957) & Anderson 
(1964) amongst others. These theories suggested different firm level variables affecting 
investment decisions. Jorgensen & Siebert, (1968) do a comparison of the alternative theories 
of corporate investment behavior. 
In 1988, Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen introduced the theory of financial constraints. 
They studied the relation between corporate investment and cash flow to test for the presence 
and significance of financing constraints. According to them investment behavior of a company 
  
129 
 
can be explained by the pecking order theory. Cost of external finance increases considerably 
due to information asymmetry and agency costs. Initially firms prefer to finance internally 
through their operating cash flow, in an attempt to minimize the cost of capital. Only when the 
company's internal funds are insufficient to meet its investment needs, it resorts to external 
financing. Therefore, the higher the investment--cash flow sensitivity, the higher the implicit 
costs of external financing and the higher the financial constraints. They classify firms with 
low-dividend pay-outs as `most financially constrained' while those with high dividend pay-
outs as `least constrained' firms, and then measure sensitivity by regressing investment on cash 
flow, controlling for investment opportunities using Tobin's Q. Their results suggest higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivities as evidence of greater financing constraints. 
Fazzari et al. (1988) ways of classifying firms as more or less constrained based on 
dividend pay-outs was criticized by Kaplan & Zingales (1997). They argued that firm's dividend 
policy is a choice variable and firms may decide to pay less dividend even though they could 
pay out more. Choosing to pay low dividends does not necessarily mean financially constrained. 
Their classification was based on qualitative and quantitative information taken from financial 
statements. If firms had more funds than required to finance their investment, they were 
classified as “never constrained” while if they do not have access to more funds than needed to 
finance their capital expenditure, they were classified as “likely constrained”. Their findings 
suggest the investments of `likely constrained' firms are less sensitive to cash flows than the 
investments of “never constrained firms”. Debate on whether investment cash-flow sensitivities 
to be a good measure of financing constraints or not is still going on. As Moyen (2004) 
demonstrates with simulated data, it is hard to identify firms with financing constraints, and the 
investment cash flow sensitivity critically hinges on the classification procedure used. While 
some methods of financial constraint identification show low sensitivity between investments 
and cash flows, others show just the opposite. 
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Studies have also been conducted to test for factors affecting financial constraints; Lian 
and Cheng (2007) argued that companies that tend to over-invest are the ones with fewer 
financial constraints as they appear to have a stronger investment-cashflow sensitivity, while 
those who under-invest face severe financial constraints. According to them information 
asymmetry is the main reason for investment-cashflow sensitivity. Wang et al. (2008) support 
this however they argue that asymmetric information theory cannot fully explain the 
relationship between financial constraints and investment--cashflow sensitivity. 
More recent literature establishes a direct correspondence between investment decisions 
and regulatory conditions or various laws passed on in a country. La Porta et al. (1997, 2002) 
for instance, are the first to study how investor protection affects corporate valuation. They 
argue that the legal environment of a country is an important determinant of the development 
of its capital market. They provide evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better 
investor protection. Further Agrawal (2013) studied the impact of an investor protection law 
namely, “blue sky laws”, on corporate behaviour and value. He tries to identify the casual 
impact of the investor protection law on firms in the manufacturing sector, by comparing the 
impact of the blue sky law on firm in states which introduced this law relative to those located 
in control states that did not introduce the law. Results support theories that predict a significant 
positive impact of investor protection laws on corporate financing and investment policy. 
Djankov et al. (2010), study the impact of corporate taxes on investment and 
entrepreneurship. Using data on effective first-year and five-year corporate income tax rate for 
85 countries, they provide evidence of a large and significant adverse effect of effective 
corporate tax rates on corporate investment and entrepreneurship. In other words, higher 
effective corporate income taxes are associated with lower investment in manufacturing but not 
in services, a larger unofficial economy, and greater reliance on debt as opposed to equity 
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finance. Their results are robust after controlling for other tax rates, including personal income 
taxes and the VAT and sales tax, for measures of administrative burdens, tax compliance, 
property rights protection, regulations, economic development, openness to foreign trade, 
seignorage, and inflation. 
Tarantino (2013), examines a link between bankruptcy law and investment decisions. 
He argues that the adoption of soft bankruptcy law (resembling the chapter 11 of the federal 
bankruptcy law, US) encourages the choice of investment that favours the achievement of long-
term results. However, soft bankruptcy can lead to the choice of investments that are biased 
towards the achievement of short-term outcomes. Adoption of bankruptcy code increases the 
renegotiation power of entrepreneurs, which can allow lenders to increase recovery rates on the 
one hand but also weakens the contract's ability to solve the moral hazard problem embedded 
in the production project. 
 
4.2.2. Industrial Economics Literature 
 
A review of the literature on industrial location and its determinants is vast and beyond 
the scope off the Chapter. The classical location theory was formulated by Webber (1929). 
Industrialization is argued to follow the classic “virtuous Cycle” principles i.e. firms locate 
where other firms are already located to realize existing benefits. Extensive reviews are 
provided by Henderson (2003), Head et. Al (2004). 
Deichmann et al. (2008) provides a survey on the important factors of industrial location 
in developing economies. According to them, factor prices (wage); utility service (Electricity 
and power); labor and regulation; market access and transport, firms in supplier industry; firms 
in own industry etc. are key factors affecting industrial choice. Lall and Chakravorty (2005) list 
five sets of determinants namely, land, capital, labor, infrastructure, regulation and spatial 
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determinants of new investment. Using proxies for each of these determinants they show that 
investments are biased towards existing industrial cluster. Mukin and Nunnenkamp (2010), 
study the same for foreign investors. Foreign investors also prefer to locate where other foreign 
investors are already present. Physical infrastructure as measured by the proximity to national 
highways, airports, ports etc. is of prime importance to foreign investors as such they mainly 
invest in metropolitan cities. However none of these studies consider the constraints for land 
acquisition and their potential impact on corporate investment which remains the focus of the 
present study, especially in the context of land ceiling legislation. 
 
4.2.3. Development literature 
 
There is now a growing literature on the effects of land property rights on investment, 
productivity and earnings in developing countries. Following the Coase theorem, this literature 
argues that well defined property rights lowers transaction costs, improves resource allocation 
independent of ownership so that secure property rights boost investment in both rural and 
urban areas (Ding and Lichtenberg, 2011; Galliani and Schargrodsky, 2011). However in land 
scarce countries striving for industrialisation like India, policy makers have often resorted to 
the legal expropriation of agricultural land and its conversion to non-agricultural production, 
using various industrial promotions programmes (Kazmin, 2015). 
There is also some literature on the optimum land compensation price which is often a 
stumbling block for land acquisition deals. For example, Banerjee et al. (2007) and Sarkar 
(2007) make the case that the use-value of land may be higher than its sale-price. While Sarkar 
(2007) traces such discrepancy, among other things, to landowners having skills that are land 
specific, the arguments in Ghatak and Bannerji (2009) would suggest that such discrepancy can 
arise out of incomplete markets, for example. Roy Chowdhury (2012) examines the role of 
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politicization and fragmentation on farmers' holdout problem, assuming land owners' inability 
to manage large sums of money and consequent lack of consumption smoothing. In particular, 
Roy Chowdhury (2012) has theoretically established that, in the absence of politicization, more 
fragmentation increases the possibility that land owners refrain from selling their land and 
demand a premium above the market price of land. Ghatak and Mookherjee (2014) too argued 
how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization 
ought to be over-compensated for efficiency.   
Others have examined the effects of various public policy interventions including fiscal 
policy, land reform policy or road construction policy. Sazanna and Davis (1973) examine both 
theoretically and empirically, the effectiveness of a land tax as a regulatory tool for boosting 
agricultural output and productivity and concluded that land taxation policy is not an effective 
device for increasing agricultural output and productivity. Besley and Burgess (2002) argued 
that the cumulative land reforms legislations lowered poverty in the Indian states and has 
attributed it primarily to the tenancy reform component of land reform. Abolition of 
intermediaries too had a negative effect on poverty, but no effect on productivity. Imposing a 
ceiling on landholdings did not however have much effect on either poverty or productivity, 
while land consolidation had a positive effect on productivity without having any effect on 
poverty. Exploiting India's massive rural road construction project since the early millennium, 
Asher and Novosad (2017) however argued that instead of boosting growth, better roads enable 
workers to access external labour market.  
The present paper assesses the role of land ceiling legislations (which was intertwined 
with soil quality of the land) on size of land holding, number of firms, capital investment and 
industrialisation that remains little understood in the literature. 
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4.3. An Analytical framework 
 
Consider a monopoly firm producing a good q using both capital, denoted k, and land, 
denoted h6. 
The production function is given by  
 𝑞 = 𝑓(𝑘) 𝑔(ℎ), (1) 
Where, 𝑓(𝑘) and 𝑔(ℎ), satisfy the usual conditions, i.e. 𝑓𝑘(𝑘) > 0, 𝑔ℎ(ℎ) >
0, 𝑓𝑘𝑘(𝑘) < 0 and 𝑔ℎℎ(ℎ) < 0 for all 𝑘. ℎ > 0,  as well as the Inada conditions. Note that the 
Cobb-Doglas function satisfies all these restrictions. The inverse market demand function is 
given by  
 𝑝 = 𝐷(𝑞), (2) 
Where, 𝑝 is the market price, and 𝐷(𝑞) is negatively sloped and satisfies a stricter 
version of the Hahn condition, namely 2𝐷′(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷"(𝑞) < 0 for all 𝑞 > 0.This condition 
ensures that the demand function is `not too' convex, and is satisfied, for example, by the linear 
demand function, as well as the constant elasticity demand function 𝐴𝑞−𝛼, where 𝐴 > 0 and 
0 < 𝛼 < 1. 
Next consider the input markets for capital and labour. We consider a less developed 
country (LDC) where while the land market is very thin, 7 the capital market is relatively more 
mature, with at least firms in the formal sector having access to the capital market. For ease of 
exposition we formalise this asymmetry through an extreme assumption; that the capital market 
is competitive with a gross interest rate 𝑟 ≥ 1, while the land market is conspicuous by its 
                                                          
6 We shall later extend the framework to allow for  .rms,   1, competing over quantities. 
7 Discuss. 
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absence. Land owners have one unit of land each, which they value at s per unit. In case a 
competitive land market existed, an unit of land would have been available at its opportunity 
cost, i.e. s. However, given that there is no organized market for land, it must be bought directly 
from the owners, giving rising to transaction costs. This ensures that for the monopoly firm the 
effective cost of acquiring one unit of land is ts, where t>1. 
Thus the monopoly firm solves the following problem:  
 max
ℎ,𝑘
𝜋(ℎ, 𝑘) ≡ 𝐷 (𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ))𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ) − 𝑟𝑘 − 𝑡𝑠ℎ. (3) 
We next define the revenue function 𝑅(𝑞) = 𝑞𝐷(𝑞) that plays an important role in what 
follows. Defining the elasticity of the marginal revenue function −
𝑅′(𝑞)/𝑞
𝑅"(𝑞)
, the marginal revenue 
function is elastic whenever −
𝑅′(𝑞)/𝑞
𝑅"(𝑞)
> 1 
We then argue that this is a natural restriction on 𝐷(𝑞), in particular in the context of 
LDCs. 
It is useful to consider some examples. First consider a constant elasticity demand 
function, say 𝐴𝑞−𝛼, where A>0 and 0 < 𝛼 < 1. It is straightforward to check −
𝑅′(𝑞)/𝑞
𝑅"(𝑞)
=
1
𝛼
 so 
that the marginal revenue function is elastic at all q.  
Next consider a linear demand function, 𝑝 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞,     𝑎, 𝑏 > 0 It is straightforward to 
check that this condition holds whenever the equilibrium level of output is not too large, ?̅? <
𝑎
4𝑏
 
to be precise. Given that productivity is low in LDCs, this condition is likely to hold in these 
countries. 
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4.4. The Monopoly Equilibrium   
 
We begin by characterising the monopoly equilibrium. Given the Inada conditions on 
𝑓(𝑘) and 𝑔(𝑘), any solution must be an interior one. The first order conditions for the firm with 
respect to k and h are therefore given by  
 
𝜕𝜋(𝑘, ℎ)
𝜕𝑘
=  𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑞)] − 𝑟 = 0, (4) 
 
And  
 
𝜕𝜋(𝑘, ℎ)
𝜕ℎ
=  𝑓(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑞)] − 𝑡𝑠 = 0, (5) 
 
where recall that 𝑞 = 𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ). Clearly, the first order conditions ensure that 
[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷′(𝑞)] > 0 at the equilibrium. The second order conditions are that𝜋𝑘𝑘 < 0, 𝜋ℎℎ <
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜋ℎℎ − 𝜋𝑘ℎ
2 > 0, 
where 
 𝜋𝑘𝑘 ≡  𝑓𝑘𝑘(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷′(𝑞)] + 𝑓𝑘
2(𝑘)𝑔2(ℎ)[2𝐷′(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷"(𝑞)] (6) 
   
 𝜋ℎℎ ≡  𝑓(𝑘)𝑔ℎℎ(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′2(𝑘)𝑔ℎ
2(ℎ)] + [2𝐷′(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷"(𝑞)] (7) 
   
 𝜋𝑘ℎ ≡  𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′)𝑞)] + 𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)𝑞[2𝐷′(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷"(𝑞)] (8) 
 
Given the `Hahn condition', we have that 2𝐷′(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷"(𝑞) < 0, so that both 𝜋𝑘𝑘 and 
𝜋ℎℎ are negative. We assume that 𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜋ℎℎ − 𝜋𝑘ℎ
2 > 0 holds for all k,h, so that the second order 
conditions are satisfied. This in turn also ensures that the solution is unique. Consequently a 
unique interior solution to the profit-maximization problem, denoted (?̅?, ℎ̅) exists. 
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We next seek to develop testable implications of our analysis that we can take to data. 
To that end we begin by deriving several comparative statics results, in particular we study the 
effects of a change in the transactions cost t and the opportunity cost of land s on firm profits, 
as well as capital and land, i.e. (?̅?, ℎ̅) 
Proposition 1 (a)  An increase in the transactions cost of land acquisition, i.e. an 
increase in t, reduces firm profits. Further, this effect is smaller in more fertile regions, formally 
decreasing in s. 
(b) Consider an increase in either the transactions cost of land acquisition, i.e. t, or in 
the opportunity cost of land, i.e. s. 
1. This leads to a reduction in the amount of land acquired. 
2. Furthermore, the amount of capital invested also decreases whenever the marginal 
revenue function is elastic at the equilibrium level of output. 
 
We next discuss some implications of Proposition 1, relating it to the land ceiling 
legislation in India in particular. As we discuss earlier in the introduction, the impact of this 
legislation is to redistribute land from a few big owners to numerous small owners. This makes 
the acquisition of land by firms more difficult, thereby increasing the transactions cost of 
purchasing land, i.e. t. Given this, Proposition 1 (a) suggests that such land ceiling legislation 
can, by reducing firm profitability, slow down the pace of industrialization, and may even lead 
to exit. Moreover, Proposition 1 (b) suggests that the level of both land and capital are likely to 
go down as a result. Further,  recall from our earlier discussion that the mandated ceilings are 
higher in more fertile areas.  Consequently in these areas the increase in transaction costs is  
likely to be of a lower order, and thus the negative effect on land and capital is likely to be 
relatively lower in these areas.  Finally, Proposition 1 (b) also shows that that the level of both 
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land and capital are likely to be low in fertile regions where the intrinsic valuation of land is 
likely to be high. 
 
We then demonstrate that the equilibrium involves under-investment in both capital and 
land relative to the first best. Let us denote the first best outcome by (𝑘𝐹𝐵, ℎ𝐹𝐵), where 
(𝑘𝐹𝐵, ℎ𝐹𝐵),  maximizes the aggregate welfare  
 𝑊(ℎ, 𝑘) ≡  ∫ 𝐷(?̃?)
𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)
0
𝑑?̃? − 𝑟𝑘 − 𝑠ℎ (9) 
 
Note that the social planner takes the real cost of land, i.e. its opportunity cost s, alone 
into account. 
From the fundamental theorem of calculus, the first order conditions for welfare 
maximization with respect to k and h are given by  
 
 
𝜕(𝑘, ℎ)
𝜕𝑘
=  𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)𝐷(𝑞) − 𝑟 = 0 (10) 
 
 
𝜕(𝑘, ℎ)
𝜕ℎ
=  𝑓(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)𝐷(𝑞) − 𝑠 = 0 (11) 
 
Note 𝑊𝑘𝑘 = 𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑔(ℎ)𝐷(𝑞) + 𝐷
′(𝑞)𝑓𝑘
2𝑔(ℎ)2 < 0 One can similarly argue that 𝑊ℎℎ <
0. Further, assuming that the marginal revenue  𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷′(𝑞) is positive at the first best level 
of output, one has 𝑊𝑘ℎ =  𝑓𝑘𝑔ℎ[𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑞0] > 0 for all 𝑞 ≤ 𝑞𝐹𝐵. That a unique interior 
solution exists follows from an argument very similar to the one used in case of the equilibrium 
variables (𝑘,̅ ℎ̅). 
  
139 
 
We next demonstrate that the equilibrium levels of land and capital are less than the first 
best level. Intuitively, this under-investment is because of two reasons. First, we have the 
standard argument that a firm does not internalise the consumers' surplus arising out of 
increased output. Second, and more interestingly, the presence of transaction costs creates a 
wedge between the social planner and the firm's incentives. 
 
Proposition 2 Let the marginal revenue function be elastic. There will under-investment 
in both land and capital relative to first best, i.e. ℎ𝐹𝐵 ≥ ℎ∗ and 𝑘𝐹𝐵 ≥ 𝑘∗ 
Remarks 1 and 2 below extend the analysis in different directions in an attempt to check 
for robustness. 
 
Remark 1 We then argue that such increased transactions costs can be traced to the 
fact that, with increased fragmentation following a ceiling legislation, all landowners realise 
that the job of acquiring land has become harder, increasing everyone's bargaining power. To 
that end we examine a scenario where the landowners bargain with the firm collectively. 
Consider a two stage game where, in stage 1, the firm and the landowners decide on the per 
unit price of land 𝐿(ℎ) using an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution where the bargaining 
power of the firm is 𝛽, 0 < 𝛽 < 1. Then, in stage 2, the firm decides on how much land and 
capital to invest in. It can be shown that that the first order conditions for the monopoly firm 
are:  
𝛽[𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑞)] − 𝑟 = 0, 
𝛽[𝑓(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)𝐷(𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑞)] − 𝑠 = 0 
Mimicking the preceding argument one can show that under the same restrictions, 
namely the `Hahn' condition, and the marginal revenue function being elastic, an increase in 
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the bargaining power of the landowners lead to lower profits for the firm, as well as lower 
capital and land.8 
 
Remark 2 We then extend the baseline framework to allow for Cournot competition 
among  n firms, 𝑛 ≥ 2, arguing that the comparative statics results are robust to this extension. 
Let (𝑘𝑖, ℎ𝑖) denote the amount of capital and land used by firm 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … . . , 𝑛}. Thus the i-th 
firm solves the following problem:  
 max
𝑘𝑖,ℎ𝑖
𝜋𝑖(𝑘1, … , 𝑘𝑛, ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑛) ≡ 𝐷(∑ 𝑓
𝑛
𝑗=1
(𝑘𝑗)𝑔(ℎ𝑖))𝑓(𝑘𝑖)𝑔(ℎ𝑖) − 𝑟𝑘𝑖 − 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖 (12) 
We shall focus on symmetric equilibria.9 Denoting the input vector of all the firms by 
(k,h), the first order conditions are therefore given by  
 𝜋𝑘 = 𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)𝐷(𝑛𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)) + 𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)𝐷′(𝑛𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ))] − 𝑟 = 0 (13) 
   
 𝜋ℎ = 𝑓(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)𝐷(𝑛𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)) + 𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)𝐷′(𝑛𝑓(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ))] − 𝑡𝑠 = 0 (14) 
We can mimic the earlier argument to show that whenever (a) 𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜋ℎℎ − 𝜋𝑘ℎ
2 > 0, ∀𝑘, ℎ, 
and  (b) the marginal revenue  function 𝑞𝐷(𝑛𝑞) is elastic, i.e.  
 𝐷(𝑛𝑞) = 3𝑛𝑞𝐷′(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑛2𝑞𝐷"(𝑛𝑞) > 0, (15) 
an exact analogue of Proposition 1 goes through. Thus, even in the presence of competition 
among firms, an increase in the transactions cost of land acquisition, i.e. t , reduces firm profits, 
with the effect being smaller in more fertile regions. Moreover, an increase in either t or s 
reduces the amount invested in both capital and land.10 
                                                          
8 The details are available with the authors. 
9 It is straightforward to argue that any equilibria must be symmetric. 
10 Note that 
𝜋𝑘𝑘 ≡ 𝑓𝑘𝑘(𝑘)𝑔(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑛𝑞)] + 𝑓𝑘
2(𝑘)𝑔2(ℎ)[(𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑛𝑞𝐷”(𝑛𝑞)], 
𝜋ℎℎ ≡ 𝑓(𝑘)𝑔ℎℎ(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′2(𝑘)𝑔ℎ
2(ℎ)[(𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑛𝑞𝐷”(𝑛𝑞)], 
𝜋𝑘ℎ ≡ 𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)[𝐷(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑞𝐷
′(𝑛𝑞)] + 𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)𝑞[(𝑛 + 1)𝐷
′(𝑛𝑞)) + 𝑛𝑞𝐷”(𝑛𝑞)], 
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4.4.1. Testable Hypotheses 
 
Several testable hypotheses follow from our theoretical model, in particular Proposition 1. 
1. H1: Imposition of ceiling legislations is likely to lower the level of capital, both overall and 
also after controlling for soil fertility. Such reductions are likely to be greater in areas with 
higher land fertility that faced stricter ceiling size. 
2. H2: Imposition of land ceiling, may slow down firm entry and may even lead to exit of firms, 
thus lowering the number of firms in the state. Further this effect is likely to be less in more 
fertile areas. 
3. H3: Industrialization is more likely in areas where land is not too fertile, after controlling for 
the bargaining power of the landowners. 
  We now take to the data to test the empirical validity of these hypotheses. 
 
4.5. Data 
 
We have compiled and processed the state-level data from a variety of sources. The 
primary data is collected for 16 major Indian states for a period of 25 years starting from 1960 
to 1985. This gives us a state-year panel data with 420 state-year observations. Appendix (Table 
E 2) summarises the variable definitions and data sources in our sample. 
The green dots in Figure E 1 (Appendix E) shows the distribution of listed firms' 
locations (as per Orbis data source) across the Indian states in 2012. Evidently, there is a high 
concentration of firms in the western states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and also some in and 
around Delhi/Haryana/Punjab. Generally, these are the states with arid to semi-arid land and 
                                                          
Note that the ‘Hahn’ condition ensures that 2𝐷′(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑛𝑞𝐷"(𝑛𝑞) < 0, whicn in turn implies that 
(𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑛𝑞𝐷"(𝑛𝑞) < 0 (since D’(q)<0), This in turn ensures that 𝜋𝑘𝑘 < 0 and  𝜋ℎℎ < 0. 
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turn out to be more industrialised states, thus motivating our study assessing  the observed 
pattern of industrialisation in terms the size of historical land ceiling legislations in India. We 
also use the state-level data for the period 1960-2015 to test the robustness of our baseline 
results using 1960-85 data.  
 
4.5.1 Land ceiling, land fragmentation and land acquisition for industries 
in India 
 
Land ceilings legislations attempt to create surplus land over and above the maximum 
ceiling, which is then redistributed among landless labourers, thus giving rise to land 
fragmentation and multiple small landholders. In order to get a given amount of land, an 
industrialist would therefore require to get consent from more landowners, especially in states 
with more fertile land and therefore restrictive land ceiling size. In other words, variation in the 
size of land ceilings across the Indian states, has a direct implication on the average size of 
cultivable land holdings. Figure 4. 1 illustrates this point that there is a positive relationship 
between size of land ceiling and the average size of cultivable landholding in our sample: the 
greater the ceiling size, the greater is the average cultivable size of landholding. Given that 
ceiling size varies inversely with soil fertility (by legislation), it means that states with more 
fertile land tend to have smaller average cultivable landholding. In other words, to acquire a 
given size of land, an industrialist needs to negotiate with more landowners in states with more 
fertile land because these states had lower ceiling size. The latter is likely to enhance the 
transaction costs of negotiation especially if some of them disagree, thus raising the total 
transaction costs of acquiring land in the states with lower land ceilings. Further Table 
E1(Appendix E) compares average cultivable land holding size in low ceiling states before and 
after 1971. We label a state as `low-ceiling' when the ceiling size in the state is below the 90th 
percentile value in the distribution of ceiling size in our sample. There is indeed some 
  
143 
 
confirmation that average cultivable landholding per household and that per person were 
significantly lower after the 1971 legislation in our sample. 
While the land market across India is not very active, Chakrabarty (2013) shows that 
urban land prices are significantly higher than the comparable incomes. Further there are 
striking inter-city differences: price per square foot of land is the highest in Mumbai, closely 
followed by Bangalore in the south and the capital city Delhi in the north of the country though 
the ranking in terms of per square feet price changes when we consider land price per acre. 
Singh (2016) computes the fundamental value of land for urban homes as the opportunity cost 
of land that could have been used in agriculture. Accordingly, he shows that the maximum 
fundamental value of land is much smaller than the market value of land as shown by 
Chakrabarty (2013) which is arguably consistent with the fact that, by and large, farmers have 
low incomes primarily derived from production of crops on land. Singh went on to argue that 
the fundamental value of land would then vary with agricultural productivity that determines 
the amount of crops produced on land, other things remaining unchanged. As such one can 
argue that the price per acre of agricultural land would vary with the land fertility. 
A major issue in acquiring productive land for industrial purposes pertains to the 
compensation to be paid to displaced land owners. This is where the scuffle between land 
owners and acquirer aggravates. While land owners believe they are being unfairly 
compensated, big industrialists aim to reduce their costs in arriving at an agreed compensation 
and often they have more bargaining power, especially when dealing with the small and 
marginal land owners. 
The compensation for the acquired land is generally based on the value of the 
agricultural land, which ignores the price increases and deprives the current owners. Secondly, 
if the prices are left for the market to determine, the small peasants could never influence the 
big corporate tycoons. Finally, it is mostly judiciary who has awarded higher compensation 
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than bureaucracy (Singh 2013). Public protests about unfair compensation schemes are 
common and further add to the costs as these protests also tend to delay transactions and start 
of production. 
The consequences of land acquisition in India are manifold - it may not only lead to 
landless-ness, joblessness, marginalisation of landowners with resultant effects on food 
insecurity, morbidity and mortality, but also stalled investments projects thus failing to generate 
expected employment opportunities. Till 2013, land acquisition in India was governed by Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894 which was later amended in 2013 and then again in 2015 that modified 
the consent clause and compensation policy. It requires a consent of 80 per cent of affected 
families in land acquisition for private companies and 70 per cent of affected families in land 
acquisition for public-private partnership projects11. Further Land bill 2015 has suggested that 
one member of the farmer family would get a job in exchange of the land for industrialisation. 
Nevertheless the process of land acquisition in India proves di¢ cult and unpopular. An 
important reason for this is that the amount reimbursed is fairly low with regard to the current 
index of prices prevailing in the economy. Further the government only considers the cases of 
‘direct displacement’ and do not consider others like fishermen, landless labourers and artisans 
and as such a disproportionately higher costs of land acquisition are borne by the poorest of the 
poor. A 2016 report by the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI), a global coalition of non-
profit organizations, and Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) suggests that capital 
investment worth 3% of GDP has been "stalled" in India due to land acquisition problems. 
Considering that the 2016 Indian GDP has been 2.264 trillion USD, a loss of 3% of Indian GDP 
is surely a very significant amount. Unfortunately, the government has not resorted to evidence-
based policy making in this respect which is absolute essential to resolve the deadlock in land 
                                                          
11 By virtue of the 1971 land ceiling legislations, the number of affected families would be much higher in states 
with greater soil fertility because these states faced lower ceiling size, which in turn meant that they had lower 
average size of cultivable land. 
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acquisition policy in India. The present paper is a first attempt, as far as we know, to provide 
some evidence in this respect. 
 
2.5.2. Empirical Model and Measurement of Key Variables 
 
In this section we develop our empirical strategy and also explain the construction of key 
variables with a view to test our hypotheses of interest. 
Our simple baseline regression for determining an outcome variable Y in the s-th state 
in t-th year takes the following form: 
 𝑌𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (16) 
 
Note that the definition of Y varies with the hypothesis of interest as explained below. 
Dependent variable for H1: We construct two measures of capital as follows First, we 
use fixed capital-output ratio as a proxy for investment in fixed capital at the state-level in a 
given year. Note that fixed capital refers to any fixed assets including property, plant and 
equipment which are not used up in the production (e.g., see Blomstrom et. al. (1993)) and we 
calculate fixed capital as a share of total value added. Fixed capital investments represent the 
acquisition and maintenance of long-term assets. A fixed capital investment can be tangible 
asset, such as a building, or an intangible asset, such as an intellectual property. We also 
consider share total capital as a ratio of total value added and consider this to be proxy for 
investment in total capital; note that total capital is the sum of fixed and working capital. 
Working capital refers to the deployment of financial resources in the day-to-day business 
operations. We particularly emphasize on the role of fixed capital for investment: it is that part 
of the new value added which is invested rather than consumed and will therefore contribute to 
future growth. The main source of the data is the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). 
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Within a panel data-framework, we can therefore trace the change in these two capital output 
ratios in a state over time. 
Dependent variable for H2: In the absence of information on firm entry/exit at the state-
level, we consider the available information on the number of factories registered under 
payment of wages act 1936 (factory) for testing this hypothesis. This information is available 
from Annual Survey of Industries and we estimate equation (22) for determining the natural 
logarithm of total number of registered factories to allow for possible non-linearity, if any, in 
the relationship between ceiling size and number of registered factories. 
Dependent variable for H3: We use the share of state manufacturing output in net state 
domestic product (nsdp) in a year as a possible measure of state industrialisation and label it as 
shnsdp. This data is available from India's national accounts. 
Key explanatory variable: Our key explanatory variable for testing H1 and H2 is the 
size of ceilings as laid by various land ceiling legislations as explained below. Size of Ceiling 
is the maximum area (in acres) of land that an individual can hold in a state . In this respect, we 
distinguish between ceiling size for more/less fertile land and also infertile land, as per the 
relevant land ceiling legislation. As argued above, the size of the ceiling is the lowest in states 
with most fertile land and since we aim to assess the adverse effect of low ceilings on corporate 
investment, we consider two possible ceilings size measures. Thus the variable 
MostFertileCeilings indicates the ceiling size on most fertile land as they are the lowest possible 
ceilings. We also experiment the robustness of our estimates using an alternative ceiling size 
variable labelled as AverageCeilings, which is the simple mean of ceiling sizes on most fertile 
land, less fertile land and dry /infertile land in a state in year t. Data come from the Department 
of Land Resource, Government of India (see Appendix Table E 1). By legislation ceiling size 
was driven by the share of food crop (as decided by the land user) and/or the soil quality.  As 
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such, both these ceiling measures are likely to be exogenous to determining Y for each of our 
hypotheses. 
 𝑌𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜎𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (17) 
 
For testing H3, we also need to include an additional control to reflect landowner's 
bargaining power. In general, landowners' bargaining power over land for industrialisation 
would be determined by the opportunity income from the land, which is usually the income 
from agriculture from the land. While we observe state domestic product from agriculture, it is 
likely to suffer from simultaneity bias while determining capital investment or industrialisation. 
Hence we look out for an exogenous proxy for landowners' bargaining power and in this respect 
we choose the percentage departure from average rainfall of the state; this variable is unlikely 
to be influenced either by the landowner or the state authority. The underlying idea is that 
rainfall shocks as measured by the percentage departure from average annual rainfall in the 
state would instill shocks in agricultural income; an adverse shock, drought or flood, is likely 
to lower landowner's bargaining power. We use the data at our disposal to verify hypothesis 
H3, after controlling for all other factors that may also influence the state's industrialisation 
rate. In each equation we also include a set of control variables X with a view to minimise the 
omitted variable bias of the estimates. These are: 
Log (state output): log of (Net State Domestic Product) available from the World Bank. 
This allows us to control for economic prosperity across the sample states. 
 
Population density: Population estimates are constructed using Population Census data 
(Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India). We 
construct population density as the ratio of total state-level population to geographic size of the 
state. This controls for the population pressure on land. 
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Percentage share of SC/ST Population: Scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) 
are constitutionally regarded as the backward castes in India who tend to be over-represented 
among the Indian poor. Traditionally they are less educated too. So the states with more SC/ST 
population shares could be major beneficiaries of the land redistribution programme while their 
predominance in a state may also indicate lower human capital status of the state which may 
discourage corporate investment. 
Percentage share of Urban to Rural population: In general more urbanised states are 
more industrialised and more developed with better human and physical infrastructure, thus 
may be better placed for attracting more corporate investment. 
Literacy rate: Total Literate/ total population *100. State-level literacy rate reflects the 
human capital of the state which is a major determinant of industrial investment/productivity. 
Soil fertility: ratio of net sown area to total land area in the state. We include this control 
to rule out the competing explanation that higher land prices for more fertile land may influence 
corporate investment.  
Labour militancy: Mandays lost in a state in a year due to strikes and other union 
activities; note that this information is only available for 1960-85 sample. 
Appendix Table E1 explains the source of information on each of these control 
variables. Further each specification also includes state and year dummies to account for the 
unobserved state and year-specific factors that may also influence Y. 
 
4.6. Empirical Findings 
 
4.6.1. Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
We first test if capital investment is lower in states with more restricted ceiling size.  
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In Table 4. 2 we consider the mean comparisons of investment in fixed and total capital 
shares before and after the introduction of the latest 1971 ceiling legislations for the states in 
the top 10th percentile and bottom 10th percentile in the distribution of average ceiling size -- 
large and small ceilings states, respectively. 
We find no significant mean difference in fixed and total capital per unit of output 
between states with small and large ceilings sizes before 1971. However, the mean difference 
in fixed and total capital per output between these two groups of states becomes significant after 
the implementation of the 1971 ceiling legislations. In particular, fixed and total capital shares 
are larger in the states with larger ceiling size in our sample. In other words, these mean 
comparisons confirm a positive relationship between average ceiling size and capital-output 
ratios, but only in the post-1971 years. 
Using the state-level panel data for 16 major Indian states from 1960 to 1985, we then 
assess the effect of land ceiling size on fixed and total capital-output ratios. In doing so, we also 
control for various observable economic variables, unobservable state-level factors, and also 
time trends that may influence capital investment shares in our sample (see discussion in the 
previous section). Estimates of capital-output ratios (fixed and total) are summarised in Table 
4. 3. We use two alternative ceiling size variables in alternative specifications for determining 
fixed (see columns 1 and 3) and total capital ratios (see columns 2 and 4); these are ceiling size 
on most fertile land and average ceiling size.  These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, there 
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the ceiling size on the most fertile 
land and capital-output ratios. Evidently, both fixed and total capital-output ratios increase 
significantly when ceiling size increases in our sample. This result is more pronounced when 
we use the ceiling size on most fertile land which is more restrictive than the average ceiling 
size variable. Accordingly, we conclude that controlling for other factors, states with low fertile-
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land ceilings tend to have lower investment in capital (both fixed and total) than those with high 
ceilings for fertile land.  
 
4.6.2 Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 pertains to the effect of ceiling size on firm entry/exit. In the absence of 
direct information on firm entry/exit, we consider the available information on the number of 
factories registered under payment of wages act 1936 (factory). As per hypothesis 2, the number 
of registered factories would be less in states with more stringent ceilings that may slow down 
firm entry or induce firm exit. 
Figure 4. 2 shows the Epanechnikov kernel fit between ceiling size(average or that on 
most fertile land) and number of registered factories in our sample. It does appear that the 
number of factories increases as the ceiling size increases irrespective of whether we consider 
the ceiling size on most fertile land or the average ceiling size on any land in the state though 
the effect is more pronounced on average ceiling size. 
Further columns (1)-(2) of Table 4. 4 summarise the ols estimates of the effect of ceiling 
size on the log(number of registered factories) controlling for other factors as in Table 4. 3. 
Note that the estimated coefficients of both ceiling variables are positive and statistically 
significant in columns (1) and (2). In other words, there is confirmation that smaller ceiling size 
is associated with smaller number of registered factories in the state, controlling for all other 
factors that may have influenced the number of registered factories. These regression estimates 
therefore support the observations from Figure 4. 2 above, confirming the validity of H2 in our 
sample. 
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4.6.3 Test of Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 argues that industrialization is more likely to happen in areas where land 
is not too fertile, after controlling for the bargaining power of the landowners. We use share of 
state manufacturing output in net state domestic product (nsdp) as a possible measure of state 
industrialisation rate and label it as shnsdp and relate it to the soil fertility measure. We include 
state's rainfall shocks as a proxy for bargaining power of the landlords.  
As before, we start with the non-parametric kernel fit between soil fertility and share of 
share of state manufacturing output shown on the left panel of Figure 4.3. Irrespective of some 
fluctuations, this highlights a positive relationship between the two variables, suggesting that 
states with higher ceiling size (and therefore lower soil fertility) are associated with higher 
industrialisation though the relations appears somewhat non-linear. 
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 4. 5 then show the estimates of the multiple regression 
coefficients to assess the effect of soil fertility on the index of industrialisation in our sample, 
after controlling for rainfall shocks and all other factors that we control in Tables 4. 3 and 4. 4 
as well.  Column (1) uses the ceiling on most fertile land while column (2) uses the alternative 
average ceilings variable; column (3) drops the ceiling variable. While none of the ceiling size 
variables is statistically significant in any of these regressions, the estimated coefficient of the 
soil fertility variable is negative in all columns, and statistically significant although only at 
10\% level. In other words, it confirms H3 that states with higher soil fertility tend to have lower 
share of industrial output in our sample, controlling for all other factors. 
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4.6.4 Long-run effects of land ceiling legislations 
 
Finally in this section we update the baseline state-level panel data1960-85 to 1960-
2015 with a view to assess the long-run effects of land ceilings on capital investment and 
industrialisation rate in Indian states. These results are summarised in Table 4. 6. Columns (1)-
(4) show tests of H1 respectively using fixed and total capital ratios. Column (5) shows the 
corresponding results for H2 while columns (6) shows that for H3. The dependent variable in 
column (5) is the natural logarithm of total number of registered factories in the state while it 
is the share of net state domestic product from manufacturing (in total net state domestic 
product) in columns (6). Controlling for all other factors, the size of ceiling (on most fertile 
land) variable remains insignificant in columns (1) and (3). However it turns out to be 
significant when we replace the ceiling size variable by a binary variable indicating if ceiling 
size is greater than its median value. In particular, estimates from columns (2) and (4) indicate 
that shares of fixed and total capital are higher (lower) only when the ceiling size is greater 
(less) than its median value. This provides some confirmation of H1 in this extended sample 
too. Likewise we get confirmation of H2 from columns (5) and that of H3 from columns (6). In 
particular, column (5) estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, number of registered factories 
increases (decreases) with increase (decrease) in the size of ceiling on most fertile land. Further 
column (6) estimates imply that controlling for land owners' bargaining power (proxied by 
states' rainfall shock), an increase in soil fertility is associated with a drop in the state's share of 
net state domestic product from manufacturing. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
 
Access to industrial land and land acquisition for new factories and physical 
infrastructure has become a major economic and political issue in India's densely populated 
economy where the tussle between farmers, industrialists, and governments has often become 
a politically explosive issue. Despite recent government attempts to amend the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894 in 2013 and then again in 2015, there is no resolution; the process of 
land acquisition in India continues to be difficult and costly not only for the industrialists, but 
also for the landowners and other poor (e.g., fishermen, landless labourers, artisans) relying on 
earnings from land. Because of dearth of the relevant data, there is very little empirical evidence 
that can guide policies. The present paper identifies an exogenously given causal factor, namely, 
land ceiling legislations of the 1960s and 1970s to explain the variation in investment in 
corporate capital, number of factories as well as industrialisation across the Indian states with 
varying soil fertility. An important implication of our results is that a national policy of land 
acquisition as laid down in the recent Land Bill (2013, 2015) is unlikely to work. Instead, results 
from the present study point towards a local rather than a national policy, that needs to take 
account of the diversity in soil quality to resolve the land conflicts more efficiently and may 
help minimising the costs to farmers and industrialists alike. 
 
 
. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) To begin with we consider the effect of an increase in transactions 
costs t on firm profits. Using the envelope theorem we find that 
 
𝑑𝜋(?̅?(𝑡), ℎ̅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝜕𝜋(?̅?(𝑡), ℎ̅(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
= (18) 
Moreover , from (18), an increase in s lowers this effect, i.e.  
 
𝑑2𝜋(?̅?(𝑡), ℎ̅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑠
= −ℎ < 0 (19) 
 
(b) We begin by analysing the effects of a change in t on (?̅?, ℎ̅). Totally differentiating (4) and 
(5) with respect to k; h and t we have that 
 𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑘 + 𝜋𝑘ℎ𝑑ℎ = 0, (20) 
   
 𝜋𝑘ℎ𝑑𝑘 + 𝜋ℎℎ𝑑ℎ = 𝑠𝑑𝑡, (21) 
 
So that from Cramer’s rule  
 
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑠𝜋𝑘ℎ
𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜋ℎℎ − 𝜋𝑘ℎ𝜋𝑘ℎ
 (22) 
   
 
𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑠𝜋𝑘𝑘
𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜋ℎℎ − 𝜋𝑘ℎ𝜋𝑘ℎ
 (23) 
 
Recall that 𝜋𝑘𝑘 < 0, so that 
𝑑ℎ
𝑑𝑡
< 0 
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Further, it is straightforward to check that 
𝜋𝑘ℎ = 𝑓𝑘(𝑘)𝑔ℎ(ℎ)[𝑅
′(𝑞) + 𝑞𝑅"(𝑞)], 
Which is positive whenever −
𝑅′(𝑞)/?̅?̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑅′′(?̅?)
> 1 
The argument in case there is a change in s of course mimics that for t. 
Proof of Proposition P3. We proceed diagrammatically. Given that 𝑊𝑘𝑘, 𝑊ℎℎ < 0 and 𝑊𝑘ℎ >
0, the graph of (10) and (11) are positively sloped in the (k, h) space (see Figure 4. 1). 
Moreover, the second order condition that 𝑊𝑘𝑘𝑊ℎℎ−𝑊𝑘ℎ
2 > 0, implies that the graph of (11) 
has a steeper slope compared to that of (10) in the (k, h) space. Moreover, given that marginal 
revenue is less than demand, the graph of (10) lies above that of (4) and the graph of (11) lies 
to the right of that of (5). 
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Tables 4 
 
 
Table 4.1. Mean comparisons of average cultivable landholding in low ceiling states 
before and after 1971 ceiling law for those below 90th percentile 1960-85 
 States with small ceilings (p90=0)  t-statistics 
 Before 1971 After 1971  
 State-level data 
Average cultivable 
landholding per 
household (acres) 
0.035 0.028 2.2339** 
Average cultivable 
landholding per 
person (acres) 
1.35*10-9 8.34*10-10 5.6410*** 
Note: The table compares average cultivable land holding (per household and per person) 
before and after the 1971 ceiling law in low ceiling states, i.e., when the ceiling size is below 
the 90th percentile value. 
 
 
 
Table 4. 2. Mean comparisons of the capital shares before and after 1971 ceiling law, 
1960-85  
 
The table compares means of capital shares (both fixed and total) in low and high ceiling 
states before and after 1971 ceiling law. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Before 1971 
Large ceilings  
(top 10th percentile) 
Small ceilings  
(bottom 10th 
percentile) 
Difference- t-
statistics 
Fixed capital share 2.09 2.14 0.2010 
Total capital share 2.09 2.15 0.2045 
    
After 1971    
Fixed capital share 2.17 1.62 2.4314** 
Total capital share 2.17 1.63 2.4304** 
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Table 4.3. Test of H1 - Effect of ceiling size on investment in fixed and total capital-output 
ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Fixed capital-
output ratio 
Total capital-
output ratio 
Fixed capital-
output ratio 
Total capital-
output ratio 
     
Ceiling size on the most 
fertile land 
0.0660*** 
(0.0186) 
0.0596*** 
(0.0175) 
  
     
Average ceiling size 
  0.00933* 
(0.00521) 
0.00147 
(0.00510) 
     
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 368 368 368 368 
R-squared 0.206 0.229 0.189 0.211 
Notes: (i) Other control variables include log(state domestic product), population density, 
share of population of scheduled castes and tribes, share of urban population, literacy rate, 
soil fertility, natural logarithm of man days lost due to strikes, and a constant. (ii) Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. (iii) *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.4. Test of H2: Effect of ceiling size on number of factories  
 (1) log(no of 
registered 
factory) 
(2) log(no of 
registered 
factory) 
VARIABLES   
   
Ceiling size most fertile 0.115**  
 (0.0395)  
Average ceiling size  0.0333** 
  (0.0114) 
Constant 4.067*** 5.474*** 
 (1.370) (1.026) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 343 343 
R-squared 0.880 0.868 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: (i) Other controls include log(state domestic product), population density, share of 
population of scheduled castes and tribes, share of urban population, literacy rate, soil fertility, 
natural logarithm of man days lost due to strikes. (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(iii) *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.5: Test of H3: Estimates of share of manufacturing output 
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Shnsdp shnsdp shnsdp 
       
Soil fertility -0.7554** -0.6688*** -0.6403*** 
 (0.277) (0.137) (0.094) 
Most fertile ceiling 0.0021   
 (0.004)   
Average ceilings  0.0002  
  (0.001)  
Rainfall shock -0.0033 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Constant -0.2047 -0.2375 -0.2611* 
 (0.173) (0.189) (0.148) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 347 347 347 
R-squared 0.794 0.791 0.791 
Notes: (i) Other controls include log(state domestic product), population density, share of 
population of scheduled castes and tribes, share of urban population, literacy rate. (ii) 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.6. Robustness tests using 1960-2015 state-level data 
Hypotheses H1  H1  H2 H3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
 
Fixed 
capital 
Fixed 
capital 
Total 
capital 
Total 
capital Ln( factories) 
Industrialisation 
rt 
Most fertile 
ceilings -0.3414  -0.4217  0.3993*** 0.0199 
 (0.331)  (0.345)  (0.080) (0.0135) 
Soil fertility -5.6027 -5.6027 -12.3448 -12.3448 
-1.4212 
(1.979) 
 
-2.746** 
 (11.006) (11.006) (10.684) (10.684)  (1.153) 
Most fertile 
ceilings> 
Median  1.5791***  1.7621***   
  (0.499)  (0.499)   
Rainfall shock      -0.0418** 
      (0.0163) 
Constant 8.0449 3.2653*** 10.1395* 4.2362*** 2.9333* 0.755*** 
 (5.546) (1.007) (5.777) (1.110) (1.409) (0.192) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 595 595 595 595 621 443 
R-square 0.436 0.436 0.474 0.474 0.964 0.912 
Other controls include log(state domestic product), population density, urban population share, 
SC/ST population share, literacy rate. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05 
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Figures : 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Effect of ceiling size on average cultivable land 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effect of average ceiling size on number of 
factories registered 1960-85 
 
 
Effect of ceiling size (on most fertile land) 
on number of factories registered 1960-85 
 
Figure 4. 2 Effect of ceiling size on number of factories 
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Figure 4. 3 Epanechnikov kernel fit between soil fertility and industrialisation 
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Appendix E 
Table E1. Size of ceilings (in Acres) as levied by different Indian states based on the 
quality/fertility of the land 
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Table E2, Panel 1: Summary Statistics, 1960-85. 
Variables Observation Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependant Variable : Fixed Capital share 416 1.773 0.892 
Dependant Variable : Total Capital share  416 3.007  0.937  
Dependant Variable : log(no of factories) 377 7.6609 1.0524 
Dependant Variable : share of manufacturing sdp 402 0.1330 0.0566 
    
Key explanatory Variables        
Size Of Ceilings (in acres)     
Land irrigated with two crops i.e. Most fertile Land 416 15.1875 2.726818 
Average ceiling size 416 27.3125 9.9425 
    
Controls 
   
Log(state Output) 404 12.3842 1.0398 
Population density 411 558.22 343.47 
Literacy rate % 372 62.16591 8.0026 
Share (ST/SC) pop. 411 0.2147 0.0817 
Share (Urban/Rural) Pop. 410 0.2006 0.0733 
Log (Labour Militancy)   405  12.7444  1.9909  
SD of average annual rainfall 389 97.0472 50.2232 
 
Table E2, Panel 2: Summary Statistics 1960-2015 
 
Variables Observation Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependant Variable : Fixed Capital share 636 2.943 2.048 
Dependant Variable : Total Capital share 636 3.867 2.253 
Dependant Variable : log(no of factories) 658 8.444 1.038 
Dependant Variable : share of manufacturing sdp 636 0.1357 0.0567  
    
Key explanatory Variables     
Size Of Ceilings (in acres)     
Land irrigated with two crops i.e. Most fertile Land 896 15.187 2.722 
Average ceiling size 896 25.25 11.795 
    
Controls    
Log(state Output) 892 14.068 2.031 
Population density 896 631.96 1340.48 
Literacy rate % 840 60.31 30.263 
Share (ST/SC) pop 896 0.24 0.088 
Share (Urban/Rural) Pop. 892 0.127 0.150 
Soil fertility  885 0.055 0.033 
SD of average annual rainfall 896 20.779 6.429 
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Table E3: IPS Unit root tests of regression variables 
 
 
The following table reports the IPS T statistics to test for the existence of unit root for each of the 
regression variables.  This table is included in Appendix D as Table D2 and the discussion Section 4.4 
(Empirical strategy)  
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     16 
Ha: Some panels are stationary 
 
Variable  T-statistic  p-value 
Dependant Variable :   
Share fixed capital  -2.0248 0.0254 
Share total capital  -2.2068 0.0054 
Independent Variables : 
Size Of Ceilings (in acres) 
  
Most Fertile Land Ceilings -70.3450         0.0001 
Average Ceilings -68.3320       0.0000 
Given that the T-statistics for all the variables are greater than the corresponding critical t-statistics for 
at least 5% level of significance, we can reject the null hypothesis of unit root in each case. Hence, we 
conclude that our dependent and independent variable are stationary. 
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Chapter 5: Concluding comments 
5.1. Significance/motivation of the study 
The thesis explores the role of corporate governance and regulations to study the impact of 
increased disclosure, excessive executive compensation and regulations governing land 
acquisition for industries on firm financing, investment and performance that determines the 
path to industrialisation and future growth of an economy. In this respect we consider India and 
the UK as two possible case studies: while Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 focus on the India, Chapter 
3 consider the case of the UK.  
One-hundred percent compliance with the corporate governance principles has not been 
achieved anywhere in the world. But the most developed countries, particularly those that are 
part of the Anglo-American legal family, e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong, Canada, have come the closest to full compliance. In contrast, despite ongoing reforms 
and some progress, investors and creditors are encountering problems of lack of transparency 
and disclosure, weak protection of minority shareholders or weak creditor rights in many 
emerging countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey. 
Our analyses of India and UK thus highlight the similarities and dis-similarities in the 
implementation of regulatory reforms that shape their success/failure, with implications for 
further policies.    
The unifying theme of these empirical chapters is to resolve the simultaneity between the 
key outcome variables of interest and one of the key explanatory variables and our approach 
has been to make use of various regulatory reforms introduced by the government thus allowing 
us to exploit the exogenous variation in the reform to identify the causal impact on selected 
outcome variables. In particular, I study the impact of Clause 49 that strengthened disclosure 
of listed Indian firms on capital structure, DRR 2013 that required disclosing executive 
compensations in the UK on capital structure and firm performance and also that of historical 
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land ceiling legislations in India that made ceiling size a function of soil fertility on investment 
in fixed and total capital. This allows us to assess the implementation, benefits and/ or the 
adverse effect, if any, of these regulations cleanly which in turn aid future policy amendments. 
 
5.2. Key findings 
 
In Chapter 2, I examined the effects of increased disclosure on corporate capital structure, using 
the 2002 introduction of Clause 49 on selection measures of capital structure of domestically 
listed (vis-à-vis crosslisted) Indian firms. The central hypotheses is that equity financing is 
likely to increase while debt financing is likely to decrease after the introduction of Clause49 
which in turn is likely to lower financial leverage of listed firms. We also hypothesize that the 
reform is likely to enhance the relative attractiveness of public as opposed to private debt. We 
argue the reform strengthened investor’s protection and reduced asymmetric information 
between managers and investors in the post-regulation years. Results suggest that the 
introduction and completion of Clause 49 has led to a greater (lower) reliance on equity (debt) 
and also a reduction in reliance on bank loans among domestic listed (relative to cross-listed) 
Indian firms in our sample and these effects are more pronounced when we consider the 
completion rather than the introduction of the reform. The Chapter also identifies heterogeneous 
impact of the reform among firms belonging to the business groups with access to internal 
capital market, larger firms and also those located in pro-business (as opposed to pro-worker) 
states; the latter highlights the possible role of supporting regulations guiding land as well as 
labour use in the Indian states. The fact that the impact of the reform varies across different 
subsamples of firms considered has important implications for policy makers in their bid to 
improving the effectiveness of Clause 49 among all. 
Chapter 3 aimed at examining the effects of executive compensation on corporate 
capital structure and performance. In doing so, I use the of Director’s Remuneration Regulation 
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(DRR) 2013 as a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of executive compensation on 
corporate capital structure in the UK. The DRR2013 aimed at enhancing information disclosure 
available to investors regarding executive pay over and above imposing a requirement for the 
board to seek approval from the shareholders in form of a binding vote. We hypothesize that 
different components of the pay package may affect firms’ reliance on debt/equity and firm 
performance differently. While Greater share of equity compensation ratio is likely to lower 
firm’s reliance on debt and improve firm performance, greater share of bonus in executive 
compensation is likely to boost firm’s reliance on debt rather than equity and is likely to have 
an ambiguous effect on firm performance depending on whether the positive incentive effect is 
greater than, equal to or less than the negative disincentive effects. Results from our analysis 
suggests that a) both equity based compensation and bonuses continue to increase significantly 
among the treated domestic listed firms in the post DRR2013 period; this is compatible with 
lack of shareholders’ activism against executive compensation and the DRR2013 fails to curtail 
executive pay- – less than 10% votes were cast against in 2015-16 (see Appendix C); b) an 
increase in equity compensation share decreases firm’s reliance on debt and improves firm 
performance while an increase in bonus compensation share leads to an increase in reliance on 
debt but doesn’t seem to have a significant effect on performance.( c) Results (a) and (b) hold 
even after we account for executive emotional biases. We argue that the latter can be attributed 
to the disclosure of the executive compensation that informs company creditors, which in turn 
strengthens the validity of debt-agency theory in this respect. In other words, the DRR 2013 
was not effective to restrain increases in executive equity compensation shares, greater equity 
share has indirectly lowered (increased) treated firms’ reliance on debt (equity) and to that 
extent it is boosted firm performance in our sample. However, the bonuses kept increasing even 
after the reform which in turn encouraged excessive risk taking by managers.  
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Finally, Chapter 4 examines the impact of historical land ceiling legislations on corporate 
investment in fixed and total capital. In general the land ceiling size was lower (higher) in states 
with more fertile land, especially after the 1971 legislations. Among others, we hypothesise that 
higher (lower) the size of ceiling on most fertile land (in acres) in a state, higher (lower) is the 
level of corporate investment, keeping the size and fertility of land unchanged. The argument 
here is that the transaction costs of acquiring land for industries as well as the land price 
premium increases after the implementation of the land ceilings as it gives rise to smaller land 
holdings. Results suggest that restricted land ceiling size tends to significantly lower investment 
in fixed and total capital shares. These results seem to persist over the long run 1996-2012 in 
our firm-level panel data for investment in share fixed capital.  Further analysis highlights that 
the adverse ceiling effect on capital investment, especially for fixed capital, tends to be more 
pertinent when firms are more land intensive (relative to industry level land intensity). While 
land ceiling legislations were historical reforms which took place mainly in the 70’s, with 
redistribution as its aim, these results highlight an unintended consequence of land ceilings on 
corporate investment in capital in our sample. While it not possible to undo the adverse effects 
of the reform, lower investment leads to lower economic growth and this necessitate a closer 
scrutiny for future policy development. In particular, we recommend a state-specific land 
acquisition policy rather than a national one (e.g., see 2013 Land Acquisition Act) that 
disregards the legacy of the historical land ceiling legislations causing important inter-state 
variations in this respect.   
 
5.3. Limitations of the Study  
 
While we try our best to build robust empirical framework to derive robust results with 
implications for future policies, certain limitations remain. One of the common limitations with 
studies involving emerging economies is the lack of available and/or reliable data, which not 
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only reduces the sample size when there are missing values but in some cases make it difficult 
to test the robustness of the results. For instance, in Chapter 2, I tried to test our second 
hypothesis, i.e.,  the reform increases the relative attractiveness of public (as opposed to 
private) debt,  on a sub-sample of firms belonging to business groups; however, I had no 
information or proxy to measure their internal source of financing. It would have been 
informative to study the effects of the Clause 49, on this sub-sample of firms comprising 
business group firms, if I had access to this information for the business group affiliated firms. 
This data inadequacy calls for future research in this respect. Another data limitation in this 
chapter is that it was impossible to observe the adoption of all different components of the 
reform year by year. Hence, we examined the aspects of the reform for 2014 (when the reform 
was officially completed) and were only able to observe firms abiding parts of the reform (see 
discussion in section 2.2.2 on the implementation of the Clause 49).   
Likewise, our analysis of the effects of land ceiling legislations on corporate investment 
has been limited by the paucity of the annual state-level data on all relevant variables beyond 
1992. As a result, I considered a panel of firm-level data for the more recent years 1996-2012. 
Further, comparable firm-level data was not available prior to 1996 – so we could not generate 
a longer firm-level data either.  
For chapter 3 the initial plan was to carry out a regression discontinuity framework 
based on shareholders’ voting against the remuneration committee proposal and its causal effect 
on corporate capital structure/performance. However we could not continue with this empirical 
strategy because there was not enough firms voting above/below the 50% cut-off to win the 
majority. Shareholders in very few firms voted against and the percentage of vote was below 
10 (see discussion in Appendix C).  
 
Another possible limitation as well as novelty of the research is the lack of prior research 
studies on the effects of bonuses in Chapter 3. Most existing studies focus on either total 
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compensation or equity compensation. The importance of bonus compensation relative to other 
forms of compensation and total compensation remains rather unexplored. Recent research 
suggests that incentives related to bonus compensation are small relative to equity-related 
incentives (Core et al., 2003). While we acknowledge that bonus compensation may not be the 
largest component of compensation, it does play a significant role in management control 
systems by linking compensation policies to strategic objectives [Indjejikian and Nanda, 
(2002); Ittner et al., (1997); Murphy, (1999)] and it seems to hold in our sample. However there 
is paucity of empirical studies critically explaining the persistence of bonus culture which is 
beyond the scope of the current study.  
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